By Rev. Charles G. Finney
THE NOTION OF INABILITY--PROPER METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR IT.
I have represented ability or the freedom of the will as a first-truth of reason. I have also defined first-truths of reason to be those truths that are necessarily known to all moral agents. From these two representations the inquiry may naturally arise, how then is it to be accounted for that so many men have denied the liberty of the will or ability to obey God? That these first-truths of reason are frequently denied is a notorious fact. A recent writer thinks this denial a sufficient refutation of the affirmation that ability is a first-truth of reason. It is important that this denial should be accounted for. That mankind affirm their obligation upon the real though often latent and unperceived assumption of ability, there is no reasonable ground of doubt. I have said that first-truths of reason are frequently assumed and certainly known without being often the direct object of thought or attention; and also that these truths are universally held in the practical judgments of men while they sometimes in theory deny them. They know them to be true and in all their practical judgments assume their truth while they reason against them, think they prove them untrue, and not unfrequently affirm that they are conscious of an opposite affirmation. For example, men have denied, in theory, the law of causality, while they have at every moment of their lives acted upon the assumption of its truth. Others have denied the freedom of the will, who have every hour of their lives assumed and acted and judged upon the assumption that the will is free. The same is true of ability, which, in respect to the commandments of God, is identical with freedom. Men have often denied the ability of man to obey the commandments of God while they have always in their practical judgments of themselves and of others assumed their ability in respect to those things that are really commanded by God. Now, how is this to be accounted for?
1. Multitudes have denied the freedom of the will, because they have loosely confounded the will with the involuntary powers--with the intellect and the sensibility. Locke, as is well known, regarded the mind as possessing but two primary faculties, the understanding and the will. President Edwards, as was said in a former lecture, followed Locke, and regarded all the states of the sensibility as acts of the will. Multitudes, nay the great mass of Calvinistic divines, with their hearers, have held the same views. This confounding of the sensibility with the will has been common for a long time. Now every body is conscious that the states of the sensibility or mere feelings cannot be produced or changed by a direct effort to feel thus or thus. Every body knows from consciousness that the feelings come and go, wax and wane, as motives are presented to excite them. And they know also that these feelings are under the law of necessity and not of liberty; that is, that necessity is an attribute of these feelings in such a sense, that under the circumstances, they will exist in spite of ourselves, and that they can not be controlled by a direct effort to control them. Every body knows that our feelings or the states of our sensibility can be controlled only indirectly, that is, by the direction of our thoughts. By directing our thoughts to an object calculated to excite certain feelings, we know that when the excitability is not exhausted, feelings correlated to that object will come into play of course and of necessity. So when any class of feelings exist, we all know that by diverting the attention from the object that excites them, they subside of course, and give place to a class correlated to the new object that at present occupies the attention. Now it is very manifest how the freedom of the will has come to be denied by those who confound the will proper with the sensibility. These same persons have always known and assumed that the actions of the will proper were free. Their error has consisted in not distinguishing in theory between the action of the proper will and the involuntary states of the sensibility. In their practical judgments, and in their conduct, they have recognized the distinction which they have failed to recognize in their speculations and theories. They have every hour been exerting their own freedom, have been controlling directly their attention and their outward life by the exercise of the freedom of their proper will. They have also, by the free exercise of the same faculty, been indirectly controlling the states of their sensibility. They have all along assumed the absolute freedom of the will proper, and have always acted upon the assumption, or they would not have acted at all or even attempted to act. But since they did not in theory distinguish between the sensibility and the will proper, they denied in theory the freedom of the will. If the actions of the will be confounded with desires and emotions, as President Edwards confounded them, and as has been common, the result must be a theoretical denial of the freedom of the will. In this way we are to account for the doctrine of inability as it has been generally held. It has not been clearly understood that moral law legislates directly, and, with strict propriety of speech, only over the will proper, and over the involuntary powers only indirectly through the will. It has been common to regard the law and the gospel of God as directly extending their claims to the involuntary powers and states of mind; and as was shown in a former lecture, many have regarded, in theory, the law as extending its claims to those states that lie wholly beyond either the direct or indirect control of the will. Now of course, with these views of the claims of God, ability is and must be denied. I trust we have seen in past lectures, that, strictly and properly speaking, the moral law restricts its claims to the actions of the will proper, in such a sense that if there be a willing mind, it is accepted as obedience; that the moral law and the lawgiver legislate over involuntary states only indirectly, that is, through the will; and that the whole of virtue, strictly speaking, consists in good will or disinterested benevolence. Sane minds never practically deny or can deny the freedom of the will proper, or the doctrine of ability, when they make the proper discriminations between the will and the sensibility, and properly regard moral law as legislating directly only over the will. It is worthy of all consideration that those who have denied ability have almost always confounded the will and the sensibility; and that those who have denied ability have always extended the claims of moral law beyond the pale of proper voluntariness; and many of them even beyond the limits of either the direct or the indirect control of the will.
But the inquiry may arise, how it comes to pass that men have so extensively entertained the impression that the moral law legislates directly over those feelings and over those states of mind which they know to be involuntary? I answer that this mistake has arisen out of a want of just discrimination between the direct and indirect legislation of the law and of the law-giver. It is true that men are conscious of being responsible for their feelings and for their outward actions, and even for their thoughts. And it is really true that they are responsible for them in so far forth as they are under either the direct or indirect control of the will. And they know that these acts and states of mind are possible to them, that is, that they have an indirect ability to produce them. They however loosely confound the direct and indirect ability and responsibility. The thing required by the law directly and presently is benevolence or good will. This is what and all that the law strictly presently or directly requires. It indirectly requires all those outward and inward acts and states that are connected directly and indirectly with this required act of will by a law of necessity; that is, that those acts and states should follow as soon as by a natural and necessary law they will follow from a right action of the will. When these feelings and states and acts do not exist, they blame themselves generally with propriety, because the absence of them is in fact owing to a want of the required act of the will. Sometimes, no doubt, they blame themselves unjustly, not considering that although the will is right, of which they are conscious, the involuntary state or act does not follow because of exhaustion, or because of some disturbance in the established and natural connection between the acts of the will and its ordinary sequents. When this exhaustion or disturbance exists, men are apt, loosely and unjustly, to write bitter things against themselves. They often do the same in hours of temptation when Satan casts his fiery darts at them, lodging them in the thoughts and involuntary feelings. The will repels them, but they take effect, for the time being, in spite of himself in the intellect and sensibility; blasphemous thoughts are suggested to the mind, unkind thoughts of God are suggested, and in spite of one's self, these abominable thoughts awaken their correlated feelings. The will abhors them and struggles to suppress them, but for the time being, finds itself unable to do any thing more than to fight and resist.
Now it is very common for souls in this state to write the most bitter accusations against themselves. But should it be hence inferred that they really are as much in fault as they assume themselves to be? No, indeed. But why do ministers, of all schools, unite in telling such tempted souls, You are mistaken, my dear brother or sister, these thoughts and feelings, though exercises of your own mind, are not yours in such a sense that you are responsible for them. The thoughts are suggested by Satan, and the feelings are a necessary consequence. Your will resists them, and this proves that you are unable, for the time being, to avoid them. You are, therefore, not responsible for them while you resist them with all the power of your will, any more than you would be guilty of murder should a giant overpower your strength and use your hand against your will to shoot a man. In such cases, it is, so far as I know, universally true that all schools admit that the tempted soul is not responsible or guilty for those things which it can not help. The inability is here allowed to be a bar to obligation; and such souls are justly told by ministers, You are mistaken in supposing yourself guilty in this case. The like mistake is fallen into when a soul blames itself for any state of mind whatever that lies wholly and truly beyond the direct or indirect control of the will, and for the same reason inability in both cases is alike a bar to obligation. It is just as absurd in the one case as in the other to infer real responsibility from a feeling or persuasion of responsibility. To hold that men are always responsible because they loosely think themselves to be so, is absurd. In cases of temptation such as that just supposed, as soon as the attention is directed to the fact of inability to avoid those thoughts and feelings, and the mind is conscious of the will's resisting them and of being unable to banish them, it readily rests in the assurance that it is not responsible for them. Its own irresponsibility in such cases appears self-evident to the mind the moment the proper inability is considered, and the affirmation of irresponsibility attended to. Now if the soul naturally and truly regarded itself as responsible when there is a proper inability and impossibility, the instructions above referred to could not relieve the mind. It would say, To be sure I know that I can not avoid having these thoughts and feelings, any more than I can cease to be the subject of consciousness, yet I know I am responsible, notwithstanding. These thoughts and feelings are states of my own mind and no matter how I come by them or whether I can control or prevent them or not. Inability, you know is no bar to obligation; therefore my obligation and my guilt remain. Wo is me, for I am undone. The idea, then, of responsibility when there is in fact real inability is a prejudice of education, a mistake.
The mistake, unless strong prejudice of education has taken possession of the mind, lies in overlooking the fact of a real and proper inability. Unless the judgment has been strongly biased by education, it never judges itself bound to perform impossibilities nor even conceive of such a thing, who ever held himself bound to undo what is past, to recall past time or to substitute holy acts and states of mind in the place of past sinful ones? No one ever held himself bound to do this; first, because he knows it to be impossible, and secondly, because no one that I have heard of ever taught or asserted any such obligation; and therefore none have received so strong a bias from education as loosely to hold such an opinion. But sometimes the bias of education is so great that the subjects of it seem capable of believing almost any thing, however inconsistent with the intuitions of the reason and consequently in the face of the most certain knowledge. For example, President Edwards relates of a young woman in his congregation that she was deeply convicted of being guilty for Adam's first sin, and deeply repented of it. Now suppose that this and like cases should be regarded as conclusive proof that men are guilty of that sin, and deserve the wrath and curse of God forever for that sin; and that all men will suffer the pains of hell forever, except they become convinced of their personal guilt for that sin, and repent of it as in dust and ashes! President Edward's teaching on the subject of the relation of all men to Adam's first sin, it is well known, was calculated in a degree to pervert the judgment upon that subject; and this sufficiently accounts for the fact above alluded to. But apart from education, no human being ever held himself responsible for or guilty of the first or any other sin of Adam or of any other being, who existed and died before he himself existed. The reason is that all moral agents naturally know that inability or a proper impossibility is a bar to moral obligation and responsibility; and they never conceive to the contrary unless biased by a mystifying education that casts a fog over their primitive and constitutional convictions.
2. Some have denied ability because they have strangely held that the moral law requires sinners to be just in all respects what they might have been had they never sinned. That is, they maintain that God requires of them just as high and perfect a service as if their powers had never been abused by sin, as if they had always been developed by the perfectly right use of them. This they admit to be a natural impossibility; nevertheless they hold that God may justly require it, and that sinners are justly bound to perform this impossible service and that they sin continually in coming short of it. To this sentiment I answer, that it might be maintained with as much show of reason and as much authority from the Bible, that God might and does require of all sinners to undo all their acts of sin, and to substitute holy ones in their places, and that he holds them as sinning every moment by the neglect to do this. Why may not God as well require one as the other! They are alike impossibilities. They are alike impossibilities originating in the sinner's own act or fault. If the sinners rendering himself unable to obey in one case does not set aside the right of God to command, so does it not for the same reason in the other. If an inability resulting from the sinner's own act can not bar the right of God to make the requisition in the one case, neither can it for the same reason in the other. But every one can see that God can not justly require the sinner to recall past time, and to undo past acts. But why? No other reason can be assigned than that it is impossible. But the same reason, it is admitted, exists in its full extent in the other case. It is admitted that sinners who have long indulged in sin or who have sinned at all, are really as unable to render as high a degree of service as they might have done had they never sinned, as they are to recall past time or to undo all their past acts of sin. On what ground then of reason or revelation does the assertion rest that in one case an impossibility is a bar to obligation and not in the other? I answer, There is no ground whatever for the assertion in question. It is a sheer and an absurd assumption, unsupported by any affirmation of reason or any truth or principle of revelation.
But to this assumption I reply again, as I have done on a former occasion, that if it be true, it must follow that no one on earth or in heaven who has ever sinned, will be able to render as perfect a service as the law demands; for there is no reason to believe that any being who has abused his powers by sin will ever in time or eternity be able to render as high a service as he might have done had he at every moment duly developed them by perfect obedience. If this theory is true, I see not why it does not follow that the saints will be guilty in heaven of the sin of omission. A sentiment based upon an absurdity in the outset, as the one in question is, and resulting in such consequences as this must, is to be rejected without hesitation.
3. A. consciousness of the force of habit in respect to all the acts and states of body and mind has contributed to the loose holding of the doctrine of inability. Every one who is at all in the habit of observation and self-reflection is aware that for some reason we acquire a greater and greater facility in doing any thing by practice or repetition. We find this to be true in respect to acts of will as really as in respect to the involuntary states of mind. When the will has been long committed to the indulgence of the propensities and in the habit of submitting itself to their impulses, there is a real difficulty of some sort in the way of changing its action. This difficulty can not really impair moral agency and accountability. But habit may, and, as every one knows, does interpose an obstacle of some sort in the way of right willing, or on the other hand in the way of wrong willing. That is, men both obey and disobey with greatest facility from habit. Habit strongly favors the accustomed action of the will in any direction. This, as I said, never does or can properly impair the freedom of the will, or render it impossible to act in a contrary direction; for if it could and should, the actions of the will, in that case, being determined by a law of necessity in one direction, would have no moral character. If benevolence became a habit so strong that it were utterly impossible to will in an opposite direction or not to will benevolently, benevolence would cease to be virtuous. So on the other hand with selfishness. If the will came to be determined in that direction by habit grown into a law of necessity, such action would and must cease to have moral character. But, as I said, there is a real conscious difficulty of some sort in the way of obedience when the will has been long accustomed to sin. This is strongly recognized in the language of inspiration and in devotional hymns, as well as in the language of experience by all men. The language of Scripture is often so strong upon this point, that but for a regard to the subject-matter of discourse, we might justly infer a proper inability. For example, Jer. 13:23. "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil." This and similar passages recognize the influence of habit. "Then may ye who are accustomed to do evil:" custom or habit is to be overcome and in the strong language of the prophet, this is like changing the Ethiop's skin or the leopard's spots. But to understand the prophet as here affirming a proper inability were to disregard one of the fundamental rules of interpreting language, namely, that it is to be understood by reference to the subject of discourse. The latter part of the seventh chapter of Romans, affords a striking instance and an illustration of this. It is, as has just been said, a sound and most important rule of interpreting all language that due regard be had to the subject matter of discourse. When can not and such like terms that express an inability are applied to physical or involuntary actions or states of mind, they express a proper natural inability; but when they are used in reference to actions of free will, they express not a proper impossibility, but only a difficulty arising out of the existence of a contrary choice or the law of habit or both. Much question has been made about the seventh of Romans in its relation to the subject of ability and inability. Let us therefore look a little into this passage, Romans 7:15--23. "For that which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I. If then I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good. Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. For I know that in me (that is in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing; for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." Now what did the apostle mean by this language? Did he use language here in the popular sense, or with strictly philosophical propriety? He says he finds himself able to will but not able to do. Is he then speaking of a mere outward or physical inability? Does he mean merely to say that the established connection between volition and its sequents was disturbed so that he could not execute his volitions? This his language, literally interpreted, and without reference to the subject-matter of discourse, and without regard to the manifest scope and design of the writer, would lead us to conclude. But who ever contended for such an interpretation? The apostle used popular language and was describing a very common experience. Convicted sinners and backslidden saints often make legal resolutions, and resolve upon obedience under the influence of legal motives and without really becoming benevolent, and changing the attitude of their wills. They, under the influence of conviction, purpose selfishly to do their duty to God and man, and, in the presence of temptations, they constantly fail of keeping their resolutions. It is true that with their selfish hearts, or in the selfish attitude of their wills, they can not keep their resolutions to abstain from those inward thoughts and emotions nor from those outward actions that result by a law of necessity from a selfish state or attitude of the will. These legal resolutions the apostle popularly calls willings. "To will is present with me, but how to do good I find not. When I would do good, evil is present with me, so that the good I would I do not and the evil I would not that I do. If then I do the evil I would not, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I delight in the law of God after the inner man. But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members," &c. Now this appears to me to be descriptive of a very familiar experience of every deeply convicted sinner or backslider. The will is committed to the propensities, to the law in the members, or to the gratification of the impulses of the sensibility. Hence the outward life is selfish. Conviction of sin leads to the formation of resolutions of amendment while the will does not submit to God. These resolutions constantly fail of securing the result contemplated. The will still abides in a state of committal to self-gratification; and hence resolutions to amend in feeling or the outward life, fail of securing those results.
Nothing was more foreign from the apostle's purpose, it seems to me, than to affirm a proper inability of will to yield to the claims of God. Indeed he affirms and assumes the freedom of his will. To will, he says, is present with me; that is, to resolve. But resolution is an act of will. It is a purpose, a design. He purposed, designed to amend. To form resolutions was present with him, but how to do good he found not. The reason why he did not execute his purposes was that they were selfishly made. That is, he resolved upon reformation without giving his heart to God, without submitting his will to God, without actually becoming benevolent. This caused his perpetual failure. This language construed strictly to the letter would lead to the conclusion that the apostle was representing a case where the will is right, but where the established and natural connection between volition and its sequents is destroyed, so that the outward act did not follow the action of the will. In this case all schools would agree that the act of the will constitutes real obedience. The whole passage apart from the subject-matter of discourse and from the manifest design and scope of the writer, might lead us to conclude that the apostle was speaking of a proper inability, and that he did not, therefore, regard the failure as his own fault. "It is no more I, but sin that dwelleth in me. O wretched man that I am," &c. Those who maintain that the apostle meant to assert a proper inability in this case to obey, must also admit that he represented this inability as a bar to obligation, and regarded his state as calamitous rather than as properly sinful. But the fact is, he was portraying a legal experience and spoke of finding himself unable to keep selfish resolutions of amendment in the presence of temptation. His will was in a state of committal to the indulgence of the propensities. In the absence of temptation, his convictions, and fears, and feelings were the strongest impulses, and under their influence he would form resolutions to do his duty, to abstain from fleshly indulgences, &c. But as some other appetite or desire came to be more strongly excited, he yielded to that of course and broke his former resolution. Paul writes as if speaking of himself, but was doubtless speaking as the representative of a class of persons already named. He found the law of selfish habit exceedingly strong, and so strong as to lead him to cry out, "O wretched man," &c. But this is not affirming a proper inability of will to submit to God.
4. All men who seriously undertake their own reformation find themselves in great need of help and support from the Holy Spirit, in consequence of the physical depravity of which I have formerly spoken, and because of the great strength of their habit of self-indulgence. They are prone, as is natural, to express their sense of dependence on the Divine Spirit in strong language, and to speak of this dependence as if it consisted in a real inability, when in fact they do not really consider it as a proper inability. They speak upon this subject just as they do upon any and every other subject, when they are conscious of a strong inclination to a given course. They say in respect to many things, I can not, when they mean only, I will not, and never think of being understood as affirming a proper inability. The inspired writers expressed themselves in the common language of men upon such subjects, and are doubtless to be understood in the same way. In common parlance, can not often means will not, and perhaps is used as often in this sense as it is to express a proper inability. Men do not misinterpret this language and suppose it to affirm a proper inability, when used in reference to acts of will, except on the subject of obedience to God; and why should they assign a meaning to language when used upon this subject which they do not assign to it any where else?
But, as I said in a former lecture, under the light of the gospel and with the promises in our hands, God does require of us what we should be unable to do and be but for these promises and this proferred assistance. Here is a real inability to do directly in our own strength all that is required of us upon consideration of the proffered aid. We can only do it by strength imparted by the Holy Spirit. That is, we can not know Christ and avail ourselves of his offices and relations, and appropriate to our own souls his fulness, except as we are taught by the Holy Spirit. The thing immediately and directly required, is to receive the Holy Spirit by faith to be our teacher and guide, to take of Christ's and show it to us. This confidence we are able to exercise. Who ever really and intelligently affirmed that he had not power or ability to trust or confide in the promise and oath of God?
Much that is said of inability in poetry and in the common language of the saints, respects not the subjection of the will to God, but those experiences and states of feeling that depend on the illuminations of the Spirit just referred to. The language that is so common in prayer and in the devotional dialect of the church, respects generally our dependence upon the Holy Spirit for such divine discoveries of Christ as to charm the soul into a steadfast abiding in him. We feel our dependence upon the Holy Spirit to so enlighten us as to break up forever the power of sinful habit and draw us away from our idols entirely and forever.
In future lectures, I shall have occasion to enlarge much upon the subject of our dependence upon Christ and the Holy Spirit. But this dependence does not consist in a proper inability to will as God directs, but, as I have said, partly in the power of sinful habit, and partly in the great darkness of our souls in respect to Christ and his mediatorial work and relations. All these together do not constitute a proper inability, for the plain reason that through the right action of our will which is always possible to us, these difficulties can all be directly or indirectly overcome. Whatever we can do or be directly or indirectly by willing is possible to us. But there is no degree of spiritual attainment required of us that may not be reached directly or indirectly by right willing. Therefore these attainments are possible. "If any man" says Christ, "will do his will," that is, has an obedient will, "he shall know the doctrine whether it be of God." "If thine eye be single," that is, if the intention or will is right, "thy whole body shall be full of light." "If any man love me, he will keep my words and my Father will love him, and we will come and make our abode with him." The Scriptures abound with assurances of light and instruction, and of all needed grace and help upon condition of a right will or heart, that is, upon condition of our being really willing to obey the light when and as fast as we receive it. I have abundantly shown on former occasions that a right state of the will constitutes, for the time being, all that, strictly speaking, the moral law requires. But I said that it also, though in a less strict and proper sense, requires all those acts and states of the intellect and sensibility which are connected by a law of necessity with the right action of the will. Of course it also requires that cleansing of the sensibility and all those higher forms of christian experience that result from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. That is, the law of God requires that these attainments shall be made when the means are provided and enjoyed, and as soon as in the nature of the case these attainments are possible. But it requires no more than this. For the law of God can never require absolute impossibilities. That which requires absolute impossibilities, is not and can not be moral law. For, as was formerly said, moral law is the law of nature, and what law of nature would that be that should require absolute impossibilities? This would be a mockery of a law of nature. What! a law of nature requiring that which is impossible to nature both directly and indirectly! Impossible.