




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THE

BIBLICAL REPERTORY

AND

PRINCETON REVIEW.

EDITED BY

CHARLES HODGE, D.D.; LYMAN H. ATWATER, D.D.

VOL. XLIII.

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED BY

CHARLES SCRIBNER & CO., 654 BROADWAY;

[AND SUBSCRIPTIONS RECEIVED BY

SMITH, ENGLISH & CO., AND PETER WALKER, PHILADELPHIA;
MCGINNESS & RUNYAN, PRINCETON, N. J.; REV. A. KENNEDY, LONDON, C. W.
REV. WILLIAM ELDER, ST. JOHN, NEW BRUNSWICK;
REV. ROBERT MURRAY, HALIFAX, N. S.;
TRÜBNER & CO., LONDON.

1871.

PRINCETON REVIEW.

VOL. XLIII.—1871.

Contents of the January Number.

	PAGE
ART. I.—Quarterly Reviews, their Province and Function. By Rev. L. H. ATWATER, D.D.	1
ART. II.—Responsibility of Society for the Causes of Crime. By Rev. J. B. BITTINGER, D.D.	18
ART. III.—Proposed Revision of the English Bible. By Rev. C. W. HODGE, D.D.	36
ART. IV.—The Philosophy of Civil Punishment. By WALTER H. LOWRIE, LL.D.	61
ART. V.—Preaching the Gospel to the Poor. By Rev. CHARLES HODGE, D.D.	83
ART. VI.—Jonathan Dickinson and Dickinson Hall. By Rev. J. O. MURRAY, D.D.	95
ART. VII.—The True Sources of Literary Inspiration. By Prof. J. C. WELLING, LL.D.	102
ART. VIII.—The Theology Taught and Preached by Christ.	120
ART. IX.—The Temporal Power of the Pope. By Rev. J. M. MACDONALD, D.D.	127
ART. X.—Notices of Recent Publications.	144
ART. XI.—Literary Intelligence.	156

Contents of the April Number.

ART. I.—The Miracles of Christ "Critically Examined." By Rev. A. BLAUVELT.	161
ART. II.—Life and Times of David Zeisberger. By Rev. JOHN HALL, D.D., of Trenton, N. J.	193
ART. III.—The Moabite Stone. By Rev. THOMAS CROSKERY, of Londonderry, Ireland	213
ART. IV.—Newman's Grammar of Assent. By Rev. FRANCIS L. PATTON.	234
ART. V.—The Constitution of the Person of Christ. By Rev. THOMAS H. SKINNER, D.D.	256
ART. VI.—The Writings of Solomon. By Rev. J. M. MACDONALD, D.D.	279
ART. VII.—Professional Ethics and their Application to Legal Practice	286
ART. VIII.—Notices of Recent Publications	305
ART. IX.—Literary Intelligence.	321

Contents of the July Number.

	PAGE
ART. I.—Mark, the Gospel for the Roman. By Rev. D. S. GREGORY.	325
ART. II.—Reformation and Restoration. By Prof. W. M. BLACKBURN, D.D.	348
ART. III.—Sunday-School Libraries. By Rev. SANFORD H. COBB . .	369
ART. IV.—Presbyterianism. By Rev. JOHN MOORE	383
ART. V.—Recent Expositions of Daniel. By Prof. W. H. GREEN, D.D.	397
ART. VI.—The General Assembly. By Prof. L. H. ATWATER, D.D. .	424
ART. VII.—Notices of Recent Publications	443
ART. VIII.—Literary Intelligence	478

 Contents of the October Number.

ART. I.—Introduction to a New System of Rhetoric. By Rev. J. H. MCLVAINE, D.D.	483
ART. II.—The Life and Letters of Frederick William Faber. By Rev. WILLIAM SCRIBNER	515
ART. III.—Future Retribution. By Rev. GEORGE S. MOTT	532
ART. IV.—Plan in History. By Rev. E. A. LAWRENCE, D.D. . . .	555
ART. V.—The Wine of the Bible, of Bible Lands, and of the Lord's Sup- per	564
ART. VI.—Church Action on Temperance.	595
ART. VII.—Notices of Recent Publications.	633

THE
PRINCETON REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1871.

No. I.

ART. I.—*The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review. Index Volume.* Philadelphia: Peter Walker, 821 Chestnut Street.*

THE immense development of periodical literature during the present century, and in a ratio almost geometrical during each successive decade, is already among the tritest common-places. A large part of the reading of most men is in dailies, weeklies, monthlies, and quarterlies. The great majority read little else. Prodigious numbers read little besides the Bible (if, indeed, they read that), and the daily or weekly newspaper. The mightiest thinkers, who do most to shape the opinions and principles of society, communicate their thoughts to men through the periodical press, some largely, and others exclusively. Many of the most celebrated authors first became known to the public and to fame in the pages of some periodical. Here their initial and tentative au-

* We again invite attention to this index volume, and its great importance to those having any considerable number of back volumes of this Quarterly. It is published wholly by Mr. Walker, former publisher of the Review. The present publishers have no pecuniary interest in the Index. But we deem the work important and valuable, and trust that the publisher will be encouraged and rewarded.

thorship achieved its first triumph, and opened the way for their subsequent success, in issuing volume after volume, exclusively their own, to instruct and delight their fellow-men.

Periodicals differ from other works in the periodicity of their publication, which is ever recurring at regular intervals. Other works are complete on their first publication, and then either disappear, or reappear in successive editions, as wanted, whether improved or unimproved; or at most they are serials appearing in successive chapters or fragments, until complete, when they take their place with other finished productions. But periodicals are never finished, till they die of inanition: not from the completion of their work, but from their inability further to prosecute it. Until they fail as periodicals, they have inexhaustible vitality and fecundity. Each separate article, however great or small, may be complete in the number which contains it. It may fall dead, or quicken tens of thousands of readers, only to be pushed out of sight and memory by others which take its place and its prerogative. But the periodical which publishes it, is ever reappearing with fresh articles equally adapted to the wants of each successive time of publication. It is ever recurring, ever new, ever young, coming forth successively, to address to men words, thoughts, facts, intelligence, seasonable and appropriate to their ever-varying occasions, exigencies, and necessities.

The periodicals of most frequent issue, from the daily to the weekly, are with pre-eminent fitness styled newspapers. Their first function is to report to their readers the latest events of which they can get intelligence in all parts of the world, in regard to every matter of public interest, and adapted to that part of the public which comprises their own readers. This renders local intelligence of what transpires in its own vicinage a prime specialty of every newspaper. It will widen its range for gathering earliest news of latest occurrences in proportion to the centrality of its location, the catholicity of its attitude, the extent of its circulation, or the character and demands of the people on whom it most relies for support. It will also make a specialty of being foremost with the news of the particular department of journalism it occupies, be it politics or the interest of any political party, religion or Christianity

in general, or any of its sects, schools, organizations, institutions, theologies, be it literature, science, sociology, or whatever else. A religious newspaper must be foremost with religious intelligence—if Presbyterian, with that of its own denomination; a democratic news-journal with movements in or affecting its party; a general newspaper with general reports of all kinds of news—metropolitan if it be metropolitan, provincial if it be provincial. All too, in their place, will gather up and interweave whatever other news may be germane and conducive to their main object. The newspaper makes men mutually cognizant of each other's doings, fortunes, and experiences, whether as individuals, states, nations, in all the forms of individual and associated life. It is the electric medium of intercommunication and sympathy between all and each of every sort and condition.

But its office does not stop here. It is not a mere disseminator of news. It is no mere daily or weekly annalist of the latest events occurring to individuals or nations. Such it was to a considerable extent in the infancy of journalism. Hence it so often bore the title of *Gazette*, *Register*, *Chronicle*, *News*, *Record*, and the like. It is now the vehicle of discussions suited to the times and the condition of its readers, of society, of the world, in their reciprocal relations and obligations at the time of each successive issue. It infuses into its news the interpretations and applications it deems important to be recognized and felt by its patrons and by the people at large. It sends out independent articles on all sorts of topics, even the most momentous, condensed and kindled to a focal brightness and heat, designed at once to enlighten the minds and fire the hearts of men in behalf of the cause of which it is the recognized organ and advocate. It scatters information broadcast on subjects manifold, now this, now that, always something apropos. And like a magnet collecting the filings or atoms of iron mingled with the mass through which it passes, it passes through the whole mass of items, brevities, proverbs, anecdotes floating about, and collects whatever will best serve its purpose, increase its readers, and its power over the largest number in behalf of the great ends for which it exists. Nor is it easy to estimate the power of the daily and weekly press,

secular and religious, in short, of the newspaper proper in all its varieties, in shaping the opinions, beliefs, principles, actions, and destinies of men. It is simply prodigious. There are single journals, metropolitan and provincial, which reach hundreds of thousands of readers daily and weekly, enforcing their peculiar principles and dogmas with marvellous point and force, with ceaseless but not monotonous repetition, spicing all with the thousand hits, touches, and jets on all sorts of subjects, which impart an appetizing relish. Who can compute their influence? Who can estimate the influence of the great dailies, the religious weeklies, of New York and other great cities, and of occasional rural journals, like the *Springfield Republican*, in determining the convictions and actions of men, promoting what is good,—saying nothing of those that promote evil among men? Where do we find mightier engines, or wielded by mightier minds, than the London or New York *Times*, the New York or Chicago *Tribune*, and others of the like? The articles with which they stir and often electrify the public mind must nevertheless be *newspaper* articles, not only short, fragmentary, vivid, or even novel, but inspired by, interpreting, applying, bearing on the immediate Present, the immediate Past, the immediate Future. Not to dwell further on the function of the newspaper, let us look a moment at what lies intermediate between these and the quarterlies, viz., the monthlies.

With small and immaterial exceptions the monthly has ceased to be a vehicle of news. In the early days of journalism, before the era of steam and electricity, in the rude beginnings of the postal system, it might have been possible for a periodical, at intervals of a month, to report some news which had not become stale and lost its quality of news, as surely as bread loses its relish by age. The early religious journalism of this country was almost entirely in monthlies, which performed the double function now filled by the religious weeklies and quarterlies. Monthlies gave the most recent news of the churches, revivals, missions, ecclesiastical occasions and proceedings, in matters of which, whatever the explanation, secular journals were then far more shy than now. They were also vehicles for all manner of religious discussions

and essays, small and great, which now find their way to the weeklies or the quarterlies. This function they now seldom discharge, except in those rare instances in which they represent those who are without quarterly and weekly organs, one or both. They are too slow for news, flashed by lightning, and too light for the ponderous discussions which, invaluable as they often are, give more weight than circulation to the quarterlies.

But in another way, and for other purposes, monthlies have recently had a development and expansion nearly unparalleled among the different classes of periodicals. They are the magazines of our time—so a large portion of them have always been—but they very largely monopolize this function now, and make it their specialty. By a magazine, in a literary sense, is meant a periodical which is neither a newspaper nor a review; which, without pretending to give the general news, or to review the great books and discuss the great topics of the time in any particular department, is a repository of miscellaneous articles, designed to entertain, or inform, or amuse; which brings before its readers tales, romances, biographies, poems, essays, dashes of humor, sentiment, occasional discussions, more or less important—complete, fragmentary, serial, as the case may be—but in any case brief, vivacious, entertaining. It is the periodical, in short, of light literature. It may be good, pure, of salutary influence; but, as a whole, it must be light, lively, capable of interesting and charming large numbers, of every sex, age, rank, and grade of culture, or, as a magazine, it is nothing. In a word, it is a varied miscellany, which may instruct, but *must* entertain and amuse. The elegant, polite, and beautiful must grace its pages, which can seldom afford to carry the burden of learned and profound discussions, that are so formidable to most of the reading public. Hence, for a writer or composition to merit the title “magazinish” is to possess a well-understood character. It means to be light, lively, rare, entertaining—qualities which may demand genius no less than the profoundest disquisition on physics, or metaphysics. We have seen Byron quoted as speaking:—

“Of *magazing* chiefs, whose rival page,
With monthly medley, courts the curious age.”

This well sets forth the grand type of those monthlies which are now issued by tens and hundreds of thousands, and contest for the supreme place on every centre table, in every passenger car, at every news-stand, in the reading of every young gentleman and lady of the country. They have their mission. If conducted aright, they provide innocent and salutary entertainment for those who must be entertained with good or evil. They refine, elevate, and purify. But if they are corruptly conducted, so as to pander to vanity, lust, and pride, like all profligate and unprincipled publications, they are in the last degree demoralizing. It affords us pleasure to speak well of the most of our monthlies of largest circulation and influence. But from their very nature they cannot be to any extent the vehicle of those profound, searching, and scholarly discussions, whose circle of readers, up to a certain point, contracts in proportion to their value and excellence. It must popularize itself in order to find the number of readers requisite to make it profitable, or even self-sustaining. And in order to do this, it must shun those extended discussions which the vast majority of even fairly intelligent readers religiously avoid as dry and uninteresting, or unintelligible. It may occasionally have such articles; so may the newspaper—daily and weekly—but they do not constitute its staple or ordinary contents. All grades of periodicals may occasionally find similar, or even the same identical articles, suitable to their work and aim, but each has its own special kind and type of matter, which alone mainly befits it, and consists with its character and success. We have seen what these are in the newspaper and the monthly magazine.*

* The foregoing analysis and classification of daily, weekly, and monthly journals is sufficiently accurate for practical purposes; yet we do not overlook noteworthy exceptions. Such journals as *Harper's Weekly* and the *New York Ledger* have more of a magazinish than newspaper character; they circulate by the hundred thousand. On the other hand, some monthlies, like the *Atlantic*, and the *Catholic World* strive to combine the lightness and buoyancy of the magazine, with somewhat of the solidity and gravity of the quarterly. The Romanists aim to have a theological and ecclesiastical organ, with enough condiments of light literature to procure for it a remunerative circulation; perhaps, with the power possessed by their hierarchy of displacing other monthlies, this will be the successful solution of the matter of monthly and quarterly periodicals for them. We observe, too, that across the water there are

Let us now inquire into the province and functions of the quarterly reviews.

And first; although not a news-organ, yet, by its character, as being a periodical, it has a special eye to the new, in a broader aspect than the mere events of to-day or yesterday. It deals with topics of present moment and interest, with the great questions which are now agitating the minds of men, in the sphere to which it specially pertains. However remote or recondite, ancient or modern the matters treated, still they are treated in their relation to the present exigencies and phases of human thought, or the present needs of those addressed. A live quarterly has this element of novelty and freshness, in common with all periodicals, but it differs from them, and fills a place which they cannot fill, in several important particulars. It does not supersede them any more than they supersede it; it supplements them. They are all mutually complementary;

even weekly and fortnightly journals, that partake quite as much, and even more, of the character of the review proper than of the newspaper. Who has not seen or heard of the *Saturday Review* and the *Pall Mall Gazette*? Great Britain abounds in weeklies more or less of this description. The nearest approach which we have noticed in this country to this species of journal is the *Nation*, whose sturdy and trenchant essays and criticisms are not unheard of by most of our readers. There are monthlies, withal, which not only, like Blackwood, blend the magazine and review, but others, which bring out, each month, the equivalent of a number of a common quarterly review. The following advertisement, which we clip from a late *Saturday Review*, tells its own story:—

Monthly, 2s. 6d.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW: THEOLOGICAL, LITERARY, AND SOCIAL.

Contents for September:

1. The Politics of the War: Bismarck and Louis Napoleon. By R. H. Hutton.
2. Constitution of the Disestablished Church of Ireland. By C. P. Reichell, D.D.
3. Professor Huxley's Lay Sermons. By Professor Calderwood.
4. Aspects of Revision—September, 1870. By Professor Spence.
5. Day-schools: their Advantages and Disadvantages. By Rev. Alfred Church.
6. The Family System for Workhouse Children. By Florence Hill.
7. Dean Stanley's Essays on Church and State.
8. Contemporary Literature.

STRAHAN & CO., 56 LUDGATE HILL, LONDON.

The price in New York is \$7.50 gold, nearly \$9 currency. For that price, if sufficient patronage could be obtained to pay the editors, writers, and publishers, we could readily issue a solid monthly review in this country. As it is we poorly support our quarterlies.

some more important to one class, some to another, all, in their order and correlation, requisite to a due outfit of periodical literature. The quarterly review in this country accomplishes the following purposes, not commonly or equally effected by other periodicals:—

1. As already intimated, it provides for the discussion of subjects needing ventilation with a thoroughness seldom attainable in periodicals of more frequent issue, without adequate space for extended and elaborate articles, or seeking a circle of readers too large to endure such articles. It will not popularize at the sacrifice of its main object, which is to throw light upon great themes, and perplexing controversies; to assist the educated, professional, cultivated, or leading mind of the country in reaching right conclusions on momentous or controverted subjects; to aid the thinkers of society in gaining the truth for themselves, and for the guidance of their fellow-men. Hence it cannot circulate largely among the masses. It finds readers and patrons chiefly among the teachers and leaders of men—the brain of society, the royal aristocracy of intellect—the same who relish and delight to read the most solid books, the productions of the great scholars and master thinkers among men. All other support is adventitious and generally transient. Men devoted to any cause upheld by a quarterly which they do not personally appreciate or enjoy, sometimes will subscribe for and promote it for the sake of the cause it promotes. In the long run, however, all periodicals must depend upon their power to command readers and purchasers, and float by their own buoyancy. We do not wish to be misunderstood. When we say that the quarterlies cannot be popularized so as to compete with newspapers and monthlies in circulation or popular attractiveness, we do not mean that they reach their true ideal in a profundity which is only a fathomless profound of dulness, stupor, heaviness, inanity. No doubt their pages are sometimes burdened with such dead-weights. To say this is only saying that they are human, and subject to the vicissitudes of all periodicals. But quite otherwise must be their normal, habitual character. They must be freighted, not merely with deep thought, learning, and scholarship—they

might have all this and be smothered under the load of torpor they carry—they must be alive with fresh, vigorous, and animated thought appropriate to the present needs of men, clothed in words instinct with life and power. They must abound in arguments, disquisitions, persuasives on the great matters which now concern men; which will inform and move the minds of those who move others, and so help them for their work, nerve them with power, and come to them as an inspiration. They should be felt as the great siege-guns and heavy artillery indispensable in breaching and demolishing the ramparts of error; while they are few in number compared with the needle-guns, the mitrailleuses, and the bayonets no less required for victory. They are no duller than, quite as popular as, the works of the great masters of human thought, the founders of schools, and headsprings of opinion, doctrine, progress among men. They are to lighter periodicals just what Bacon, Milton, Locke, Reid, Kant, Edwards, are to ordinary popular literature. Probably Dickens is read by a thousand to one that reads Bacon's "Advancement of Learning," Butler's "Analogy," or Hamilton's "Metaphysics." What then? Are the latter any the less a necessity and a benediction to mankind? Can we do without them? And is not the fit audience they find, though few, one which tells upon the race, and through which they tell upon the race, more than many who count their immediate readers by tens or even hundreds of thousands?

2. This suggests that the great articles of the quarterlies percolate through the leading minds they inform and inspire, among all grades of society, until they indirectly influence a countless multitude. A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump. Thus to "speak wisdom among those that are perfect," is to speak it through these to the great multitude reached by them. They contribute to equip those who, from the pulpit, the rostrum, the lighter periodicals, and other forms of publication, reach and mould the public mind. This is peculiarly so in regard to reviews which are the recognized expositors and defenders of any particular type of doctrine or policy. It is only necessary to refer to the work done by the *Edinburgh* and *London Quarterly Reviews* and by some of the leading

religious quarterlies of Britain and America, to illustrate and confirm this remark. They have ever been great laboratories and fountains of opinion, argument, inspiration, which have been distilled in all practicable forms and by all available channels through all grades of men.

3. This brings to view another use of the quarterly as the representative expositors and defenders of principles earnestly held by their conductors and promoters. This is not its province exclusive of other periodicals. But it is a work which it does in its own way, while other periodicals and publications do it in their way, but not in a way that is a substitute for the quarterly. Many of the mightiest advocates of great principles and causes, cannot put forth their strength in the brief and fragmentary articles of the lighter periodicals. They need a wider scope to open out a subject in its various parts and relations, root, trunk, and branches, with clear, logical division, distinct and adequate definition, and with cumulative and overpowering arguments. As many writers cannot otherwise lift themselves to the height of great arguments, so many subjects physical and metaphysical, political, social, theological, cannot otherwise be adequately discussed. And unless such discussions can gain access to the public through periodicals, they will not adequately reach it at all. We have only to recur to some great representative instances as already named, such as the *Edinburgh, Quarterly*, and *Westminster Reviews*, and the leading quarterlies of our own country, in attestation of this. Have not the former been the brain of the Whig, Tory, and Radical parties? Have they not at once voiced and formed their several schools of criticism, of literature and philosophy, whether Christian, rationalistic, sceptical, or destructive? Who can estimate the service to the old Whig party rendered by such writers as Brougham, Jeffrey, Macaulay, Sidney Smith, in the *Edinburgh*? And what can exceed the service rendered to materialism, positivism, scepticism, and all forms of nihilism by the *Westminster*? In our own country how comparatively feeble had been the championship of New Haven divinity, if Dr. Taylor and his collaborators could not have argued their system, as occasion required, through the pages of the *Quarterly Christian Spec-*

tator? And where would the adherents of the Calvinism of our standards have been without quarterlies through which to set forth their cause in all its successive periodical, and even fugitive, phases to the public mind, and especially to the parties concerned? It is in the field of religion in this country that quarterly reviews have had their most extended and enduring development. No large religious body, no type of doctrine or tone of thinking in religion in this country, numbering many adherents and sympathizers, has long been without a quarterly review to represent and defend it, or a bi-monthly or monthly endeavoring to combine some of the peculiar characteristics of a quarterly with the more popularized and magazinish features of a monthly, of which the *Catholic World* is now a strong and apparently successful specimen. Nor do we think that any of our great religious bodies, or systems, or any platform of doctrine or practice in the church has any fair chance to maintain itself, or be fairly dealt by, without a quarterly review or its equivalent in which it can be expounded at length, with whatever ability its adherents possess. A notable and memorable example of this is the condition of Old School theology in New England. It is not enough to rely on pamphlets, books, or individual publications. These have their uses. But for any great school or type of opinion to rely upon these alone, unless compelled to do so, is sheer fatuity. A telling article in a review, at once reaches a large body of appreciative readers without expense or risk, and generally with remuneration to the author. A pamphlet or book on many subjects needing ventilation, or in behalf of some doctrine in philosophy or theology, which is to most readers dry, simply because precise and didactic, is what publishers are shy of, unless from a pen of celebrity, and sometimes even then it can only be published to the world at the cost and risk of the author. It requires great expense to bring it to the notice and attention of the right parties, or to convince them that it is worth its cost, or to find those who, if willing, are able to purchase it. In most cases, therefore, it is not likely to be published at all, or, if published, to find those who most need it. Any great cause will fail of adequate support, and of commanding pens most

able to render it effective aid, unless it has that class of periodicals regularly appearing, in which solid and extended discussions, appreciated by the sober and thoughtful, can at once find access to the public. Without the quarterly or its equivalent, it must inevitably suffer the loss of much vigorous advocacy from writers known and unknown, which would thus be withheld from the public. Such contributions form an aggregate which no good cause can afford to lose.

4. We are thus led to see another incidental advantage to writers and readers of this medium of communication with the public. It brings out many valuable monographs, and papers on special subjects that otherwise never would see the light. Many of the best and most famous writers have such special dissertations, monographs, and dissertations of high value, which they would not think of first giving to the public in a separate volume, but whose natural place is in the quarterly. Still more is it true that large numbers of men capable of high authorship, are so occupied that they only once or occasionally during their lives work up a valuable paper on some subject, which most happily befits such a journal. And there are other cases, not a few, of men in various walks of life, not specially gifted, who, nevertheless, have given such special attention and study to single topics, that they can produce articles of high value upon them, which will adorn a quarterly, although they have no call to general or professional authorship. This explains how it is that so many valuable articles in quarterlies and other periodicals are from men unknown to fame. The article in review of the Duke of Argyll's "Reign of Law," in our January number a year ago, excited very general attention, with a keen inquiry for the name of the author. It came from an unknown lawyer in an unknown place in Virginia. Such experience is familiar to us, and accounts for some of our best as well as other articles, which, without such a medium of access to the public, would have been unwritten, or, if written, unpublished.

5. Hence one of the most excellent services rendered by the quarterly is in affording an opportunity for young and unknown writers to make their first and tentative literary efforts, and test their power with a chance of fair appreciation by oth-

ers. Many of the ablest writers have made their first important attempts at authorship in the quarterlies, spreading themselves to dimensions unsuited to a monthly or weekly, while they would not have ventured on publication in separate volumes. Macaulay's essay on Milton, and Carlyle's on Burns, at once made them famous, and gave new brilliancy and celebrity to a review already made great by Jeffrey, Smith, Brongham, and the coterie which they adorned. The articles and their authors at once became known, even on this side of the Atlantic. While we were yet a boy in college, we remember the delight with which we drank in these and the other earliest articles of these great authors, which begat the keenest appetite for their collected essays and other independent volumes when afterward given to the public. The same may be said of some of the great contributions of Lockhart, Croker, and others, in the *London Quarterly*, and afterward of J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, *et id genus omne*, in the *Westminster*. Many of those most celebrated in these and other forms of authorship first became conscious, or rather assured, of their strength by making the world conscious of it in these first tentative contributions to the quarterlies. It is a matter of constant experience with us, that young writers of power first become known to the church and the world by publishing on our pages articles which attract great attention and excite general inquiry as to their authors; or that they are attributed to men for whose writings it is enough credit to any young writer that his own articles should be mistaken. Some of the most valued present contributors to this journal were first encouraged to persevere in this sort of literary effort by finding their articles often attributed to those honored men, living and dead, who founded this Review and gave it its original character and power; and who through it, no less than elsewhere, acquired a national and even European fame.

Some of our readers, we know, will feel that this is an argument against the anonymous character adopted by the earlier quarterly reviews and thus far maintained in this. We do not mean to argue this question, as a whole, at this time. With regard to this particular point, however, we think the advantage is on the side of the anonymous system. Untried writers

feel more free to put forth their utmost strength, and without that morbid consciousness, often tending to affectation, which is so liable to cramp and enfeeble writers in their first essays over their own name. But still more does it give them a chance of being fairly and candidly estimated. Many a reader will not take the trouble to read an article known to be from some unheard-of young writer, who will be sure to examine it carefully if he be searching to find what articles are valuable and are likely to have been furnished by favorite or known and eminent authors; or he will see merits in it if he thinks it may have come from such a source, which otherwise had remained hidden from his view. When its merits are fully known, if they are high, the author will be sure in the end to get the credit of it. In any event, he will be sure to suffer no disgrace. The general question of giving or withholding the names of the authors of articles in quarterlies is mixed. It is far from being perfectly clear or one-sided. Most of our readers express a desire to know the authors of articles as they read them. And yet very subtle considerations, which often elude notice, bear upon the subject. We will only say, generally, that the impersonal character of articles causes them to be estimated upon their merits, and with a judicious accuracy which would not always be exercised if the name of the author awakened a personal bias. Sometimes, too, a periodical of known character can speak with an authority which would not be awarded to the individual writer. On the other hand, it is often true that greater interest would be felt in articles were the writers known at the time of reading them; that the proper persons would have the credit of what is creditable, and that none would acquire an adventitious and undeserved authority because their personality disappears in the impersonal journal: that greater latitude and freedom can be allowed to individual writers over their own names, because the review is not so strictly responsible for their utterances. All this may with truth be said. But the question still returns, whether all is not more than balanced by the higher editorial responsibility, and the power of an established and influential periodical speaking as such, instead of merely containing what some individual says. After all, what the great journals, daily, weekly,

monthly, or quarterly, which aim to influence the convictions and opinions of men, say, is one thing; what A., B., or C., however eminent, may say in them, is another. If they say any thing not over their signatures, worth attending to, it will be likely to command attention, and its authors will not be likely to remain unknown. We have not yet seen our way clear to change the general impersonal character of our Review. What we may do in the future must be determined by experience. Perhaps the ultimate solution will be that of the dailies and weeklies—a large portion, including most of the editorials, being anonymous, while other articles bear the names of their authors.

Another advantage which is really important though easily underrated, is the facility of preservation which belongs to the quarterly. Its form admits of permanent preservation even without binding, but it is convenient for this purpose, which greatly protects the separate numbers, and enhances their value. The contents of dailies and weeklies are necessarily as fugitive and ephemeral as news itself must be, if from no other cause, from the difficulty of preserving them. Not only so, but from their very nature, the contents of quarterlies, although adapted to the time of publication, have permanent literary value. If they represent any particular school or type of doctrine or opinion, they become great repositories of arguments and facts in that department. No equal number of volumes are more valuable, or more read than the sets of the *Edinburgh, Quarterly*, and *Westminster* in our public libraries. The complete sets of the *Quarterly Christian Spectator* furnish by far the best thesaurus of arguments for the New Haven divinity. And if we may refer to the more than forty volumes of this Review, of which many complete sets are in private and public libraries, surprise has often been expressed not only at the amount of doctrinal discussion, but at the great variety and ability of the articles on miscellaneous topics it contains. Within their range, the quarterlies that have an enduring life tend more and more toward an encyclopediac scope and variety of topics.

A single other service of the quarterly review remains to be noticed, which, though last, is far from being least. It is

in providing for ministers condensed views of the great works, controversies, discussions of the day, without putting them to the expense (in most cases impossible) of procuring, or the labor (often equally impracticable) of reading through the books in which they first appear. In both these respects they are invaluable. Pastors of the largest congregations having ample means, perhaps, to buy books, often find it impossible to read them. They are obliged to rely much on quarterly reviews as well as other periodical literature, for such a distillation of the essence and aroma of the thought and movements of the age as they have time to take in; without the quarterlies they would no more be able to compass it than to master another profession. But still! another—alas! the vastly larger—portion of the ministry are altogether too poor to buy new books, or any books whatever. Without the religious quarterly they remain mostly strangers to the living issues and questions which are agitating Christendom, or which pertain to the defence of Christianity, orthodoxy, the apologetics, and the evangelism of the day. Their minds are too liable to stagnate because not stirred by live thought; to starve for want of fresh pabulum; to wither till all vitality and fecundity are gone. Weak and shrivelled, they are in danger of losing the respect of the souls they are called to win. To such, what a boon is the review, coming each quarter laden with new and solid matter for them to study and digest! By none is it more thoroughly read. In this kind, none so give attendance to reading that their profiting may appear to all. What a God-send is it, as it reaches the toiling pastor or missionary too often impoverished in body and mind for want of food convenient for both! And how many are thus preserved from intellectual decay and feeble ministrations!

But how many, we fear even a majority, of our needy ministers are utterly unable to furnish themselves this cheap, but precious and essential mental nutriment! They cannot do it without taking bread from the mouths, or raiment from the bodies of themselves, their wives, and children. And when it comes to this, bread or the quarterly review, there is no alternative. The latter must yield to the demands of hunger and nakedness, and be given up. And if the choice lie be-

tween the quarterly and the weekly, there is rarely any alternative. The weekly, which is for all the family, which tells of the immediate movements of the church and Christendom, must be retained, notwithstanding the loss of intellectual sustentation suffered in dropping the quarterly. The letters received by the publishers of this journal, from poor clergymen, pleading for the Review on the cheapest possible terms, abound in heart-rending tales of poverty and suffering. We have yielded to these appeals, beyond our means to relieve them.

It is our solemn belief that there is no way in which those who have money to give for the propagation of the Gospel and the effectiveness of ministers and missionaries, can do a better service than in providing that none shall be prevented through poverty from regularly receiving one of our standard Christian quarterlies. There is no way in which, as it seems to us, so much good could be done with so small an outlay. This, too, is demanded for the due support of the quarterlies themselves, which have found increasing obstacles to contend with in the greatly advanced cost of printing and paper, the increased poverty or relative smallness of salary in the class who furnish most of its subscribers and readers, in the prodigious development of dailies, weeklies, and monthlies, each doing more of the work of the quarterly than of old, yet none or all of them supplying its place.

We feel that we have a right to appeal to all who are interested in the maintenance, efficiency, and usefulness of this journal, to aid in increasing its circulation. With a general and united effort, we believe it can be put on a stronger basis than ever before, that shall more than offset and surmount the loss inflicted by the war.

We thank God for the past, which has been made secure by the blessing of God in the labors of others, living and dead, whom we delight to honor. They have made it the oldest religious quarterly in the country. May the blessing of God give it a future worthy of such a past, which has led others to describe it as "that great quarterly, unquestionably the ablest Calvinistic review ever published."*

* *New York Observer*, March 10, 1870.

ART. II.—*Responsibility of Society for the Causes of Crime.*

SOCIETY sustains a fourfold relation to crime :—

- (1.) To those who are in danger of becoming criminals ;
- (2.) To those who are criminals ;
- (3.) To the prison population ; and,
- (4.) To the liberated convict.

These several classes differ very much as to numbers—from the comparatively small class, the imprisoned, to the large class, the criminals themselves ; and the still larger body, those from whom the criminal class is recruited.

I.—THE EXPOSED POPULATION.

Helplessness.

Of the above four classes the most clearly defined is the prison population. Their numbers are definitely known, or at least knowable, as also are their offences. If now from the seventeen thousand criminals in the different penitentiaries and State prisons of the United States (1868), we can get an answer to the question : *What brought you here?* we shall have made a great advance toward answering this question : *What is the responsibility of society for the causes of crime?*

Now what is their answer? More than 28 per cent. tell us they could not read when they entered, 97 per cent. had never learned a trade, those from foreign countries number 28 per cent., those under age nearly 22 per cent., while $3\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. are insane or feeble-minded. Here are five causes of crime : Ignorance, imbecility, want of a trade, youth, and voluntary exile.

If, from these penitentiary statistics of the whole country, we pass to examine those of the common jails of New York (1864), we find that 32 per cent. could not read, 72 per cent. were without a trade, 50 per cent. were foreigners, 49 per cent. were left orphans before they were fifteen years of age, and 50 per cent. admitted their frequenting gambling-houses,

houses of ill-fame, and grog-shops. Here, in addition to ignorance, orphanage, exile, and want of a trade, we have gambling, licentiousness, and intemperance, as causes of crime.

Coming still nearer to the honest community, and therefore nearer those causes of crime for which the community is responsible, let us hear what answer is given to this question by the inmates of our twenty-eight reformatories, including under this name: industrial schools, reform schools, farm schools, houses of refuge, and juvenile asylums. Their average number of inmates, in 1868, was seven thousand nine hundred and sixty-three; and their average age, a few days less than thirteen years. Of this number 60 per cent. were of foreign parentage, 55 per cent. orphans and half-orphans, 23 per cent. used liquor and tobacco, 43 per cent. were homeless and truant, and 27 per cent. wholly illiterate.

There is a sad uniformity in these respective percentages, and a still sadder uniformity in the directness with which they point to ignorance, idleness, homelessness, orphanage, licentiousness, and drunkenness as sources of crime. It is noticeable that most of these causes of crime are negative. They are the want of knowledge, want of a trade, want of work, want of a home, want of friends, want of parents, and want of mind. Is it strange that a population from whom most of the natural and moral defences are taken away should be tempted and fall? Such helplessness borders on hopelessness; and nothing remains for its heirs but starvation or crime. Crime is the last resort of the helpless honest, unless society provides a refuge. "O poverty! thou art indeed omnipotent! Thou grindest us into desperation; thou confoundest all our boasted and most deep-rooted principles; thou fillest us to the very brim with malice and revenge, and renderest us capable of acts of unknown horror! May I never be visited by thee in the fulness of thy power."

Orphanage.

Of 1,553 children received at Mettray, 297 were illegitimate, 705 were orphans, 114 were foundlings, 302 whose parents were in prison, 214 of parents married again, and 99 of parents

living in concubinage. Take Mettray away, and what choice was left to these innocents? "Look," says Dr. Guthrie, "at the history of the children of Edinburgh, in the original ragged school, as detailed in some of the annual reports: Found homeless, 72; with the father dead, 140; mother dead, 89; deserted by parents, 43; one or both parents transported, 9; fatherless with drunken mothers, 77; motherless with drunken fathers, 66; both parents worthless, 84; beggars, 271; known or believed to be the children of thieves, 224." Outside of the Edinburgh Ragged School, there was for these children, neither help nor home, father or mother. Society had in effect shut them up to crime. They must live, and a criminal life offered most chances.

What kind of life poor orphan girls in cities generally choose, the following figures, by Mr. Brockway, show: "Eighty per cent. of the females received into the Magdalen Home, at Glasgow, Scotland, in 1866, were orphans or half-orphans. Seventy per cent. of all females received into all these establishments in London, in the same year, were also either orphans or half-orphans." Out of fifteen thousand commitments of females in New York City, in 1866, two thousand two hundred and forty were for vagrancy—which is but another name for homeless girls—girls who have already lost the bloom of their virtue, if not their virtue itself, and are steadily moving on toward a life of prostitution. But no statistics, however startling their ratios, can convey an adequate idea of the fearful tendency which orphanage among the poor of our cities has toward crime. During the same year (1866), nine hundred and sixty-eight girls between the ages of fifteen and twenty were imprisoned for petit larceny. Here, then, we have more than three thousand girls, out of fifteen thousand female offenders of all classes, committed to theft and lewdness.

Now, let us look at the crimes of boys. We quote from the *XXI. Annual Report of the Prison Association of New York*, because Mr. Brace's figures, with which the comparison is made, belong to that year (1866). Out of 24,329 male commitments, 2,347 were boys for petit larceny. That is, one-tenth of all the offences committed were by boys, and three-

fourths of the whole number of petit larcenies for that year were by the same juvenile class. Here, then, we have picked up, by the police, in the streets of New York, in one year, 3,315 boy-thieves, to say nothing of the larger number undetected. Most of them were orphans, all of them uncared for. So much for those who, through idleness, friendlessness, and homelessness, choose the street for a home, and crime for a living. Many of this class, it is true, beg; but the limits between begging and stealing are very narrow, and when begging becomes an occupation, they disappear altogether. Professional beggars are thieves in disguise. Their children can hardly be said to steal; they merely follow the trade of their parents. Their vagabond lives beget in them beastly appetites and habits. They have few ideas of property, none of daintiness or self-restraint. If idleness, and the want of home and parents, work so disastrously, it is safe to infer that, if these wants were supplied, these sources of crime would be drained, if not dried up. And when Red Hill can show 70 per cent. of recovery, and Mettray 89 per cent., no community that neglects or refuses to give their methods a fair trial, can escape the responsibility for more than three-fourths of its juvenile criminals.

Ignorance.

Ignorance is a source of crime. It operates in various ways: first, to expose men to it, and then to prepare them for it. The uncultivated mind is weakened by non-use. For lack of ideas it is often left to the suggestions of the animal appetites, with their debasing and corrupting tendencies. In a land of books and schools ignorance is not consistent with self-respect or manliness. Even the pitiable standard set up in our prison statistics—to be able to read—is far above many of the adults that enter their walls. But when we erect the higher and truer one—of being able to read with facility and zest—such proficiency as puts knowledge, both as a pastime and a power, within men's reach, how beggarly is the show then among our prison population! The average per cent. of the State prison population of New York, in 1864, that could not read was 32. Now, admitting that the remainder

could read, and not disparaging the quality of it, it shows eleven times more ignorance among these twenty-four hundred inmates than among the whole outside adult population of the State. Of those outside the penitentiaries, only three per cent. could not read, while 32 per cent. of those inside could not. Even not knowing how to read is eleven times more likely to lead to crime than knowing; or, as Dr. Wines has put it, one-third of the crime is committed by one-fiftieth of the population. So great is the affinity of crime for ignorance. Ninety-seven per cent. of the non-prison population of New York, in 1864, could read; in the same year only sixty-eight per cent. of the prison population could read. Knowing how to read is two-thirds as favorable to honesty as not knowing. In other words, knowledge is more preventive of crime than promotive of virtue.

But as the want of practical knowledge is as really ignorance as the want of book-knowledge, the following figures by Mr. Byers, late chaplain of the Ohio Penitentiary, are more to the point as to the influence of ignorance upon crime. Out of 2,120 under his care, 67 per cent. were uneducated, that is, men who could barely read, or who could merely scratch their names; 14 per cent. did not know their "A B C's;" 74 per cent. had never learned a trade. Here we have 81 per cent. ignorant of books, and 74 per cent. ignorant of a trade. Apply these proportions to the outside population, and what a mass of ignorance and helplessness it would make! Supposing the population of New York to be 900,000, more than 350,000 of her adult population would be unable to read or write. Hugh Miller, a shrewd observer of man, and himself a mechanic, speaks of these two kinds of knowledge and their influence on men, as follows: "I found that the intelligence which results from a fair school education, sharpened by a subsequent taste for reading, very much heightened on certain items the standard by which my comrades regulated their conduct, . . . not against intemperance or licentiousness, . . . but against theft and the grosser and more creeping forms of untruthfulness and dishonesty."

Emigration.

Another fruitful source of crime is emigration. The figures here are so startling in their disproportions as to foster, and apparently justify, a strong prejudice against our foreign population. Foreigners crowd our alms-houses and asylums, our jails and penitentiaries. In the Eastern Penitentiary of Pennsylvania, from one-fourth to one-third of the inmates are foreigners. At Auburn, from a third to one-half. In Clinton prison, one-half; and at Sing Sing, between one-half and six-sevenths. In the Albany Penitentiary, the aggregate number of prisoners during the last twenty years was 18,390, of whom 10,770 were foreign born. Formidable as such numbers are in their disproportions, we must not be hasty or harsh in taking up a reproach against "the stranger." The excess is local—following the seaports and lines of emigration. For example, while the general average for the whole country is twenty-eight per cent. of foreign-born criminals to seventy-two per cent. of native born; in Nevada, the foreign-born criminals are fifty-six per cent. while in Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina, they are only one per cent. There is however an excess, and to account for it let us look at some of the circumstances that are against foreigners. They come here as strangers; often sick, always poor. They have few friends to meet them, greet them, or care for them. They are ignorant of our language, our laws, and our customs. Without a place in which to live, to work, or to worship. Human waifs stranded, rather than landed, on our shores. If they remain in our cities, as too many of them do, they are always exposed to the worst classes of both their own and our countrymen. Is it strange that, with all support and sympathy withdrawn, these exiles should despond, and fall to drinking, or despair, and commit crime? The loss of ten dollars through a sailor boarding-house, or a fraudulent ticket-agent, may make the difference between a thrifty farmer in Wisconsin, or an inmate of Sing Sing.

As the asylum of the poor of all nations, the United States is specially charged with the duty of a philanthropic legislation respecting immigrants. The famine of Ireland threw

thousands of paupers and the product of pauperism on our shores. The emigration since, though less depressed in character, is still a poor if not a pauper emigration, and only in a modified sense can it be said, that this is not the character of all our foreign influx; whether the stream is fed by the coolies of China, the cotters of Ireland, or the peasants of Germany. Most of them live so near the line of pauperism at home, that on reaching our shores, with neither home, employment, nor capital—and strangers, thousands fall below the dead-line of life, with no record but the mortuary or criminal register. But no words can plead for these exiles, as do the following facts and figures taken from the last report of the *Commissioners of Emigration*.

Emigrants provided with food and lodging.....	18,288
Emigrants provided with situations.	36,293
Emigrants relieved, forwarded, etc.....	73,187

Society must keep this population from approaching “the dead-line.” The Commissioners of Emigration have done nobly, but no local organization can direct and distribute this mighty tide. The nation must do it. “The object of government is to do for a community, what the community cannot do for itself.” Emigration mediates between Europe and anarchy, and what the old world is travailing with, till she is delivered, the United States must stand ready to receive. We need a national emigration bureau—with forwarding agencies abroad, and distributing agencies at home. The community on which these immigrants bestow themselves and their labor, cannot quit itself by merely offering homesteads. It must see that the men for whom she intended these homesteads shall find them. She must insist that shipmasters shall not revive the horrors of “the middle passage,” and that our railroads shall run their emigrant trains at least as fast as their cattle trains.

The tendency of *homelessness*, with its concomitant privations, to crime is strikingly illustrated by the character of our canal, railroad, and river populations. The number of criminals in proportion to the number of wayfarers and common carriers is very large; so large that it taints the popula-

tion adjacent to all great thoroughfares. Along the Erie Canal there was in 1863 one crime to every 1,276 of the population. In the population not adjacent, the commitments were one to every 2,876. The nine counties bordering on the Hudson furnished one conviction to every 1,518 of their population, while in the same number of counties secluded from trade and travel we have only one conviction to every 2,864 of the population. Rafting, lumbering, and mining show similar evil flowing from homelessness.

As an episode bearing on the dangers of homelessness, we condense a long letter, written some years since to the Secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association of New York, by one of the hundreds of young men, who annually go to the city to seek their fortunes. First came *rum* to keep up spirits and energy for night work, then came three-fourths of their salaries spent in *theatres* and *bar-rooms*—in dull seasons more *rum* to drive away the blues. Many go to *low concert saloons*, only to kill time. They play *billiards* for *drinks*, and *bagatelle* for *lager*. Play *faro*, or have a throw at *cards*. They go to the *opera*, to the *theatre*, oyster suppers, and *worse*. All this to feed the hunger of their homeless hearts, and no wonder, for "they bunked in boarding-houses." In receiving and caring for this home emigration let our young men's Christian associations find their proper and sufficient work.

Drunkenness—Prostitution—Gambling.

In all our criminal statistics these three vices appear as the most productive sources of crime. More than one-half of our prison population are intemperate, or were under the influence of liquor when they committed the crimes for which they were imprisoned. The Provincial Penitentiary of Upper Canada, in its report, names drunkenness as one of the two chief causes of crime. Out of 47,313 in the city prisons of New York (1867), 31,298 admitted their intemperance. Fifty per cent. of all the inmates in the county jails of New York (1864) confessed that they frequented drinking, bawdy, and gambling houses. What is the duty of society toward these "institutions?" We will not stop here to answer this question, only promising

that we shall better understand what that duty is when once we come to regard drunkenness, gambling, and prostitution, not as *causes* of crime, but as *crimes*. The same remark applies to tenement-houses, swill-milk, and tainted and adulterated food—not the tenants and consumers, so much as the venders and owners, are the real criminals. We say nothing of hereditary crimes; under a wiser legislation these will be held to be diseases and misfortunes, not crimes, and every verdict of acquittal on a plea of insanity will be followed by a sentence to an insane asylum. It is no longer a question of science whether there are hereditary mental and moral as well bodily peculiarities. Kleptomania is only one of many manias. Thieving argues not merely moral depravation, but intellectual as well. It is not an easy way of making a living. Measured by the criminal's standard of labor and wages, it is a hard way—an extra-hazardous occupation. It is gambling against the whole community, and sure, in the long run, to be a losing game. When restitution shall once become a recognized element in our penal legislation, we shall have few old offenders against property who will be judged sane.

II.—THE CRIMINAL POPULATION.

We come next to consider the responsibility of society to the criminal population. This class forms the middle term between the endangered class and the imprisoned class. It is smaller than the former, and very much larger than the latter. Though our judicial registers are sadly imperfect, they furnish testimony sufficient to show that the disproportion between arrests and convictions is very great. Dr. Parrish, in a paper on *Professional Criminals*, says, “that out of some 20,000 miscellaneous arrests in Philadelphia per annum, there are but about 1,000 convictions.” If this proportion is an average for the whole country, it makes the numbers of the criminal population something appalling. Great Britain reckons that one person in 300 of her entire population is a juvenile delinquent—“a destitute vagabond, abandoned, and in many cases a law-breaking, child below the age of seventeen.” About the same ratio holds as to adult criminals. If, now, these

proportions obtain among us, supposing our population to be 39,000,000, "the dangerous classes" would number a quarter of a million—more than one-half of whom would be criminals. Now here is a secret caste, numbering at least 150,000, composed of thieves, forgers, robbers, burglars, and counterfeiters,—men and women guilty of prostitution, seduction, rape, and murder. Their business is crime. They have their capital and places of trade, their amusements, literature, and schools. They maintain a sort of loose family and social connection, and under the same laws of increase and education which work in honest communities. They are an organization of criminals for the purposes of crime. How far is society responsible for the existence of this guild of outlaws? How far is Quetelet's dictum—that "society prepares the crime, and the criminal commits it"—true?

Let us see. First come the capitalists of crime—the makers of counterfeiters' and burglars' implements; the receivers and vendors of stolen goods; the lenders of money on stolen goods; on "putting up" jobs, and for "spiriting away" offenders—also the owners and keepers of "flash-houses" for the resort, lodging, and concealment of criminals. Separated from the capitalists by a very narrow line, come the middlemen of crime: men and women who get their living by converting the vicious into criminals. Among these are the keepers of drinking-houses, stews, and dance-houses; the owners of rat-pits, dog-pits, cock-pits, and gambling hells. At another short remove come the amusements of the criminal class. Whatever excites or gratifies the baser passions, whatever stimulates the appetite for sufferings or hazards, is a source of pleasure and a means of amusement to them. The dog or prize fight, the rat and cock pit, badgering and baiting, horse-racing and public executions. Every kind of betting is their delight. All their pastimes are so many schools to brutalize the idle, the vagrant, and the young.

They have also their peculiar literature—dime novels, sporting papers, illustrated papers, doctor books, obscene prints, photographs. These papers are filled with the details of vice and crime. They debase and corrupt by their horrible and indecent pictures, and above all, by advertising the whole

paraphernalia of licentiousness. The agents of this lewd and licentious learning are found even in some of our remotest rural towns. It is a literature in which the heroes and heroines are thieves and prostitutes, and policemen and honest traders muffs. It foment criminal desires, and opens the way to criminal practices. In one case, at least, it circulated in a State prison. When a literature which is essentially "earthly, sensual, and devilish" circulates freely among the outside criminal population, and as in this instance (*XII. Ann. Report New York Prison Ass.*, p. 482. Quest. 800), by "corn-baskets full" among the prisoners themselves, is it to be wondered at that "self-abuse" is the vice of our prisons and penitentiaries?

III.—THE PRISON POPULATION.

The criminal is a cause of crime. This is not an idle play upon words. Like produces like. The prisoner, as a criminal, is a source of crime. As held in duration he forms a society by himself. So far as he is unemployed and vicious, he becomes a teacher of vice or crime to other persons. In the first stages of imprisonment offenders are generally huddled together irrespective of age, sex, or criminality. Not unfrequently we confine in the same room the criminal and the witness by whose testimony he is to be brought to justice. We commit the boy for doing nothing, because he has nothing to do, to the same apartment with the hardened offender, to be entertained, depraved, and educated for crime, by listening to the recital of its excitements and pleasures. The vagrant girl is lodged with the brazen prostitute. In such a community every thing tends lower. There is no general virtuous sentiment or opinion to control. The feeling of the imprisoned is a class-feeling, "and whatever tends to class-feeling tends to demoralization first, and then to degradation—not merely of the body, but of morals. Classes care only for the opinion of the class, elites for the opinion of the elite, clubs for the opinion of the club."

If, therefore, there is to be any recuperation in prison life, it must come from without. The officers must originate the

recovery, and society must demand such officers as possess this healing power. If selfish men are put to watch these degraded and hardened prisoners, their selfishness will harden them only the more. So long as prisons are looked upon merely as houses of detention and punishment, it matters not what the character of the keeper is, provided he keeps the prisoner safely; but if reformation is the aim of prison discipline, or restoration to society its issue, then the character of the keeper is of the first importance. He ought to be an evangelist; and no man is morally fit to be a warden, chaplain, or assistant, who lacks interest or faith in the prisoner's recovery. In securing this result the co-operation of the prisoner is indispensable. The keeper must know that enforced work is only less dangerous to the criminal's character than enforced idleness. Self-interest must be awakened. The criminal, even in his outlawry, retains something of a sense of justice and propriety, and these must be preserved and strengthened. They are our last hold on him. If you shut him up to the thought that he is a criminal, and is expected to continue such, you take hope from his horizon. He will emerge from the prison less fitted to assimilate with the honest community, than when it cast him out the first time. So far as seclusion from criminals outside and segregation or congregation with criminals inside were fitted to reform him, he has been reformed—and that is all. Formerly he was a free criminal, now he is an imprisoned criminal—his character is unchanged, and therefore he can never exert on himself or others any but a criminal influence. When he has served his time he becomes once more a free criminal, adding another to the sum of outside criminals—thus ever moving in a vicious and vitiating circle.

The proportion of the criminals restored, to the criminals released, is the test of the efficacy and efficiency of a system of prison discipline; and society is as truly responsible for those causes of crime which work upon the convict while in prison, as for those which brought him there. We separate the criminal element, because it is cheaper and safer when segregated than when diffused through the body politic; if, however, the period of segregation is badly managed, it may, at the time, cost the State as much pecuniarily, and, after the disturbing element

has been received back again, may cost more than if no imprisonment had taken place. Two things therefore must be sought imperatively :—

Reformation of the prisoner if possible.

Perpetual detention if not reformed.

IV.—THE LIBERATED CONVICTS.

The relation of society to this class of the criminal population, and its responsibility through them for the causes of crime, is a subject of vital interest and importance. The duty of society toward the convalescent criminal is of the most delicate nature. If there is enough power in the Gospel to reform the criminal, there ought to be enough power in it to lead us to treat the reformed criminal with confidence. So long as society does not believe in the reformation of convicts, it cannot stand at the open prison-door, and say to them truthfully, or to any good purpose: "Go and sin no more." One thing is certain, society must take back the released prisoner, or the penitentiary must. There is no middle ground. If society conspires against the convict, he must conspire against society—or die a martyr. If our scorn or suspicion hedge up his way to honesty, and open it to crime, we are responsible for that crime. Le Sage says: "A reformed drunkard should never be left in a cellar," yet this piece of uncharitableness we practise, when we demand more integrity and steadfastness from a reformed criminal than from an honest man. It is not the dream of optimists that thieves may repent. If Jesus of Nazareth offered one a place with him in Paradise, is it too much for us to offer him a place with us in the community? But it is not necessary to argue this point in detail. It is the logical conclusion to the cure of crime. A reformed criminal is not a criminal, and to treat him as if he were, is itself a crime. Facts gathered from the experience of France, Ireland, and especially Bavaria, favor the practice of the largest confidence, and the exercise of the broadest charity toward released convicts.

AXIOMS IN SOCIOLOGY.

The following axioms will help us better to understand the responsibility of society for the causes of crime:—

I. *Whatever exposes men to commit crime is a source of crime.*

Helplessness may be considered the sum of this exposure. Poverty is a kind of helplessness. Ignorance is a kind of helplessness—ignorance of reading, writing, and arithmetic; ignorance of a trade, language, laws, customs, etc. Orphanage is helplessness, as also are homelessness and imbecility. In all civilized countries, society has committed itself, in part, to the helpless, in each of its dependent phases. It provides alms-houses for the poor; schools for the ignorant; emigration commissioners for the foreigner; asylums for the orphan. What it needs to do, in order to meet all its obligations, is to enlarge, systematize, and enforce its supervision. If society has the right to take the property of the community for the support of paupers, it has the nobler right to legislate in respect to property, that there shall be no honest paupers but imbeciles. If society, for reasons of state, has the right to tax the rich for the education of the poor, it has the complementary right to compel attendance upon the means of education. The rich man's duty to support the school is the poor man's duty to attend it. The same principles which make society responsible for orphans *de jure*, make it responsible for orphans *de facto*—thus the children of criminals and friendless paupers would become the wards of the state.

Charity in its higher sphere, when it ceases to be a mere impulse and becomes a principle of equity as well, is an attempt to restore and maintain the lost balance between the rich and the poor. Its action may be individual or political, accidental or systematic; it is a moral libration, showing the unrest of the world; and any kind of help that does not tend to maintain an equilibrium is so far forth inadequate and injurious. Society must give each man the opportunity to secure his balance. It must teach every man to maintain it—and those who fail it must support. This may appear too

much like inaugurating a paternal government, but no government is too paternal that seeks to secure for each man, woman, and child the opportunity of bettering themselves. If they fail and fall, we feel bound in charity to help them; are we any less bound to guard against their failure or fall? We feel bound to purchase the pound of cure; are we any less bound to provide the ounce of prevention? So far as society legislates the disproportion between labor and capital, and thus produces poverty, hardship, hardness, and crime, it is responsible for crime. So far as society helps the strong, instead of, Christ-like, helping the weak, it is responsible for the crimes of that weakness. So far as society does not help the weak, in, Christ-like, bearing one another's burdens, it is responsible for certain crimes. So far as society does not restrain the strong, it is responsible for the crimes of that strength. Government exists for the weak.

II. *Whatever induces men to commit crime is a cause of crime.*

Under this head come gambling, prostitution, and drunkenness—the most productive of crime, and the most difficult of regulation. They are the three great criminal vices. Vices, so long as they are private; crimes, so soon as they become public. The difficulty of dealing with them is the difficulty of fixing this boundary line.

Let us first look at the difficulty in respect to gambling and prostitution. Both are occupations of choice, seldom of necessity. Both are public. There is not a house of assignation, ill-fame, or gambling that is not known to the police. The vagrant boy or girl, for doing nothing, having nothing honest to do, we imprison. What of the keepers and patrons of brothels and gambling hells? Is not the industry of this man and woman far more criminal than the idleness of that boy, or the vagrancy of that girl? That boy and girl are on the way to crime, it may be the road leading to those very "hells," and for this we herd them in jails full of old criminals to make their destruction surer—the keepers of the bawdy and gambling houses are criminals already, and they go "unwhipt of

justice." Is society quit of its duty so long as it knows of houses in which women publicly advertise licentiousness, and men as publicly tempt to fraud? The same question applies to the publication of obscene books, prints, and papers.

As to that most vexed question of drunkenness—that it is the most fruitful source of crime no one doubts—that it is a public vice is equally admitted. Its haunts are even better known than those of the gambler and courtesan. The latter are known to the whole police, the former to the whole public. Can the community do nothing better than license rum-shops and then build inebriate asylums? We put these two questions: First, Is there a single valid reason for a *drinking-house*? An ice-cream saloon or a soda-fountain may be a luxury, and an eating-house a necessity; but there is not a single argument of necessity or luxury for a dram-shop. Yet New York, in 1864, had twenty-one thousand two hundred and forty-two. One public drinking-place to every one hundred and eighty-three of her population. The other question is this: If drunkenness is a crime when it comes before the public, why cannot it be punished as well as theft or fraud, and *in the same manner*? Until a satisfactory answer is given to these two questions, society must be held responsible for the crimes of drunkenness and drinking-houses. As we approach the perilous line that divides between private vices and public crimes, legislative responsibility increases in delicacy and obligation, but a sound moral sense will help us to find the line, and to enforce the law.

III. *Whatever appeals to the baser passions and instincts is a source of crime.*

All the specific amusements of the criminal classes come under this axiom: such as dog-fighting, prize-fighting, and cock-fighting; baiting, badgering, ratting, and sparring. Debasement and cruelty mark them all. And all of them are known to the police. Why does society mulct these outrages just enough to give them zest in the eyes of their perpetrators and patrons? Henry Bergh's interposition to prevent cruelty to animals points the way in which legislation and

public morality should go, though horse-racing, agricultural-fair trotting, and the furor which travelling ball-clubs and international boat-racing excite, show that there is yet a long way to travel.

IV. *Whatever, in the administration of justice, outrages justice is a cause of crime.*

The whole prison area needs reformation, from the commitment of the prisoner to his release. The incompetent treatment of crime is a source of crime: not promptly to ferret out criminals is incompetent treatment; not carefully to classify criminals is incompetent treatment; not adequately to punish criminals is incompetent treatment. A just system of penal treatment must secure a classification of criminals, and also a classification of penalties. It must seek and maintain the line that divides the hopeless from the hopeful, and when hope of reformation ceases, hope of liberation should cease too. Penalties should be just, rewards generous. The former must commend themselves to the criminal's conscience, the latter to his affections. To intrust these important and delicate responsibilities to political or perfunctory agents is itself a fruitful source of crime, both among criminals and prisoners. May "the keeper of the prison" at Philippi have a large succession.

V. *Whatever evinces an inadequate repressive legislation is a cause of crime.*

An inefficient, insufficient, or low-toned police is an encouragement to crime, because it offers such large chances against detection. Prevention is better than apprehension. The eye of the vigilant patrolman is a greater terror to the man who meditates crime, than a score of detectives, after he has committed it. This is especially true of crimes of premeditation, as compared with crimes of passion. Statistics show that crimes against property are four times as numerous as crimes against persons, and of these the great majority are crimes of reflection. When we come to crimes against persons, we find the major part are unpremeditated. Most criminal acts are secret, or depend on skill and opportunity. Cowardice

rather than courage marks crimes. There are twenty petit larcenies to one robbery; seven grand larcenies to one burglary. Even the boldest crimes carry the badge of cowardice—the burglar works under cover of night, and the robber lurks in secrecy. Inexperience, too, and first attempts characterize large numbers of offences. Therefore, so far as crimes of inexperience, cowardice, and premeditation are concerned, a vigilant and sufficient police is more repressive and deterrent than a vigorous judiciary or a rigorous imprisonment.

An inefficient judiciary and executive encourage crime by offering chances of non-commitment, non-conviction, or easy pardon. The significance of this statement will be seen when we consider the aggregate of the prisoner's chances of escape from punishment. It is estimated that the chances in favor of the criminal between his commission of a crime and his commitment, is eighty-three per cent.; between commitment and conviction, five per cent.; between imprisonment and pardon before expiration of sentence, fifteen per cent. Thus, in the lottery of crime, there are eighty-eight chances out of a hundred against the honest community before the criminal is incarcerated, and from fifteen to twenty per cent. after he is in prison. It is hardly necessary to say that so many chances in favor of the criminal are so many encouragements to commit crime. These facts give new force to Beccaria's maxim of *certainty* in punishment. Certainty is of the essence of prevention. It ties the penalty to the crime, and the criminal to the executioner. One of the main ingredients of certainty is celerity. Certainty makes the bond between crime and punishment indissoluble, and celerity makes it formidable.

The efficiency of a police system is measured by the number of criminals committed compared with the number of crimes committed.

The efficiency of the judiciary is measured by the proportion of convictions to the number of commitments.

The efficiency of a penal system is measured by the proportion of released convicts to the number of recidivists.

In conclusion: The responsibility of society for the causes

of crime is very great, and the amount of crime is very formidable, but the work of prevention, punishment, and reclamation, is far from being hopeless. Even crime has its compensations. Its habitat is known. Its area is limited and definite. It lies in and about the great centres of population, and along the main lines of travel and traffic. Its largest masses move in the smallest orbits. Criminals are chiefly recruited from the ignorant, the idle, the homeless, and the friendless. They are found in force wherever there are grog-shops, houses of ill-fame, brutal sports, and betting. It is a population fully known to the police—their practices, haunts, and pastimes; their capitalists, panders, and customers. The known criminal population of England and Wales numbers 134,323, one-fifth of whom make London their head-quarters. What is so public, defined, and limited, must be, in a great measure, preventible, punishable, and reclaimable.

The harmonizing of labor and capital; compulsory education; legislative control of the idle, the vagrant, and the helpless; a prompt and rigid prosecution and punishment of the capitalists and caterers of crime, and an enlarged and enlightened application of the law of kindness to prison discipline, will diminish crime to a minimum, by changing it to virtue, or reducing it to vice.

ART. III.—*Considerations on the Revision of the English Version of the New Testament.* By BISHOP ELLICOTT.

Trench on Bible Revision. Second Edition.

Westcott's History of the English Bible.

The London Quarterly Review. April, 1870.

Revision of the Gospel of St. John, and three Epistles of St.

THE revision of the authorized version of the Bible is no longer a question of propriety; it is already begun, and will, in due course, be accomplished. All who read the English Bible are therefore interested to know the principles upon which the

revision is to be made, and the amount of change contemplated. The discussion of the subject has excited far more attention in England than in this country. During ten years past it has given rise to several volumes, and to frequent articles in the magazines and in the daily papers. Public opinion has been essentially changed. Many who once disapproved, now promote revision; and many who would be glad to leave well alone, are convinced that such a course is no longer possible, and take part in the work in order to insure its accomplishment in a right way, and to forestall the appearance of a more radical change. Much good has resulted in the thorough investigation of the history of our version, and of the principles upon which it was made. Mistakes of recent scholars are no longer excusable. Mr. Westcott has shown conclusively in the work of Mr. Froude—which multitudes will take as their guide, not only because of his popularity, but also his reputation as an investigator, and for correcting the mistakes of others—that there are whole paragraphs in which the misstatements are as frequent as the statements. So, too, Mr. Marsh is corrected, especially when he denies the independence of Tyndale's translation, declaring it to be but a reissue of Wicliffe's (Ellicott, p. 61), not to mention the statement in older writers, like Mr. Hallam, that Tyndale's version was avowedly made from Luther's and from the Vulgate. And besides this historical service, much has been done in the way of direct criticism of the translation; so that instead of vague and general charges, a mass of information is collecting as to what are the errors, and what the sources to which they are severally due. Works like those of Trench and Scrivener, and Westcott's history of the authorized version, and Ellicott's, are valuable contributions to literature, although a work which shall collect and classify the details of the whole subject is not yet possible, but may be hoped for in the future as one result of the labors now in progress.

No one engaged in this movement thinks of a new translation, but only of a revision of our old translation. This fact removes many serious objections, and softens the prejudice with which every one approaches this subject. There is no intention to furnish supports for individual or denominational views.

Were that the case we should certainly have at least a Rationalistic, a Baptist, perhaps a Prelatical, as well as a Common Bible. The efforts already made in this direction are a safe warning for those who are seeking reverently to amend from a purely scholarly point of view. Nor is it proposed to sacrifice religious associations, or alter the classical character of our Bible. A critical age is not attempting to rival or replace the choicest production of a creative age. Bishop Ellicott does not offer to supersede William Tyndale. The design is, to take another step in the line of improvement arrested in 1611, which is thought to be required by changes in our own language, and by increase of critical and grammatical knowledge of the original texts. A marked characteristic of the promoters of revision is the determination to root this work deeply into the spirit and principles of the early translators, to make it no more than another stage of growth, to lose nothing more than is absolutely necessary of the vocabulary and the very aroma of the old Bible. Whether they propose to themselves impossibilities or not, we may judge later—but this is what is proposed, and if the English reading public do not pronounce that they have succeeded, they do not ask acceptance. A work growing out of such a conflict as the Reformation, for which a man unrivalled in literature for qualifications as a translator was provided in William Tyndale, contains more than any living English scholars, working in this department, imagine they can produce. But what Tyndale effected was repeatedly revised until a standard text was reached, with but little loss of the best of his work : so, it is hoped, it may be again.

Personal genius was the foundation of the great success. From the moment when, at his patron's table, he declared to a priest who was present, "that, if God spared him life, ere many years he would cause a boy that driveth the plough to know more of the Scriptures than the Pope did"—through all his persecutions on the Continent, selling through the trade one edition of his Bible, for which the English ecclesiastics offered an extravagant price to burn it, and using the money to publish a new and better one—until toward the close of his life he could solemnly write from the Tower, "I call God to record, against the day we shall appear before our Lord Jesus, to

give a reckoning of our doings, that I never altered one syllable of God's word against my conscience, nor would this day, if all that is in the earth, whether it be pleasure, honor, or riches, might he given me"—his life was given to the one object of giving to the people God's word in its purity, and to him we owe the English of our version. This fact is clearly made out; any one may convince himself of it in a very brief comparison of Tyndale's with the authorized version. Every subsequent edition in the line of direct descent from Tyndale's professed to do no more than correct and amend (Ellicott, p. 79). Coverdale's even does no more. Matthews' (or John Rogers') Bible gives little more in the New Testament than Tyndale's own corrections, with some preserved from Coverdale. The Great Bible, or Cranmer's Bible, in the New Testament, was Tyndale's again, submitted to several revisers. This was the Bible of England until ten years of Elizabeth's reign. The Genevan Bible introduced more changes, and has been the source of many of the corrections in the authorized version. To supersede it, through jealousy of its popularity, the Bishop's Bible was made in 1568—avowedly a revision of Cranmer's, and the rules imposed upon the revisers of 1611 required that as few changes as possible should be made in the current version, and that the authorities consulted should be the versions of Tyndale, Coverdale, Matthew, Cranmer, and the Genevan. Only personal inspection will verify this general statement, but there needs no proof to one who will compare them, that the genius of the language of the authorized version is still Tyndale's, and that the improvements made are due only to revision.

How closely the present movement is intended to be assimilated to what has gone before will be understood best by as brief as possible a statement of the principles laid down in Bishop Ellicott's seventh chapter, which have doubtless been already adopted by the revisers.

1st. He insists that Convocation is the best possible body to appoint revisers and supervise the work. One current objection has been, that it should be a national and an international work. Parliament has been urged to it, and the proposition made that the President of the United States be requested to

appoint scholars to co-operate. The great advantage claimed for the course now adopted is, that far less radical and dangerous changes will be made than if it were done in these days under government auspices. The design of those engaged is to satisfy reasonable demands for improvement, by as little change as can possibly be made.

By inviting eminent scholars of every other denomination, the danger of *denominational* changes will be avoided. All must agree. This point was insisted on in the preparation of the authorized version. One of the instructions given and specially inculcated was, that the ecclesiastical terms should not be changed—church, rather than congregation—baptism, not washing. This will be necessarily secured by the mixed composition of the body. The charges made against our version of corruption from doctrinal interest have never been well sustained. The revisers of 1611 removed some things which the existing Roman Catholic controversy induced in the earlier versions, and if any thing of this sort remains, it is more likely to be removed than new causes of disagreement to be introduced (Trench, ch. 10). To quote Bishop Ellicott's words: "A body so constituted, can hope that their work will take the place of the venerable version now in our hands only by being that version, not only generally and substantially, but that version in all its details, save only those where amending hands may have removed some scattered errors and imperfections." The Presbyterians and Nonconformists are coming to the work with great cordiality. Among all the scholars invited, refusals have come only from Dr. Newman, Dr. Pusey, and Dr. Tregelles—the latter only on account of the state of his health. With such a body, whether they would or not, a leading rule must necessarily be, as in 1611, "the least possible change consistent with faithfulness" (p. 206).

2d. A point much insisted on is, that the work must be done round a common table. It is shown that this method of co-operative labor secured for the authorized version much of its excellence. But it was not fully carried out. The New Testament was divided between two companies of eight each, one sitting at Oxford and one in Westminster. And by this means some, not all indeed, of the needless variations of the

translation were introduced. Consistency of rendering, and harmony in the application of grammatical principles, can only be obtained by consultation. Every scholar would, of course, do his own work thoroughly, in private and in writing, but every change must be submitted to a formal vote.

3d. The work should be done tentatively—a record made of principles arrived at, and rules of rendering kept, and tested by every new instance which arises. Thus a series of general principles would, by degrees, be arrived at.

4th. To make the revision fairly sufficient, but to guard it most carefully, distinguishing between necessary corrections and supposed improvements.

5th. In corrections, limit the choice of words to *the vocabulary of the present version*, combined with that of the versions which preceded it; and in alterations preserve as far as possible the rhythm and cadence of the authorized version. This was a rule imposed upon the revisers of 1611. The need of it is vastly greater in any thing done now, and except in the case of certain archaisms, there will be little difficulty in carrying out the rule. Where the meaning of words has changed, in some cases, other equivalents may have to be adopted. "The revised version must be popular. It must be heard as well as read. It must be such that no consciousness of novelty is awakened in the mind of hearer or reader. In a word, we must never be reminded that we are not hearing the old version." This result may be largely secured by adhering to a strictly biblical vocabulary. Whether it is possible may be tried experimentally; but this is the aim.

6th. In every case of dispute, the vote is to be reserved till the next meeting. A two-thirds vote shall be required to make a final change.

7th. In doubtful passages, the alternative reading should be placed in the margin, yet always so that, in the opinion of two-thirds, the text shall be better than the margin.

8th. The spirit of the rules of the revisers of 1611 shall be faithfully observed.

Such rules, in the hands of such scholarship, both Greek and English, as is now engaged upon the work, will secure the utmost conservatism consistent with the object sought.

The argument for revision is twofold : the improved knowledge of the original text, and the necessity for correcting mistranslation. In the first, the difficulty mainly belongs to the New Testament, the Hebrew text being comparatively uniform. In the second, the Old Testament needs amendment the most, partly because of the intrinsic difficulties, and partly, doubtless, because Tyndale had no direct hand in the authorized version of the Old Testament, further than the historical portions. The two divisions of the Bible are to be intrusted to two separate bodies of revisers, who are afterward to compare and harmonize their work. In this article, only the New Testament branch of the subject is presented.

A strong argument for revision is derived from the advance made in the critical knowledge of the text. The labor of many lives has been spent in this field. And the results obtained are so important that there can be no excuse for not making the people at large acquainted with them. The question of conscience at once occurs. Is it honest to present to the people as the Word of God, words, texts, even whole passages, which we do not ourselves believe were ever written by inspiration ? This argument is much exaggerated, especially by those who have the least practical acquaintance with the subject. But it is seriously felt by those who have the most.

And yet, on the other hand, this very subject, the condition of the original text, affords one of the most solid reasons for not proceeding in the work at the present time. And that for the obvious reason that what is done now will certainly have to be undone, and done over again in the future, to an indefinite extent. No revised text has been yet reached which commands the assent of any two critics. In many cases where the critics agree, the exegetes do not. And in many cases where all agree, upon evidence as now possessed, great hesitation would be felt in disturbing the version in important passages, both because of the weight of testimony which has to be set aside, and because of the possibility of the discovery of greater light in the future. From an analysis of Tischendorf's editions, it appears that between his third and seventh editions, of 1849 and 1859, respectively, there are 1296 variations, and that in nearly half of these he returns, in the later

edition, to the common text. But in the edition now publishing, in the first thirty-two chapters, he reverses his judgment of 1859, in one hundred and sixty-eight places, and falls back on his earlier opinion of 1849 (p. 47). Evidently no text of any one editor can be taken.

These facts are clearly recognized by those having the work in hand, so that they do not propose as a preliminary labor to settle upon a new *textus receptus*. This must be hoped for only in the future. They propose, therefore, to introduce changes only in cases where the best editors agree, and in which, it is supposed, upon exhibition of the evidence there would be a unanimous conviction on the part of the revisers. Ellicott estimates, upon careful comparison, that in nearly one half the cases in which reasonable doubt exists, there would be a general consent of critics. But the formation of a critical judgment sufficient to justify the interpretation in a commentary, becomes a much more serious thing when it is proposed to alter the vernacular Bible of the people. In the one case opinion is given for what it is worth, supported by argument, and qualified by concession of the force of conflicting testimony. In the other, there is a positive statement of the result of modern scholarship as to what is the Word of God. It is very doubtful whether the consent of the best editors is a sufficient reason for making changes now, because there is a constant and rapid increase in critical materials every year. The most important manuscript of the New Testament has only been in the possession of its editor about ten years, and still less time published to the knowledge of scholars. And what reason is there to take for granted that the oldest, and the last extant, manuscript or fragment has yet been unearthed. It is neither impossible nor improbable that other monuments of antiquity may yet come to the relief of the mind of the church.* Besides this, an immense amount of work is still doing

* The *Saturday Review*, October 1, 1870:—"The manuscripts by means of which the Greek and Roman classics have been preserved through the dim twilight of the Middle Ages are neither numerous, nor, for the most part, very ancient. There survive a fragment or two of Virgil at Florence, which some venture to date as early as the third century; another in the Vatican, and a portion of Dion Cassius, possibly written in the fourth century; a palimpsest of Homer in the British Museum, and a Sallust in the Vatican, both ascribed to the

in the text of the old versions. It is said that the knowledge of the Eastern versions has not been brought to any thing like as satisfactory a condition as of other materials. Tischendorf himself is said to derive his knowledge of the Syriac at second hand. And the profound labors of Tregelles and others in the text of the quotations in the Fathers, are things of to-day.

fifth century. Some poor wrecks of the Greek dramatists, recently swept into the Imperial Library at St. Petersburg, complete the meagre list of very old authorities on which our classical texts are constructed, and even those of comparatively modern date are far from considerable either in merit or in number. A portion of Æschylus' masterpiece, the Orestean trilogy, has come down to us virtually in a single mutilated codex. The more popular of the Christian fathers, such as Chrysostom and Augustine, have fared somewhat better at the hands of monkish scribes. Yet of the genuine Epistle of Clement of Rome, the contemporary of the Apostles, only one copy is known to exist, that annexed to the Alexandrian manuscript of the Bible in the British Museum. Even of so important a treatise as Irenæus "Against Heresies," though it must always have been the very text-book of early Christian history, the best manuscript (now in the possession of Sir Thomas Phillips, at Middle Hill) is as recent as the eleventh century. Thus the critical materials within the reach of editors of classical and patristic writings have been brought together without inordinate labor or difficulty, and no true scholar can have used them without oftentimes wishing for more abundant and less uncertain light, while seeking to thread the mazes of some obscure and intricate passage. Those, on the other hand, who attempt to master the criticism of the Greek Testament, soon come to understand what the poet meant when he complained, *inopem me copia fecit*. When men had few books to read, the demand for those few must have been very pressing indeed. Every church, every monastic library, the closet of every learned ecclesiastic, must, of course, have been supplied with at least one copy of the New Testament. The principal Eastern convents, such as those of Mount Athos, of Patmos, and of Saint Saba in the desert of South Palestine, contain even to this day a large collection of them, widely differing from each other in age, in style, and even more in regard to intrinsic value. Considerably above one thousand manuscripts of the Greek Testament (those of the Latin Vulgate version must be well-nigh countless) have been already catalogued by those who have made this subject their study. In whatsoever direction we turn, more are constantly coming to view. Only last year, eight were brought to England from so unlikely a spot as Jamina, in Epirus. An unwrought mine of similar wealth is believed to exist in Roumania, especially in the mansions of those old families whose ancestors fled thither from Constantinople just before its capture. Of all this mass of documents, illustrative in widely different degrees, yet nearly all in some degree, of the very title-deeds of our Christian faith, not one twentieth part has hitherto been examined at all, while too many of the collations which have been executed, are known to be so loose and inaccurate, that it would have been in every way better had the codices been left untouched by the incompetent hands that have rashly meddled with them."

The men who have brought the subject to its present condition, which has created the necessity for revision, are still living and at work. Many of the principles of criticism are still in dispute. Surely the time is not ripe for a final emendation of the text. And until that has been obtained there cannot be a final revision of the authorized version. The only answer to this argument that change now would be the inauguration of endless changes in the future, is that fidelity to the truth requires the results of modern scholarship to be published to the people; but this is really a begging of the question. The question is, are these results sufficiently secure to be trusted as final? * What does fidelity to truth demand? Is it not best not to be too hasty in deciding on such a matter? Should not critical principles and facts be allowed more time for settlement, and is it well to presume upon them when, as now, the most important results are so recent, and when every year adds to the sources of correction. So far as fidelity is concerned, the conscientious work of the English revisers seems to meet every demand. The materials are now in the hands of all students. Even English readers may assure themselves of the amount of change which has taken place by means of critical editions of the English text, and by the discussion of the subject in popular periodicals. And while it is most desirable that the results of recent interest in the subject should not be lost, and the labor of living men best qualified for it, and sure to apply right principles to it, secured, still it seems evident that what is now done should only be as a step forward toward a future revision: that any new Bible now published should be for scholars only; and that church authority and Bible societies should not be committed to what can certainly hold its own only for a time. The objection to the loss of stock on hand in Bibles and stereotype plates is worthless on the supposition that it could be replaced

* The controversy between the authority of the oldest manuscripts and the greater mass of more recent manuscripts is still going on. Mr. Scrivener would give more authority to the latter than others are willing to do. And Tregelles is criticised for excessive adherence to the former, so restricting the range of his authorities as to assimilate his text to Lachmann's, though from different principles. Ellicott himself has changed in this respect since he began to publish on the New Testament.—*Saturday Review*, October 1, 1870.

by better. But the knowledge that the revised Bible must be replaced by new revisions, at no one knows what interval, would seriously hamper the enterprise both of business and benevolence in the issue and distribution of the vernacular Bible.

The amount of change required in the Greek text is surprisingly small, considering the antiquity of the book; and the lax way in which the common text was made. It is traced to the fourth of Erasmus, which contains about five hundred improvements upon his first; and his first was published after six months' labor, from a cursive manuscript with a late text, with comparison of a few others of the same character; setting aside a much older one in his possession, which is now considered ancient and among the best, for the reason that it differed so much from the others in hand. The revisers of 1611 used Beza's fourth, and the Stephens' fourth, which were both based on Erasmus, differing from it less than his fourth from his first. In neither was any thorough critical appeal made even to the most ancient manuscripts then in possession. The whole controversy about the comparative authority of the ancient and modern texts, the demonstration of the former by means of comparative criticism, by Bentley and Bengel, and Griesbach and Lachmann, as well as the abundant researches of other editors, are all subsequent to that time. That no more serious differences have been proved, illustrates not so much the wonderful scholarly tact of Erasmus as it does the fidelity of the church in the transmission of the Scriptures and the care of Providence over the Word.

The amount of change in the revised English version required by the principle of the consent of editors has been pretty accurately estimated. Westcott thinks these changes would be more numerous and serious than those required by errors in translation. Ellicott, probably justly, disputes this estimate. He bases a calculation upon a revision, published by five clergymen, of St. John's Gospel and three of Paul's Epistles, extending the proportion there observed to the whole New Testament, and arrives at the result that about fourteen hundred changes in all would be necessary, or about one in every five verses. Many of these are unimportant. But that

some judgment may be formed of the character of them, a few examples will be enumerated.

Among the more important instances are usually included the last twelve verses of the Gospel of Mark. But certainly consent of critics cannot be claimed in this case. Authorities and arguments are pretty evenly balanced. Tischendorf, with the Vatican and the Sinaitic manuscripts, omits them; Tregelles holds that they could not have belonged to the original form of the Gospel as written by Mark, but were added so early by some other hand, that they must be regarded as part of the canonical Gospel. The revisers would probably not venture upon the omission.

Consent would exclude the last clause of the third and the whole of the fourth verse of John v., which are traced to three marginal scholia gradually incorporated into the text. (Tregelles' *History of Printed Text*.) Thus the whole reference to the angel as the agent in troubling the water, and the restriction of the case to those first going in, are omitted, relieving some exegetical difficulties.

The same rule excludes the twelve verses, John vii. 53—viii. 11, the account of the woman taken in adultery, which no one can lose without regret, and yet which is said to have appeared in no New Testament manuscript until after the middle of the fourth century. The evidence alike of manuscript versions and fathers is in this instance all on one side. It is not improbable, indeed, that the incident is historically true, preserved by extra-canonical tradition; but no rules of accurate criticism could accord it a place in the text.

Acts viii. 37, Erasmus inserted bodily from the Vulgate, having seen it only in the margin of a Greek manuscript. No critical text now admits it. The words are important, and often quoted for support of doctrine. "And Philip said, If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." The revisers would undoubtedly omit the verse, although, in this case again, its origin is very ancient.

To the same source are due the words in Acts ix. 5, 6: "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks. And he, trembling and astonished, said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?"

And the Lord said to him"—the gloss occurs in no Greek manuscript. Erasmus took it from the Vulgate. In this case, however, the words are not lost from the book, since in the parallel passages, Acts xxvi. 14, we have, "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks," and in xxii. 10, "And I said, What shall I do, Lord?"

Of the famous passages disputed on theological grounds, 1 John v. 7, 8, the testimony of the heavenly witnesses (*ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ πατήρ, ὁ λόγος, καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα · καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἓν εἰσι. Καὶ τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῆ*) would certainly be omitted, as occurring in no ancient manuscript. Tregelles says the passage is the only one in which the common text was influenced by the Complutensian edition.

The rule proposed would read in 1 Tim. iii. 16: "Great is the mystery of Godliness, *who* was manifest in the flesh"—instead of "God was manifest, etc.

And in Acts xx. 28—"to feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood," the editors agree in preferring the reading *κυρίου* instead of *θεοῦ*, "the church of the Lord which he hath purchased," notwithstanding both the Vatican and Sinaitic manuscripts, read *θεοῦ*. In a case like this, where there is so much evidence on the other side, the English revisers would probably make no change. In one sense the concession of every doubtful reading of this sort would be a gain, because the truth of the statement often made, and more often questioned, would be demonstrated, that after every change which the most rigorous criticism would demand had been made, the substantial ground of no doctrine of the Scriptures would be changed, nor would the convictions of any reader of the Scriptures be changed. While errors stand which favor certain doctrines, it is easy to create an impression that they are essential to their support. But essential truth rests on no isolated proof texts. The whole text is compact with truth, and essential truths stated in the text are revealed in the historical development of the church from the beginning, so that more danger is to be apprehended from weakly clinging to unnecessary and unreal supports, which distract attention from the real, than from committing ourselves to the results of the most rigid investigation.

There is no limit to which the illustration of disputed passages may not be carried.

Matthew ix. 17—*τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν; οὐδεὶς ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ εἷς, ὁ θεός*—Tischendorf and Tregelles read, *τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθός*. Scrivener disputes. (In the parallel passages, Mark x. 18, the reading is as in the common text of Matthew.) And one passage bearing the other way, 1 Peter iii. 15: *κύριον δὲ τὸν θεὸν ἀγιάσατε*—where evidence is all for *Χριστόν*—and as the expression replaces, in a quotation from the Septuagint, the words, “Jehovah of hosts himself,” Isaiah viii. 12, 13, it is a strong text for the divinity of Christ.

In the case of the Lord’s prayer, critical consent would leave out the doxology, Matthew vi. 13, “for thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever and ever, Amen.” It would probably change the present tense, *ἀφίμεν*, as we forgive our debtors, into the aorist,* *ἀφήκαμεν*, as we *forgave*, in this case strengthening the force of the condition by turning from a general statement of a habit, or a purpose to forgive, to some actual instance in experience, in which one is less likely to deceive himself. The form of the prayer, as given by Luke, has, since Griesbach’s day, stood thus with the critics—“Father, hallowed be thy name; thy kingdom come, give us this day our daily bread, and forgive us our sins, for we also forgive every one that is indebted to us, and lead us not into temptation.”

But enough has been cited to show that both as to extent and doctrinal importance, the critical changes are not so slight as has often been asserted.

But there are a multitude of minor cases, affecting words, and their collocation, which alter the turn of thought, and in which very often there is a crispness and originality about the revised text which has been lost by supposed amendments, or the carelessness of transcribers. It is exceedingly difficult to present examples of this sort, because the modification is often slight, and because a number of instances carefully compared are necessary to produce an adequate impression.

Taking Ellicott’s revision of the Sermon on the Mount, we

* Ellicott calls this *a perfect*, and translates it “have forgiven,” p. 146.

find, besides the instance already given, the following, which he thinks considerable enough to require correction :—

Matthew v. 22. "Whosoever is angry with his brother, without a cause"—the words "without a cause" are so doubtful he would advocate a marginal reading.

25. "While thou art with him in the way," is better than "while thou art in the way with him."

27. "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time"—omit "by them of old time."

30. "Thy whole body should go"—not "be cast into hell."

44. "Love your enemies and pray for them which persecute you"—omit "bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you;" and before "persecute you," omit "despitefully use you and."

Matthew vi. 1. "Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men," instead of "alms."

4, 6, 18. Omit "openly," "Thy father which seeth in secret, himself shall reward thee."

5. "And when ye pray, ye shall not be,"—"thou prayest thou shalt not be."

21. "For thy and thine," read "your."

34. "The morrow shall be careful for itself"—omit "the things of."

Matthew vii. 2. "It shall be measured to you"—omit "again."

9. "Of whom if his son ask," read "of whom his son shall ask bread."

From Romans v.—viii :—

Romans v. 1. "We have peace with God," read "let us have."

Romans vi. 1. "Are we to continue in sin," for "shall we."

11. "In Christ Jesus," for "through Jesus Christ our Lord."

12. "Obey the lusts thereof," for "it [the body] in the lusts thereof."

Romans vii. 6. "Having died unto that wherein we were held," for "that being dead, etc."

18. "But to perform that which is good, is not," for "how to perform I find not."

Romans viii. 1. "There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus," omit "who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit."

These may serve for illustration. The two passages are taken from a part of the New Testament with a comparatively pure text. Much more change would be found in some other portions. It will be remembered that in some of the more important cases given above, it is believed that such opposition would arise as would prevent alteration, yet enough is left to show that one of the gravest difficulties must arise from this source. And that whenever, if ever, there shall be found a text which commands universal acceptance, there will be another revision. The question whether fidelity requires

alteration in the present state of knowledge, may be judged from most important instances which have been adduced. Elliott seems to treat this difficulty too slightly, when he thinks that an almost unanimous opinion could be reached on the principle of the consent of editors. Yet it is believed, on the other hand, that whatever dissatisfaction may at first arise from changes in our familiar Bible, it will, in the course of time, subside, when it is found that after all no truth is compromised.

This unsatisfactory condition of the original text excites in many minds difficulties about the doctrine of verbal inspiration. Criticism has had to fight its way from the first against the prejudice naturally felt from this source. On the contrary, the highest doctrine of verbal inspiration ought to produce the most careful investigation into the actual words of inspiration. To say that because the *ipsissima verba* were originally inspired, there can now be no doubt what the *ipsissima verba* originally given were, is a doctrine which requires the infallibility of the church, infallibly preserving the text, in order to be consistently held. Only mistaken reverence would deprecate strict inquiry, by endeavoring to maintain the inspiration of mistakes. The work of criticism is to eliminate the corruptions of human origin from the word which came from heaven. And no more convincing proof, of an external kind, of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures need be asked, than the wonderful integrity and purity both of canon and text, when we consider the means adopted by Providence for securing the results.

Turning now to the second branch of the subject, the necessity for correcting mistranslations, no such radical difficulty bars the way, although at first much difference of opinion as to the application of the previously mentioned principles must be expected.

Among the cases requiring revision, may be selected, first, a few of those where the translation affects the doctrine conveyed: always remembering that the doctrine of the clause mistranslated alone is in question. No case has yet been adduced where the real foundation for any doctrine of the Scriptures has been affected, and, in many cases, the very idea

wrongly incorporated in the words lies explicitly or by implication in the immediate context.

The principal instance of this kind adduced is the passage in Romans v. 15, 17, 18, 19, where the omission of the article in the English version obscures the sense, and, according to Bentley (Trench, p. 117; Ellicott, p. 101), opens the way for some hurtful mistakes about partial redemption and absolute reprobation. Verse 12, the Apostle says, "that by one man sin entered the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon *all men*—for that all sinned." Then verse 15, for if through the offence of one (τοῦ ἑνός) many (οἱ πολλοὶ) be dead, much more the grace of God by one man (τοῦ ἑνός), Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many (εἰς τοῖς πολλοῖς). All commentators agree that "the many" in the first clause are an antithesis to "the one," and an equivalent to the πάντες, "all," of verse 12. Trench and Ellicott both quote Bentley approvingly, in making "the many" of the second clause co-extensive with "the many" of the first—the grace of God by Jesus Christ hath abounded unto "the many," *i. e.*, the entire species of mankind, exclusive only of the one. So again, verse 18, "as by 'the one' man's disobedience 'the many' were made sinners, so by the obedience of 'the one' 'the many' shall be made righteous." Pushed to the extreme, the passage would teach Universalism. But this must be guarded against by exegetical considerations, (1.) either by understanding the statement as referring to the offer and sufficiency of the Gospel, (2.) or by limiting the universal terms by the idea of the context, all in Christ, all believers. Evidently it is interpretation and not translation, when the English version avoids the difficulty by omitting repeatedly words, from their position, most significant, and doing so they really make the words teach positively, what is only taught inferentially in the passage, and is not contained in the clause in dispute at all. For if many are dead, and many are justified, the language clearly teaches that *all are not*. And it easily lends itself to the interpretation that it is not offered to all, or not intended for all. Here are questions between Universalism on the one side, and a limited atonement in the strictest sense on the other, affected by the translation. Now, while it is clear that this

omission is a subordinate consideration to the greater doctrine of the passage, and while the advocates of each interpretation look for their support in the analogy of Scripture, and are not affected by the English text, and while the universal statement remains even more strongly pronounced in verse 18, it must be admitted that the English reader would naturally be biassed by the difference in this clause, where the translator introduces a question not contained in the original, and that the scope and nexus of the whole passage would be apprehended more clearly if the strong antithesis of the original were preserved in our English text.

Again, 1 Corinthians xi. 29, "Wherefore he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself, not discerning the Lord's body." This passage has been the fruitful source of superstition as regards the Sacrament, has burdened many consciences, and kept many, for a time at least, away from the Lord's table. The word *κρῖμα* probably never means damnation, in the absolute sense of final perdition, although so translated six times in the English version—elsewhere also by "judgment" and "condemnation." The effect upon the reader would be entirely different if he saw that the condemnation is limited to the specific sin of unworthy partaking. And when to this is added the consideration, that the *ἀναξίως* is one of the instances which modern critics agree in dropping, the idea becomes still more clear, "he that eateth and drinketh, eateth and drinketh condemnation to himself, if, or because, he discerneth not, or not discerning the Lord's body." (See Tregelles, *Printed Text*). In verse 27, prejudice has been charged upon the translators, for using *and* for *or*, "eat this bread *and* drink this cup," instead of "*or* drink," in order to avoid the inference that the communion might be taken in one kind. The charge cannot be substantiated, although the mistake is obvious.

A curious instance is Hebrews x. 38, "The just shall live by faith; but if (*any man*, sc.) draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him," where the words *any man* are supplied as the subject of *ὑποστείληται*, whereas the most obvious construction makes *δίκαιος*, in the previous clause, the subject (so Tyndale. "If *he* draw back." So Coverdale and Cran-

mer)—the change being made to avoid the implication that it was possible for a believer, one who “lives by faith,” to draw back. Winer authorizes the subject *ἄνθρωπος* as derived from *δίκαιος*. Three considerations favor the stricter rendering. 1st. The verse is a quotation from the Septuagint, *Ἰαβακκὺκ*, ii. 3, and inverts the clauses for the sake of avoiding the mistake of making *ἐρχόμενος* of Hebrews x. 37, the subject of *ὑποστειλῆται*, He that cometh shall come, etc. If the order of the quotation was changed to prevent error as to the subject of the verb, it is not likely another error would be risked by the new collocation. 2d. The analogy of the Epistle favors the stricter rendering, as it contains several passages where the hypothesis of the possibility of falling from grace is discussed. And 3d. It is right to supply nothing, when the grammatical construction is perfect, unless forced by exegetical necessity. The same verse offers two other minor points for correction. The critics supply *μου* after *δίκαιος*, “my just one.” And the future time of the words, “my soul *shall* have no pleasure in him,” is not in the Greek, but “my soul hath.”

Acts ii. 47—“The Lord added daily to the church those that should be saved,” *τοὺς σωζόμενους*, and not the future passive. The charge has been confidently made that our translators altered the tense in order to gain support to the doctrine of predestination. Whereas the original obviously requires “those who were being saved,” or were in the way of partaking of the salvation which was preached. There is, probably, no foundation for the charge as to motive, as the mere awkwardness of the translation is enough to account for the change, and yet a different sense is given. A great deal has been made of this passage in England. This, with the last instance from Hebrews x. 38, are the passages which have been mainly, though not exclusively, relied upon in proof of the charge of Calvinistic bias in our translators, as against Arminianism. They do not avail for the impeachment of motive in the translation, although they serve properly as an illustration of errors which involve doctrinal questions.

The critical history of this verse also is very unsatisfactory. Modern authorities reject the *ἐκκλησία*, and complete the sentence by the first words of the following chapter (iii.), *ἐπι τὸ*

αὐτῷ, the Lord added daily those being saved into one body. The ecclesiastical history of this word *ἐκκλησία* begins at this point. It is found but twice in the Gospels, in both places referring to the future church. Here it is for the first time applied, if genuine, to the church actually founded—and most appropriately in the narrative of the very day of its founding, the day of Pentecost. The emendation is no improvement here, even if it be conceded to be necessary.

It seems very clear that the translation of *ἀπεκδυσάμενος*, in Colossians ii. 15, is erroneous. “And having spoiled principalities and powers, he made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it.” There is no instance of the force of the middle in this word being to “strip off for one’s self,” *i. e.*, to despoil. But it is always “to strip off *from* one’s self,” as in this same Epistle, iii. 9: “having put off the old man,” *ἀπεκδυσάμενοι*. And the noun *ἀπεκδύσεις*, in this chapter, verse 11, “the putting off of the body of the sins of the flesh.” See Ellicott’s Commentary, Colossians ii. 15. And here, again, the omission of the articles, “principalities and powers” instead of *τὰς ἀρχὰς, τὰς ἐξουσίας*, unwarrantably does away with what many think a reference to the *ἀρχῆς* and *ἐξουσίας* of verse 10, *the* principalities and powers before mentioned, of which he is the head. Having divested himself of these, “he made a show of them openly, etc.” Referring, therefore, not to evil powers but good. Whatever be the exegesis of the verse, however, there is no good reason either for neglecting the articles, or changing the only meaning the verb ever has. The translation, “*spoil*,” is here peculiarly unfortunate, here it translates so different a word in verse 8, of the same chapter, “Beware, lest any man spoil you, through philosophy, etc,” *μή τις ὑμᾶς ἔσται ὁ συλαγωγῶν*. Where, perhaps, few English readers derive the sense of “make a booty of you, lead you away as his spoil.” To make *συλαγωγῶν* and *ἀπεκδυσάμενος* mean the same thing in the same context, is not fortunate.

Another error, occurring in John x. 16, has been charged as characteristic, if not intentional. “And other sheep I have which are not of the fold, *ἀλλῆς*, them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice, and there shall be one fold, *ποίμνη*, and one shepherd.” The mistranslation of *ποίμνη* as *fold*

instead of *flock*, is the stranger, as it is not only thus confounded with the *ἀλλῆς* of the verse, but the striking alliteration at the end is lost, one flock, one shepherd, *μία ποίμνη, εἰς ποιμήν*. The English version would seem to imply that there was to be one fold, one church. However this may be, what the Lord here says is, that there shall be one flock, gathered from many folds, Jewish and Gentile.

Even if the worst be true with regard to errors of this class affecting doctrine, the zeal and bitterness with which Bishop Ellicott speaks on this point would seem scarcely called for. "No one with the most moderate knowledge of theology can deny that a great number of current deductions, commonly made and commonly accepted, affecting such vital doctrines as the doctrine of personal salvation, and the doctrine of the last things, rest upon mistranslations of words and misconceptions in exegesis, which might be greatly reduced, if not wholly removed by a fair and scholarly revision." "There are passages, not few in number, which revision would certainly relieve from much of their present servitude of division in religious controversy. It would really form a just subject for wonder, that perhaps the greater portion of those who are loyally attached, even to extreme views as to verbal inspiration, are now found among the opponents to revision, if the reason were not intelligible and somewhat easy to divine. When we simply call to mind the many passages in which certain shades of certain opinions, not in the original Word nor in the context, were still permitted to linger, if indeed, here and there, they were not introduced, we may perhaps cease to be surprised at the almost passionate language with which all attempts to exhibit with greater faithfulness the real mind of the inspired original are deprecated and condemned. The truth is often unpalatable, and we fear it may be so in this case, but the fact is certain, some extreme views, especially in reference to some deeper doctrines, would lose some amount of the support which they now find in the translated words of the English version of the New Testament, if these words were fairly reconsidered by impartial and competent scholars." All of which implies that the theology which the bishop deprecates is based upon the translation to the exclu-

sion of the original, and it may be said upon his own showing, it much exaggerates the effect of changes made in this direction. Enough remains. Still the argument of faithfulness has force in this class. Besides errors involving doctrine, Ellicott advocates the entire removal of all proved errors in translation. He adduces instances, most of which are discerned by Trench: Matthew xxiii. 24, *διυλιζοντες*—"Straining at a gnat." Probably a printer's mistake for straining out. Matthew x. 4 (Mark iii. 18), *κανανιτης*—Simon the Canaanite, as though he were not an Israelite—for Simon the zealot. Acts ii. 3—*διαυεριζόμεναι*, "Clowen-tongues," instead of "distributed." *Ειδους*, 1 Thessalonians v. 22—"Abstain from all appearance of evil," where the idea is entirely changed if we go back to the Geneva version, all kind of evil. As Trench says, it was an appearance of evil when our Lord healed on the Sabbath, or consorted with publicans and sinners. Ephesians iv. 18—*πάρωσιν*—"because of the blindness of their hearts," when the word means hardness. This looks like a variation arising from the distribution of labor between the two bodies of revisers, for wherever the word, noun or verb, occurs in the Epistles, it is translated blindness, and wherever it occurs in the Gospels, it is hardness. Philippians ii. 15, *φαίνεσθε*—where the force of the middle is lost—"among whom ye shine as lights in the world," for "among whom ye appear." 2 Peter iii. 12, *σπεύδοντας τήν παρουσίαν*—"Hastening unto the coming of the Son of Man," for "hastening the coming." And our Lord's words, "which of you can add one cubit to his stature?" where Trench and Ellicott both translate, "which of you can add one cubit to his life-time." Hebrews x. 23—Why should *ἐλπίς* be "hope" everywhere else in the New Testament, but here, "the profession of our faith"? All errors of this class are to be removed on *pure principle*.

With regard to minor inaccuracies, the rule is more restricted. Care is to be taken against over-correction, loss of idiom, and even the turn and rhythm of the sentence is not to be interfered with. The proposition is, to keep within such limits that no one will notice a change when read, but only upon attentive observation. The hope seems sanguine when we come to the trial.

Under this head are classed :—

a. The genitive of quality, frequently resolved in authorized version by an adjective. Ellicott advocates going back in some such instances to the stronger Greek form. "The body of our vileness," "the body of his glory," "the liberty of the glory," for the glorious liberty. "The light of the glory of the Gospel of Christ." "The kingdom of the son of his love." "As children of obedience," for obedient children.

b. The tenses are very often missed in the English version. Here no pedantry is to be allowed, because absolute precision is impossible without circumlocution, which loses more than it adds. Trench adduces, "I give tithes of all that I possess," where *κτῶμαι* only gains the sense of possess in the perfect—"all that I acquire." When the same verb, Luke xxi. 19, should read, "In your patience make ye your souls your own." So Winer. Imperfect lost, "They chose out the chief rooms," for "were choosing." "The disciples of John and the Pharisees used to fast," for "were fasting at that time," *ἦσαν νηστεύοντες*—"Their net brake," "was on the point," or "in the act of breaking." Often aorists are rendered as perfects, and *vice versa*. Colossians i. 16—"By him were all things created," *ἐκτίσθη*, but in the same verse, the change to *ἐκτίσται* is lost. "All things *have been* created by him and for him."

Prepositions.—*ἐν* especially has suffered. The authorized version translates, in, into, within, among, with, wherewith, at, by, on, upon, to, unto, because of, throughout, for, about, through, besides being often resolved adverbially, or merged in the construction of the governing verb. Much latitude is necessary on account of difference of idiom, but all know that much of precision, often the true relation, is lost by such looseness as is indicated by the list above.

The particles are often happily rendered, but much is suggested by way of improvement. Ellicott suggests keeping "wherefore," for Paul's *ἄρα*, or *ἄρα οὖν*, as the stronger illative than *οὖν*. Dr. Alexander's Commentaries call attention to the frequent and needless changes of *ἀλλά*, *δέ*, *καί*, etc., in the same context. A glance at a concordance will convince that classification and reduction would tend both to precision and vividness of style.

In Titus ii. 13, the best rendering grammatically as well as exegetically, would be, "our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ," "instead of the great God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ," obscuring a distinct statement of divinity.

The article, as in the passage, "Whosoever marrieth *her* that is divorced." The Greek has here no article, although

of itself this is not enough to settle the question whether the prohibition is restricted by the clause specifying an unlawful cause of divorce.

Trench cites 1 Timothy vi. 2—"Believing masters, partakers of the benefit," where the rendering of the article improperly dropped gives the sense, the benefit not of Christ, but of their service. They who have the good of their service are believers in and beloved of Christ. Paul says "the love of money is a root of all evil," not *the* root as the authorized version makes him say.

The force of the moods in conditional propositions, usually accurately observed in New Testament Greek, and often accurately rendered in English, is sometimes lost. Absolute uniformity is not attainable.

Uniformity of rendering of the same words is also to be desired. Not the mechanical uniformity recommended by some, because words are not precise equivalents to one another in any two languages, but needless variation should be avoided, especially in the same passage. In Romans iv., *λογίζομαι* is translated, counted, reckoned, imputed. Uniformity would strengthen the argument. The revision of 1611 by two sets of hands does not account for all of these cases, because they occur in the same context, and in the same books revised by each body respectively. Matthew xxv. 46—"These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal." Where *αἰώνιον* is the word in both clauses, which strengthens the contrast. Such words as *καταργεῖν*, which is used twenty-seven times, and has seventeen different renderings, *ζηλοῦν*, used twelve times, has nine. Parallels, such as occur in Peter and Jude, Ephesians and Colossians, are obscured by needless divergence.

Archaisms are to be removed only when they occasion obscurity. "I know nothing by myself," *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἑμαυτῷ σύννοδα*—when "against myself" would do. It is said that the expression as it is, would still be understood in some parts of England. "Taking up our carriages," "taking no thought," are examples. Trench cites Acts xvii. 23, *σεβάσμητά*, devotions which once meant the outward object of devotion, temples, shrines, etc. Acts xix. 37—robbers of churches, *ιεροσόλους*—

church is constantly used in old English for heathen and Jewish temples. Cases are given where a word has lost its strength. Ephesians iv. 3—*Endeavoring* to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace. “Endeavoring is now very weak for *σπουδάζοντες*—“but it once denoted all possible tension, the highest energy which could be devoted to an object.”

Besides these there are other obscurities of translation, and also the matter of punctuation, and of chapters and verses, is to be considered, in which it is to be hoped no change will be made that is not also in the Greek text.

The numerical calculation referred to with regard to the text, when applied to this department, and based upon the revision of Five Clergymen, averages a little more than at the rate of one change in each verse, or about one word in twenty: one in every four due to textual criticism, and about one in each due to grammar and exegesis. Whether this is compatible with the preservation of old association, which is considered the *sine qua non*, can only be known by trial.

In conclusion, as to the objection much urged, not now for the first time, but throughout the history of criticism, whether as applied to the original text or to the versions, that such changes tend to unsettle faith, Ellicott replies by a somewhat sad confession that the objection was more valid ten years ago than now. That what is needed now is something to confirm faith, by showing that vague and extravagant charges against the validity of inspiration are groundless; and, by giving the people the Bible as it stands after the most thorough sifting, to prove to unbelievers that it remains in all essential points the same, and as reliable. And in this view he is borne out by an able article in the *London Quarterly*, April, 1870, which it is believed is from the pen of one out of the Church of England.

Ellicott recognizes that this English version must stand upon its merits; that it is not to be forced by authority; and that the probabilities are that a long time may elapse before it supersedes the authorized version. The history of the authorized version itself indicates this, which, though so much superior, required nearly two generations before it quite took the place of the Genevan. In the Latin Church, two hundred years elapsed before the revised Vulgate superseded

the older and corrupted text of the Ante-Jerome versions. So now he writes, "Even with the most prospered issues, a generation must pass away ere the labors of the present time will be so far reeognized as to take the place of the labors of the past. The youngest scholar that may be called upon to bear his part in the great undertaking, will have fallen asleep before the labors in which he may have shared will be regarded as fully bearing their hoped-for fruit. The latest survivor of the gathered company will be resting in the calm of paradise, ere the work at which he toiled will meet with the reception, which, by the blessing of God the Holy Ghost, it may ultimately be found to deserve. The bread will be cast upon the waters, but it will not be found till after many days."

In this view the most serious objections to revision are much mitigated. If no force is to be employed, there need be no division among denominations in the final result. And if time enough is given, the critical difficulty may be diminished. Their criticisms have been quoted, but not the eulogies of the authorized version, to which these well-known scholars are behind none in paying eloquent tribute. Let us guard against the impression which fault-finding often makes, that it does not recognize the good. With all its imperfections, no church and no language has such a version of the New Testament as our own. And under God, working through the struggles and genius of the age, the English-speaking church owes, and, after the utmost is done that will be done in the way of revision, will continue to owe, the debt to William Tyndale.

ART. IV.—*The Philosophy of Civil Punishment.*

"HE that goeth about to persuade a multitude that they are not so well governed as they ought to be shall never want attention and favorable hearing; because they know the manifold defects whereunto every kind of regiment (government) is subject; but the secret lets and difficulties, which in public

proceedings are innumerable and inevitable, they have not ordinarily the judgment to consider. And because such as openly reprove supposed disorders of state are taken for principal friends to the common benefit of all, and for men that carry singular freedom of mind; under this fair and plausible color, whatever they utter passeth for good and current. That which wanteth in the weight of their speech is supplied by the aptness of men's minds to accept and believe it."

It is with these reflections that "the judicious" Hooker starts his treatise on the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, written in the trying times of Queen Elizabeth, when the dawn of modern life was still struggling with the darkness of the Middle Ages, and when renovated principles were striving to remould the forms and institutions by which they were to be expressed and fortified. Very frequent, in the course of human history, have been the instances of such trying times as those; and always, in the progress of society, there is some fermentation going on, producing changes in social sentiments and opinions, and requiring some corresponding changes of institutions, and therefore such reflections are always needed.

Considering the great differences of age, of mental capacity and moral conditions, of occupations and aims of life of the individuals who constitute society, it becomes obvious that some such social fermentation must always exist. When every element of society is continually changing in quality, and shifting its position in the social mass, by the process of physical, moral, and intellectual growth and decay, it is manifest that there must be a constant process of rearrangement and readaptation going on, which renders all fixedness or system and constitution impossible, except in most general outline.

This spontaneous social process may, of course, be counteracted and mitigated by artificial means; as when society is graded off into classes or castes, separated by definite and impassable lines, according to age, occupation, or birth, or according to the will of a reigning class. Or it may be artificially favored and aggravated, as when these social differences are unduly stirred up by the envy of those whose selfishness is offended by social estimates which do not concede to them their

desired distinction, or by the benevolent zeal of others who are more acute in discovering defects in social arrangements than wise in discerning their causes, or in their plans of curing them. There is a measure of selfishness, or at least of selfhood, in both these kinds of the reforming spirit, in this, that one, consciously or instinctively, seeks the transient eminence which it admires, while the other seeks to realize its own opinions of what is good for the whole society without duly considering what the various members of society may consider good, or the long process by which they can be adapted to properly accept it as such. Some for their own glory, and some, for the benefit of society, demand new measures and followers to support them, without taking sufficient pains to know that their schemes are good, or that they are qualified for leaders; and no doubt this is done, in most cases, without any consciousness of the vitiating motive.

Such fermentations are, from the very nature of human society, necessarily incident to its progress; because human reason, consisting, not of intellect alone, but of intellect and affections—hopes, fears, resentments, aspirations, faith, and love—can never be satisfied with the present, and must always be striving after something which it has not. We may be allowed to suppose that a perfect balance between these two elements of our nature, or an entire subjection of one to the other, would produce a complete torpor of our reason. Each, in its turn, and according to the work that is to be done, must have precedence of the other; and yet the undue exaggeration of either must always have an injurious effect upon conduct and character. The determination of a proper measure of the precedence of one to the other in all circumstances, is quite impossible; and yet approximation to it is what constitutes the very rare phenomenon of a well-balanced character.

No doubt these social variations are quite inconvenient to many minds that find it hard to keep up with them and become adapted to them. They would much rather that things should be adapted to them than they to things, and are prone to find fault when it is not so. Well, grumbling is, no doubt, a natural right of the social man, as a form of expressing his

dissatisfaction with any existing institution, or with the application of it; it is a way he has of voting for a change, and of urging others to support him in obtaining it. Yet the fault may be his own. Peculiarly shaped men are hard to fit, and often puzzle tailors very much, but the countless adaptations which social institutions require call for much greater skill than belongs to a tailor's art, and it would be strange if they should fit at any point so well as to take away all chance of grumbling.

There are many people in the world who are prone to abuse this natural right, and some do it very ruthlessly, and seem to be quite out of humor that any institution should be so good as to require a labor of acuteness to discover any defect in it. They cannot hear a good man praised without a display of their perspicacity by showing that the credit given him is, in some respect, excessive. Benevolence is a pleasant and popular disposition, and such people love to persuade themselves that all this censoriousness of theirs is really the expression of their desire for the public good; and, no doubt, this desire is often involved in it. We ought to be careful how we censure the censors of society, for they are an essential part of its moral police, and are not much more apt to commit mistakes in the exercise of their functions than are the civil police, especially if we do not count the omissions of the latter. We should have trouble in finding out whether institutions fit well or not, if we should forbid all grumbling about them, on the ground that it is only the grumbler who is not fit for the institutions. This may mostly be the case; and yet it is not always so. And when it is, it may be the duty of society to take care of him, by some special regulation. The cry of babies tells us nothing about what is the matter with them, but only calls on others to apply some proper remedy.

These social functionaries are not generally very dangerous, except within the narrow circles to which their criticisms are usually confined, and wherein they do sometimes cause serious disturbance. Their disposition is rather to talk than to act, and it is satisfied when they obtain hearers; they seek no remedies for the ills which they discuss, and therefore want no followers, and do not derange the general order of society.

They lead no party, and organize and excite no combination for the purpose of agitating the multitude into turbulent or noisy demands for reforms, which, by their very form, violate the natural process of social growth.

But this is not always so. Social censors exist, in great variety, who are not satisfied with merely grumbling at the faults they find, and whose energies are so restless that they are driven to combine and array all the appliances of pertinacious zeal in agitating, not so much society, as the official law-makers of society, into the changes which they desire. Very many changes of our laws are continually brought about in no other way. One of the favorite themes of this class of censors is the law which imposes the penalty of death for wilful and malicious murder, and even all our laws for the punishment of crimes. We trust, therefore, that we may confer a public benefit if we here present some views that may at least suggest proper care and forethought in such movements of supposed reform.

It is very common for those who object to the punishments of the state, to require that its authority to punish shall be vindicated by means of the very principles on which the state is founded, or at least by others that are essentially connected with them. And this demand seems not unreasonable; for the state is nothing without its functions, one of which is the duty of defining and punishing offences. When such inquirers meet with the theory that government is constituted by a social compact among all the members of the state, they at once suggest how fictitious it is by asking: When and where was such a compact made, and what were its terms? Did all men and women and children really contract that they should be punished for offences, and what the punishments should be? The theory breaks down under such interrogations; and it can hold its place in political philosophy only because some theory is necessary, and no better one is presented.

This theory was invented in order to declare a principle by which the duty of rulers toward their subjects might be defined and limited; and for this it was useful. In that aspect it had, moreover, some appearance of truth; for rulers are usually inaugurated by swearing to exercise their functions

according to the laws and customs of the people. But that is very far from going back to the origin of government. Such an oath implies that the state is already organized, with valid laws and customs recognized as such by the people who demand the oath, and that it is the duty of every officer to respect them. By taking the oath he accepts the organism as it is, with all its laws, including its authority to exercise further legislative power. The question then still remains; by what right do those laws and that organism exist? On what principle is the state itself, with its authority and laws founded?

The authority to punish transgressors of its order is one of its most essential functions; and if this cannot be founded on contract, the social compact theory fails entirely; unless we change the meaning of the word compact in accepting it, which would be an abandonment of the theory. Now it is of the very essence of punishment that it is inflicted, not contracted for. If it depended on contract, no one could be subject to it, except him who had so contracted; and then, indeed, the business of what we now call criminal courts would be merely to interpret and enforce contracts; indictments would be actions on contracts, and the state would be a creditor suing for a stipulated duty, and must produce the agreement.

And if social organization and government depend upon contracts, then each member of the state must be a party to the contract, and each may insist on his own terms, and the organism could be maintained only by constantly renewing the contract. Legislation could not exist except in the form of making social compacts. Fathers could not act for their children, for that would itself imply government without consent. On this principle nothing is social until contract makes it so; and, as government or society contracts with each only as to his own rights, no one could complain that the rights of others are disregarded.

Another theory would found society upon the principle of self-interest; but that is not at all a social principle, and therefore, this theory amounts to a denial of social principles in human nature. As man is certainly individual, he must, of course, have individual qualities and rights, and the instinct

or principle of self-interest must exist to prompt him to protect them. But self-interest can give him no rightful power over others, for that would imply social relations as already existing, and social qualities to found them on. If this is the only motive of human intercourse, then all control and influence by others must be regarded as tyranny, and no right of civil punishment can be admitted.

In so important a matter as the organization of society, our Creator has not left us to the guidance of such uncertain calculations as are wrought out by our reason. Indeed, we could not decide the fact of our interest in society without trying the benefit of society and of solitude, and contrasting them; and until we should finish this rational process, society and solitude would be equally indifferent to us. But human association precedes all such calculations. Besides this, if society is founded on a calculation of interest, then all social acts are so likewise. Then the generous deed ceases to be generous; the philanthropist and patriot are misnamed; and our admiration of all noble-hearted heroism and self-devotion is a false and perverted sentiment, for there are no such virtues. And if it is self-interest in man, it is the same in beasts; and they become reasoning creatures, and enter into calculations of interest before they unite into flocks and herds; and they reason better than we, for their society is less disorderly than ours, and less unequal in its benefits.

We must look for other principles than these, if we would discover those on which society is founded and organized. All existing things have certain modes of acting, and of being acted on, and these we call the natural law of those things. If they act or are influenced differently, the law of their nature is violated, and some physical change in their condition must be the consequence. The tree whose roots are destroyed, the flower which is cut from its stem, must wither and die. The polar bear cannot endure the heat of the torrid zone, nor the camel the cold of the arctic regions, without suffering. Our wheat and rye cannot exchange either soil or climate with the pine-apple and sugar-cane. To disregard their adaptations is to violate their natural laws, and deteriorate their quality, or produce their destruction.

We cannot call these consequences of violated law punishment, because we are not speaking of intelligent beings. But, when we consider existing things in their relation to man, we discover that very many of them are specially adapted to his wants; that is, there are laws of their nature that have a special adaptation to the laws of his nature, so that their condition influences his, and his theirs. The first smith who discovered and taught the adaptation of metals to the wants of man was a great benefactor of our race. If there should cease to be smiths, if this adaptation were neglected, we should fall back into barbarism, and this would seem very like punishment for neglected opportunities.

If the thorny and acrid-fruited plum and crab be taken from the forest and cultivated, they produce the most wholesome luxuries of life, and man is improved in learning and applying their adaptations; and herein is reward for observing and obeying natural law. The return of these fruits to their wild state is the natural consequence and punishment of man's neglect of them. And so it is with domestic fowls and beasts. They are not naturally domestic, but naturally adapted to domestication, and to be improved by intelligent training, and fitted to the climates where man may dwell. Without them, man is a savage; training and improving them he grows in civilization, and here again is reward and punishment by the course of natural law. The gardens of the earth have their laws of adaptation, and reject their proprietors who are disobedient, and who neglect to dress and keep them. No double flaming-sword could more sternly warn man away from the gates of cultivated nature, and leave him to wander in the mountains and morasses of savage liberty, than does his own disregard of law. All nature becomes wild because man is so; and this is its reaction against the transgression of those intellectual laws to which it ought to be subject; and thus far at least, even the coldest rationalism can understand the curse of the earth when man falls from his high estate; and it ought to see in this the warning of its own fate, unless it consents to accept the fear of the Lord as the beginning of wisdom. We know of no abiding improvement anywhere, that is self-sustaining, or that proceeds from mere unconscious law. Man

has intelligent dominion over vegetable and animal nature for its and his own improvement, and he can certainly and constantly improve himself only as he recognizes that God worketh in him.

It may not be unprofitable to look a little further into these natural punishments of violated relations. The habit of dishonesty cannot thrive even in pecuniary matters. The miser gradually loses all the generous feelings of his nature, and all sympathy with the joys as well as the sorrows of others, and deprives himself of the happiness of a frank and generous intercourse with them and a conscientiousness of having done them good. The sensualist, whether drunkard or glutton, or whatever else, sacrifices the high moral and intelligent qualities of his soul to the exactions of a mere animal appetite, until little more than the animal is left. His indulgences increase his appetite while destroying his capacity for enjoyment, stultifying his intellect, and degrading his moral sensibilities and perceptions—a terrible start for the life to come, since we see no way of changing its course then.

Those whose selfishness habitually expresses itself by cheating, thieving, robbing, rioting, fighting, and other forms of fraud and violence—they, too, are punished by the operation of natural laws: first, by the direct effect of such conduct in making them continually worse and more degraded internally; and, second, by the reaction of society upon them, excluding them from the ranks of the virtuous, and thus marking them as externally degraded. The family rejects the son who ruthlessly violates the family morality, and he becomes an outcast from society and goes to associate with vagabonds. He even casts himself out; for the disorderly cannot endure order, the vicious cannot bear the companionship of the virtuous or the silent censure of a contrast with them.

It is part of the natural law of the ease that sinful affections and their secret acts always tend to develop into manifest character. No degree of skilful hypoerisy can entirely prevent this. Habits of vice, however hidden, and even of vicious sentiments, taint the whole character and make it offensive to morality. It is the same law that produces the most admirable qualities out of habits of virtuous thought and action;

and thus, in both cases, the recognition of the fact and the retribution are public. Thus, by natural law, nothing is secret that shall not be made manifest; nothing hid that shall not be known. The external aspect of retribution, by the reaction of other beings whose nature is violated, is sometimes too obvious to be mistaken: as when the reaction answers immediately to a special act of wrong. At other times it is easily traced as a social resentment against a general course and character of wrong-doing; and thus, by natural law, he whose hand is against every man finds every man's hand against him.

And this reaction is manifestly instinctive. It arises instantly on the manifested purpose of wrong, and ceases not when the deed is done. It waits for no philosophical solution of the right to destroy the tiger or the wolf or the assassin, or of its own interest in the question. Its adaptation to its purpose depends upon its unreflecting promptness, and it even grows in intensity on perceiving that the wrong is done, and that it cannot prevent, but only punish, the act. It involves no shadow of thought of reforming the wrong-doer; and it is a property of all animate creation; for there is no living being that does not exhibit it on suffering wrong, or on seeing it approaching. It is an essential element of individual and of social nature having any sphere to occupy or ends to pursue; and it would be impossible to discover any consciousness of right or purpose where there is no manifestation of resentment at its invasion.

Every thing that lives has its spontaneities, including all the processes of vegetable and animal growth, and unconsciously expressing themselves in wonderful variety in the provisions made, by flower and fruit, shells, horns and claws, and vital organs, for the propagation and preservation of each race. The spontaneities of sensitive and intellective beings, in all their grades, from the worm to man, relating to the use of their powers, the germs of all their active life, are their instincts. In man alone they may be controlled and trained by reflection and reason, and become converted into enlightened and regulated will.

The spontaneity by which beings react against danger threatened, or wrong done, is as various as the races in which

it exists; being, in the lower orders, a mere instinct of escape, as with the oyster by shutting its shell; and rising in the higher to the most terrible self-defence or un pitying retaliation. In man, at least, it is a moral sense by which we see the wrong and are prompted to repel it; and in many lower animals it is almost so. It is this that demands our rights and makes us ready and fit to enforce the rights of others. It demands payment of debts and performance of contracts. It reclaims our lands or goods of which we have been wrongfully deprived. It claims reparation for injured character, and ruined health and broken limbs. It is this that wails over murdered friends and vows revenge. It pronounced the old German *Vögelfrei*: "Let no bloody hand touch an inheritance; let the murderer wander far from human society in the depths of the forest, and there let him die without burial, a prey to the birds of heaven."

In a savage state, where government exerts but little authority, it is this that puts the sword of justice into the hands of the injured party and his friends, and urges them to redress their wrongs. In a somewhat more civilized state it is discovered to be conducive to the peace, order, and prosperity of society to regulate such matters; or, rather, a regulation grows up in such an unobserved way that they seem to regulate themselves, by a sort of customary rather than positively instituted penalties and punishments, beginning with such as resemble the injury—limb for limb, eye for eye, etc.—and requiring compensation in cattle, and afterward in money, for offences which cannot be thus punished.

Surely it is not difficult to read these phenomena with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Surely they indicate innate principles of human nature; perverted, certainly, yet fundamentally inherent. Clear them of their sinful taint, and we find in them the voice of God in the heart of his creatures, impelling them to maintain the functions and vindicate the rights which he himself imparts. We do not always hear this voice rightly or repeat it truly. It may come to our consciousness mingled with the voices of degraded passions, or echoed from a corrupted selfishness, and thus be misunderstood. But it speaks still, encouraging us in the ways of

truth, justice, and goodness, and warning us by the moral degradation of the wicked, by their social condemnation and rejection, by the brand of sin and vice on the face of degraded humanity, that we must do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly before God. If we do not, by vain imaginations, darken our heart, and, by boasting ourselves wise, become fools, we shall more and more learn its teachings and use them rightly.

Humanity will never be able to read the entire character, capacity, and functions of the fundamental germs that are forever developing in its life. For the time being, it can comprehend nothing higher than itself, though it is itself continually growing higher by believing in higher things and striving after them. It cannot, at any stage of its progress, mark the horizon of a higher stage, or indicate the views, sentiments, and plans which, for it, are proper. In such matters, no social or material platforms, but only true spiritual growth, can give us the elevation that will enlarge our moral and intellectual views. These germs of life, therefore, foretell nothing definite to the subject of them, though they be interpreted with some facility by those who have experienced their development or watched it in themselves or in others.

Those who fully comprehend this thought will recognize how impossible it is for society to have an organized life without historical institutions transmitted by the experience of bygone generations to their successors; how essential to social unity is the social instinct of imitation and of faith in the examples of parents and elders, by which the young naturally grow up into conformity with social usages; and how dangerous to the order and morality of society is the spirit of innovation, which makes the rules of social morality dependent on the mere will of public officers, and which, by the power of a despotic will or by popular agitation, breaks down customary institutions and doctrines, and thus deranges the standards which constitute the safeguards of social order. Certainly inherited institutions are, with the great majority of orderly people, the very standards of social morality, and they have a property in them which makes them sacred in their eyes. When they are broken down, not by being outgrown, but by mere will, it is only by a long process of social

growth that they can be replaced by efficient new ones; generally the error of the innovation is corrected by a return, as nearly as possible, to the old institutions.

One social institution, the greatest of them all, and essential in some form everywhere, is valuable only in proportion to the fulness and accuracy with which it is inherited, and that is our mother tongue. It is very defective and anomalous, but its state is in reasonable accordance with our intellectual progress, and all changes of it tend to produce intellectual, and even moral confusion. Give it peace and it will grow in a natural and orderly way, and continually adapt itself to our mental progress. No institution of humanity can maintain its life either far above or far below the mental condition of the people among whom it exists. Even if divinely given, it is for men to practise and maintain, and they can do this only in proportion to its adaptation to their social life. It must have its maintaining, as well as its originating cause, as is the case with every other part of God's works; its "seed is in itself," its vitality is inherited and affected for better or for worse by the links through which it comes.

God instituted human justice by creating man endowed with active qualities and principles that call for its existence and maintain its exercise according to man's intelligence of his rights and duties. Among these none is more manifest than the instinct of resentment, which testifies his prompt perception of wrong, and his readiness to resist it. Finding this instinct implanted in our very nature, we must study its character and purposes, and allow it to act its proper part. It is not a mere selfish principle; and, if it were, this would be no reproach to man, for he is individual as well as social, and must have principles appropriate to both parts of his nature. It is also a social sentiment; its tones sound in distinct response to the dangers and sufferings of others. Nothing so quickly assembles a sympathizing crowd as the cry of human suffering. No popular wrath is so mighty and terrific as that which is roused by the conviction that human brutality is trampling down humanity, or degrading its accustomed dignity. And when society has no other law of punishment, it is this social feeling that awakes the public expectation and

demands that the family shall pursue the murderer of their relative to death. Afterward, experience, reflection, and reason regulate this instinct by providing cities and places of refuge for those who have a reasonable excuse, or the regulated duel of the old feudal times, or some other means of judicial investigation and sentence where society is prepared to bear it.

We have to guard this element of our nature, as well as every other, from all undue exaggeration. It is very apt to be unduly weakened, in its social action, by an exaggerated sentimentalism, which is always embarrassing the administration of justice. It may proceed from a defective morality, attempting, by imitation, to act upon high principles without understanding them, or even from an affectation of benevolence, assumed for the sake of popularity, even at the risk, it may be for the purpose, of weakening the safeguards and sapping the foundations of social order. It looks very beautiful to the unthinking and ignorant, and yet it is neither poetry nor morality; for often it is in harmony with the most degrading vices, the note of the siren flung from the chords of corrupted affections, leading the giddy dance of sin, and ending in the death of all moral harmony. In the family it ruins children by indulgence; in the state it sacrifices order to a real or pretended sympathy for the subjects of guilt; in the church it sacrifices principles for the sake of a worn-out symbolism which cannot be restored to life. It begets a perpetual seesaw of criminal administration, sometimes favoring the most daring criminals with acquittals, pardons, slight punishments, or even with popular honors (release unto us, not Jesus, but Barabbas); and sometimes executing its passionate judgments on the innocent or the guilty with unreflecting haste, and without trial. We can hardly imagine a worse state of society than that where sentiment has free play, unrestrained by law, or morality, or fear of the future, or of the danger of the like play of sentiment in others. Capriciously and dangerously it strikes the chords of human sympathy, and is sure to leave them out of tune.

For the sake of humanity let us sympathize; but let us do it as intelligently and honestly as we can; there is no lack of

proper objects. Human kindness may sympathize even with the sufferings which are the consequence of vice; but it ought rather to be directed to reform the heart that gives issue to crime, than to turn aside the punishment denounced by law against it. This is sympathy for sin itself, and yet it is often manifested to a degree that is highly injurious to social order. Vice despises, as a weakness, the pity that favors its plans, while it respects and fears the resentment or justice that warns it to be sure of appropriate punishment. We must suppress neither of these affections, but train and regulate them both into adaptation to the demands of social order. They are important motive powers of society, and when both are allowed their proper functions in proper times, there is no danger that the natural plasticity of our social system shall assume the rigid forms of our mere logical moulds. Pity is misplaced if it be not met by the deep respect that makes it influential for conversion.

We mutilate our nature when we suppress any of the germs of individual or of social life of which it consists. We postpone its proper progress when we miss its living springs or supply their place by mere cisterns. We do so when in our theories of the constitution and maintenance of society and the state we substitute the will of man for the will of God, expressed in the active principles of our nature, by which alone his will can be accepted and executed by us. It is the will of God that man should be a social being, and this is expressed by his birthright to society and his dependence on it, and by his being endued with principles which, in their development, more and more impel him to maintain society and to improve its organization as he improves himself, and to grow by means of it; the improvement of each being both cause and effect of the improvement of the other. These principles are not at all of human origin, and arise not at all from the will of man; though, by his will in directing and working them, he may improve them all, and with them all persons and things around him.

The state is an organized society, and it is spontaneous and instructive in its origin. It is only by observing this spontaneous form of human action that we can know any thing

about the nature of man's organizing capacity and get any thing to reason about concerning it. Society is organized just as naturally at first as a well-ordered ant-hill or bee-hive is developed out of the nature of the ant or the bee, though this process is always disturbed by the wide differences in the development of the men engaged in it. It begins with the family and its organic customs and morals, and naturally extends into the tribe and the state, always changing with the nature, circumstances, and aims of the society of which it is a part. Constant association generates community of sentiments, opinions, modes of action, dress, and habitation, and of social aims, and these naturally generate institutions which are regarded as law, and are law. If these depended on the mere will of man, or on his *a priori* judgment of what is proper for him, he would be the law-maker of his own nature, that is, he would have no nature. His will and reason are given to him, not as substitutes for his natural and instinctive tendencies, but as means of observing, guiding, and improving them, and holding them in harmonious action.

Government is the means of regulating social interests and relations, and civil law is the system of rules by which it acts. Both civil laws and natural laws have their penalties, and it is important to study the purpose for which they exist. Some persons suppose that no punishment is legitimate that does not tend to reform the transgressor: let us consider this.

If it be true, then it follows that a transgressor of law, by the simple fact of transgression, secures a title to be educated at the expense of the State. If this be so, the State does not at all perform its duty when it requires restitution of land or goods wrongfully withheld, or compensation for trespasses committed, or performance of broken contracts. It ought further to take charge of the transgressor, and train and educate him until his moral character is so improved that he will not do the like again. And then, too, the State must have a very acute discrimination of character, for this education, called punishment, must be nicely adapted to the moral and mental character of each subject of it. No civil service act can give us officers that are certainly qualified for such duties.

And not until reform is secured can such education cease. If so, then the worse criminals are, the clearer is their title to be housed, clothed, and fed at the public expense; that is, punished by being better fed, clothed, and taught than the honest and industrious poor; for all this may be necessary for their reformation. Then our prisons must be turned into schools and colleges, or at least houses of refuge and hospitals, for those who are morally diseased, and their keepers must be doctors of morals instead of wardens and jailers. Nay, carry out the principle, and as government cannot enforce moral duties, it cannot enforce the reception of instruction, but only offer it; and the abolition of civil punishment would be inevitable, because its purpose would be found unattainable.

And if reform were its purpose, then the purpose would in all cases control the sentenced, and the term would always be until reform should be effected, however heinous might be the offence. And notice what changes in the law this definition of its purpose would require. True, it would still be a rule of future conduct for the citizen; but all its most difficult and complicated provisions would have to consist of instructions to the officers of the law about how they should treat the transgressor in order to reform him, and what should be sufficient evidence of his reform. Surely there can be no danger that we shall ever so mistake the purpose of punishment.

But does punishment tend to reform? or, rather, is this tendency so decided as to be proof that that is its purpose? The most obvious purpose of law is to teach what the order of society requires, and what penalties society thinks proper for its breach. And as matter of historical fact, it has not hitherto been the purpose of punishments to reform the offenders; and, moreover, states have seldom tried to make reformation a superadded consequence of its punishments. Punishment alone, in the ordinary sense of the word, has been the only conscious purpose of all penal laws.

Perhaps it may be said that the Divine purpose or natural law of punishment, which underlies the civil laws, is, that punishments shall be reformatory, and that states are bound to carry out this purpose in their penal laws. Then we should expect to discover the proof of this natural law or Divine

purpose in following out crime with its natural consequences. Then the loss of all social confidence and respect caused by thieving, dishonesty, laziness, neglect of duty, and infidelity in positions of trust, would have for its purpose the reformation of the offender. For this purpose society withdraws its confidence and leaves the man to starvation and poverty, and for this purpose God means that it shall do so, if this theory be correct. Then, also, the utter and loathsome moral degradation and helplessness, and the confirmed bondage to vicious and corrupt habits into which men fall by their disorderly conduct, would have for their purpose the reformation of the transgressor, though it is obvious to every one that their actual tendency is to make reformation hopeless. In all such cases, extermination, rather than reformation, is the natural consequence to the offender.

In fact punishment, whether by natural or by civil law, has no general tendency to reform the intentional transgressor. He that knowingly takes the risk of the penalty for the sake of gratifying an evil passion, may be much alarmed as the evil day comes on him; but this is very far from that sorrow for his sinful disposition and hatred of it which are necessary elements of true repentance and reformation. The fear of the law's penalties, which does not grow by reflection into respect for society and its established order, and into regard for the known rights of others, does not naturally improve by the sentence or by the infliction of the condemnation which was known to it before. For such improvement an entirely different training is required. Punishment can be reformatory only because it is so accepted by the subject of it; he can make it an occasion of his reform.

There is a principle of education to social order in the instinctive respect and imitation by which the acts and judgments of parents and several leaders are accepted as examples and precedents, and thus become customs and laws; by which process all primitive legislation is instituted; but that very principle involves the right of civil punishment, not for the purpose of education, but because the transgressor shows that he has not accepted the education required by society, and provided for in the very nature of man. Thus the law natu-

rally becomes a teacher of order, not to the culprit, but to all others who witness its punishments, and thus most impressively learn what it demands.

But such analysis as this of the principles of human action can never accompany their first manifestation. Man passes through a long course of action and experience before he can begin to perceive the natural and fundamental principles of his activity, and to use them in defining the laws of his physical and psychical life. Thus it is that law with its penalties, so far as it depends on human wisdom for its realization, must necessarily be instinctive in its origin, and become rational only as man becomes capable of discovering the rational principles which are involved in all his instincts. The germs of mental life must grow by their appropriate action in order to ripen into reason and to produce its fruits. And so all laws must originate and grow, and with them the idea of penalty. At first this may be called and regarded as revenge, and it may retain this name even after the conception of its proper function has greatly improved; but, in time, it becomes distinguished as a more or less regulated form of social principle and action, and is called punishment or justice.

So far as we can judge, it is a necessary principle of all animate nature; but it has its highest grade in man because of his capacity for improvement. Bird, beast, reptile, and insect resent every offence against their nature with an instinctive promptness that excludes all supposition of calculation, and proves that it is the reaction of the very chords of life given to them by their Creator. Man, with equal promptness, resents every assault upon his nature or his rights: instinctive and uncalculated, it is with him as with other animate beings, though he may learn to regulate it.

We call it resentment, a responsive feeling, a reaction of moral or of physical sensibility. Generally it is regarded merely as reaction against offences; but in its more proper sense, it is the reaction of animate nature however it may be affected or influenced. The action and the reaction must be accordant; if the act or influence be agreeable to our nature, the reaction of sentiment is pleasant, and a contrary influence produces a contrary sentiment. Our morality consists not of

these sentiments, which are necessary, but in our guidance of them.

It is essential to sensibility that it be responsive to influence; the eye that contracts not before the light, sees not; the punctured nerve that starts not, feels not; the law of vitality is abrogated when the power of reaction is gone. Apart from reason, this sentiment contains no element of morality or of immorality; but when united with reason, its measure must be in harmony with the dignity of a rational nature. Reason may fail in its function of regulating this sentiment, or may degrade it with pusillanimity or cruelty; but duly regulated, it is the natural fortress of right and virtue, and the natural expression of man's consciousness of them. There can be no love of justice, honesty, truth, and order, without hatred of injustice, fraud, lying, and disorder; for love of one means hatred of its opposite; tolerance of vice is indifference to virtue.

One of the most obvious natural functions of an organized society or state is the regulation of the action of this principle of resentment, in so far as it relates to wrongs done by one citizen to another. It must exercise this function for the sake of public order—that this may not be unduly disturbed by the exercise of private revenge. But such regulation implies the right which it regulates; and, therefore, it admits the duty of the state to each injured citizen, that the regulated redress must be adequate to the wrong done. When it fails in this it does not save the public order, because it does not redress the private wrongs; and a feeling of this kind is sure to breed disorder, by urging private citizens to supply the defects of public law, by acts of unregulated violence. This is, of course, wrong; and yet it ought to be accepted as a mode of complaining of the insufficiency of the legal remedies.

There may be legal punishments that are too severe; but the error is much more likely to be on the other side, where they are not directed by a ruling class against a subject class, which is considered dangerous to its power, or whose pretensions are regarded as an insult to its dignity. It is hard to feel it right that a convicted criminal, after a temporary imprisonment, should stand, in all respects, as the equal of

honest men before the law; that the thief, robber, burglar, counterfeiter, faithless public officer, or fraudulent voter, or even sometimes the murderer, may jostle honorable men at the polls, sit with them in the jury-box, or compete with them for public station. Such defects of public law are not favorable to public order, and sometimes they suggest the thought of danger to our penal system, because our official legislators do not respond to the moral tone of the people.

Our traditional and habitual estimate of crimes is very apt to be weakened, in cases in which we are not ourselves affected, because we are apt to forget how naturally moral disease spreads through society when preventive remedies are not sufficiently watchful and decided, and, hence, to overlook, or even sanction, the remissness of official persons. It shows sad signs of weakness when we witness, without resentment, the many assaults made against public justice; when criminals escape punishment, because it is unduly dangerous or troublesome for private persons to prosecute them—or it may be made their interest not to do so; when condemned criminals are treated as martyrs to a noble cause; when sheriffs fear to hang convicted murderers, and meanly hire masked executioners to act in their place; when even respectable citizens join with the vicious and disorderly in reviling police officers who have faithfully performed their distasteful duty; or when jurors declare on their oath that a criminal is not guilty, merely because they think the legal punishment is too severe.

But the principle of punishment has the support of our moral instincts, and it cannot be broken down, or even seriously impaired, except with the degradation of all our other institutions. Our instincts are more powerful and enduring than our imperfect regulations of them, and will outlive and control them. It is a necessity of our imperfect nature that this principle is imperfect in its action, and cannot suit itself to all tempers. It will now and then be somewhat rough toward the sentimentalism that it meets with; this is unavoidable. But a world cannot stop in its progress to avoid disturbing the orbit of a meteor; and a world of whole-hearted, high-hearted men and women cannot be stopped by the

sentimentalism that opposes them. They are going ahead, and they mean to keep going. They are not perfect now, but they are marching, perhaps blundering, toward perfection. Their road is not in the very best order, and they cannot stop to make it so; it improves by being used. They are forgetting the things behind and reaching forward to those that are before; and perhaps trampling down the Hittite and the Amorite that oppose their march, and carrying with them the Rahabs that have faith in their principles and their destiny.

If we consider this instinct of right, as it impels to the bloody feuds between savage tribes, or the more terrible wars of civilized nations; as it guards the Indians' hunting grounds, gives sanctity to national boundaries, and hallows every national flag; we see that it is in no danger of being lost. It has its place in the very heart that would theorize it away, and crushes all its sentimental logic. Everywhere it demands that the state shall punish offenders and compensate for wrongs according to the general, social sense of justice, which is the only true standard for the time; he that substitutes for it a measure of his own, or of some speculative agitator, is unfaithful to the principle of representation. And in no way is this demand more clearly made than when individual revenge or popular frenzy undertake to supply the defects of the criminal law. It presides at and directs Lynch courts and committees of public safety when the laws are inadequate, or their administration uncertain or corrupt; rules in the quiet indignation of the people where punishment is inadequate; and makes them avoid the contamination of the house that shelters the acquitted murderer. It reigns in the jury-box, even against law, when the verdict of the jury washes out the blood-stains of the sacrifice offered for a wife's or a sister's honor; and in this form it pronounces many punishments inadequate, and declares that other crimes besides wilful homicide may demand the penalty of death. No wise legislator can slight such evidences of public opinion in relation to the criminal code. He is faithless to his trust if he so weakens the law as to transfer the functions of the state to Lynch courts or to mob violence.

ART. V.—*Preaching the Gospel to the Poor.*

ONE of the evidences of our Lord's Messiahship was that the Gospel was preached to the poor. "God hath chosen the poor." "Look at your calling, brethren, not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called, but God hath chosen 'the foolish, the weak, the base, the despised, those who are nothing, that no flesh should glory in his presence.'" In the Old Testament, "the poor," and "the people of God" are almost equivalent expressions. They constitute much the larger part of mankind. They have the same right to the Gospel as other classes of men. It was intended for them as well as for others. The command to preach the Gospel to every creature of course includes them. They have special need of its consolations and supports: no Christian, therefore, has ever doubted that it is the duty of the church to preach the Gospel to the poor. To preach the Gospel, and to teach the Gospel, are interchangeable expressions. The thing to be done is to bring the poor to the knowledge of the Gospel, and therefore every means of communicating that knowledge is included in preaching the Gospel, in the scriptural sense of the words.

It being admitted that it is the duty of the church to preach the Gospel to the poor, it must also be admitted that any church which fails to bring the Gospel to bear upon the poor, fails in its duty to Christ. It refuses or neglects to do what he has specially commanded; and sooner or later its candlestick will be removed out of its place. In spiritual things at least, those who fail to communicate fail to possess. A candle under a bushel soon goes out.

The most superficial survey of the Christian world is sufficient to satisfy any one that some churches are much more faithful, or at least much more successful, in bringing religion within reach of the poor, than others. Such survey also proves that, in some cases, those churches which are in other respects most what they ought to be, are most deficient in this

one duty. It will further prove that the degree in which a church succeeds in reaching the poor depends quite as much, if not more, on the principles which underlie its organization and modes of action, than upon the character of its ministers or members.

The Roman Catholic Church, for example, does reach the poor. In Roman Catholic countries, as in France, in Spain, in Italy, the poor are in the church. They are all baptized in the name of Christ. They are all confirmed. They all participate in the ministrations of the priesthood. They crowd the sanctuaries, even when the houses of worship are forsaken by the educated and rich. This one thing the Romish Church does do. This, however, does not counteract the evils flowing from the false doctrines and superstitious observances of that church. But as to the point in hand, it is an example to the whole Christian world.

The same may be said of the Church of Scotland during a long period of its history. It is a clear proof that John Knox was one of the greatest men of his own, and perhaps of any age, that, in that period of the world's history, he formed and carried out the plan of having an university in each of the great divisions of Scotland, an academy in every county, and a school in every parish. These schools were under the care of the pastor or the elders of the church. The children were all instructed in the principles of religion. The population being to a great degree homogeneous, the mass of the people were brought under the power of the Gospel. After its adoption by the Church of Scotland, the Westminster Catechism was taught in all the parish schools. A people imbued with the truths and spirit of that matchless compend of Christian doctrine, could not fail, under the ordinary blessing of God, to be intellectual, moral, religious, energetic, and independent. And such were the Scotch as a nation. The late Archbishop Hughes, of New York, had good reason for what he is reported to have said in one of his public addresses, viz.: That if Ireland had been peopled by Presbyterians, they would have driven the English into the sea two hundred years ago.

Immigration and political causes have in a measure changed this state of things in Scotland; but still, both in the estab-

lished and free churches of Scotland, the poor are reached to a greater extent than in most other Christian countries.

The Church of England has in a great measure failed in preaching the Gospel to the poor. Nearly one half of the people of England are outside of the established church; and in the larger cities the great mass of the population live and die in ignorance of the first principles of Christianity. In the rural districts and among the peasantry that church has been more successful in the accomplishment of its mission. It is foreign to our present purpose to inquire into the reasons why that richly endowed establishment has not more successfully accomplished its work.

In Prussia the poor are effectually reached by all the ministrations of the church. There are two ways in which the religious character of a nation may be determined. The one is, the character of the people; the other is, the character of its institutions. If we adopt the former standard, the United States may be pronounced to be one of the most Christian nations on the face of the earth; if the latter, we must admit that it is one of the most irreligious. Prussia, if judged by her institutions and laws, must be regarded as the most thoroughly Christian nation in the world. The law requires that every one born in the land (unless of Jewish parents), shall not only profess, but be taught the Christian religion. A certificate of baptism and confirmation is required before any citizen of Prussia can be received as an apprentice, before he can marry, or enter upon any profession. In confirmation he makes a profession of faith in Christianity. And he cannot be confirmed unless he is familiar with the Old and New Testament history, and can repeat the Apostle's Creed (which he must adopt as his own), the Ten Commandments and Luther's Catechism. These laws are not obsolete or inoperative. As the Prussian system secures that every man shall be a soldier, so it secures that every man shall be a Christian, so far as knowledge and profession are concerned. No child, although barefooted, of twelve years of age, can be found in Berlin or Halle who cannot read and write, and who is not familiar with Scripture history. The experiment has been often made. The children are all required to go to school. The pastors are

required to devote so many hours a week to their religious instruction. The churches are all free, and whatever may be the character of the sermons, the Scriptures are read, an evangelical liturgy is used, and devout hymns are sung. The hymnology of Germany is probably richer than that of any other Christian people, if not than that of all other nations combined. The Germans are a musical people, and these hymns are sung not only in the churches but in the homes of the poor all over the land. Hence, while the French soldiers are roused by the Marseillaise, the Germans nerve themselves by singing the grand old hymn of Luther, "A sure defence is our God, a trusty shield and weapon." The churches throughout Prussia, as a general thing, are crowded with worshippers. The rich and titled may or may not be there in curtained stalls, but the body of the church is thronged by the common people. While, therefore, in Prussia, as elsewhere, many of the educated, and especially of the scientific class, have given themselves up to scepticism, the nation, as a nation, is eminently Christian.

In this country the work of evangelization is not in the hands of any one denomination, and things seem tending to the result that one denomination will address itself principally to one class, and another to a different. But this is anti-Christian. No church can afford systematically and of set purpose to neglect the poor, or, in point of fact, fail to reach them.

Of the Protestant denominations in the United States, it must be admitted that the Methodists have been the most successful in accomplishing this great object of the Christian church. Wesley began his career by preaching to the poor, and he employed his great constructive genius in organizing a system that should secure that object. His followers, especially in this country, have followed his example; and the good which has thus been accomplished is beyond all estimate.

It is with great reluctance that we are constrained to acknowledge that the Presbyterian Church in this country is not the church for the poor. It is not meant that they are excluded, nor that we fail entirely to reach them. But it is true that our system does not make adequate provision for their

instruction. In purely agricultural districts, where the poor hardly exist as a class, this evil is not felt; but in all our larger towns and cities it is great and apparent. Great efforts are, indeed, made to accomplish the object by means of city missions and chapels. But these means are inadequate. A very small part of the poor, much smaller than is our proper portion, belong to the Presbyterian Church. We, as a church, are not doing, and never have done, what we were bound to do, in order to secure the preaching of the Gospel to the poor. We are not disposed to refer this neglect to any special want of intelligence or zeal in the ministry or members of our church. They may compare favorably in these respects with the ministers and members of any other church in our land. The evil is to be referred to our system. The Presbyterians early adopted in this country, and have always adhered to the principle, that, as a general rule, a minister should look for his support to the particular congregation to which he preaches. We have, indeed, never been unmindful of the wants of those who were not able to sustain the Gospel by their own resources. Our church from the beginning has labored in the field of domestic missions, and made systematic efforts to aid feeble congregations in the support of their pastors. This, however, was regarded as a temporary expedient, and at one time the rule was adopted by our Board of Missions that if, in the course of a few years a church did not become self-sustaining, it should be dropped from the list. The error, however complained of, is not in the Board of Missions, either in its principles or its operations. It is in the church itself. The error is that no general provision has been made for the support of the preachers of the Gospel. Every minister has been left to depend on those to whom he preached. The inevitable consequence of this system is, that those who are unwilling or unable to support the Gospel are left in ignorance. Had those who went before us acted on this principle we should be without the Gospel to this day.

There are two principles which have been generally recognized in the church, but which we, as a denomination, have not adequately carried out into practice. The one is, that every minister, devoted to his work, is entitled to an adequate sup-

port. The other is, that the obligation to furnish that support does not rest exclusively on the particular congregation which he serves, but upon the church as a whole.

The first of these principles does not admit of dispute. Our Lord says in reference to his ministers, "the laborer is worthy of his hire." He has a right to it. To withhold it from him is an act of injustice. It is dishonest. It is not very euphonious to speak of ministers as hirelings, and of their salaries as their hire. But it is the idea, not the word, with which we are concerned. The principle is of universal application, in all departments of life, and among all classes of men; emperors, statesmen, generals, have their "hire" as well as poor ministers. "Who," asks the Apostle, when speaking of this subject, "goeth a warfare at any time at his own charges? Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? or who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?" This principle, he tells us, is recognized in Scripture even in its application to brutes, for it is written: "Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn." "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we shall reap your carnal things?" "Do ye not know, that they which minister about holy things live of the things of the temple? and they which wait at the altar are partakers with the altar? Even so hath the Lord ordained, that they which preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel." There is no need of arguing this question. This the Apostle has done for us. He has not only argued it on the general principles of justice and of established usage, but announced it as an express command of Christ; that they who preach the Gospel shall live of the Gospel.

As to the amount of a minister's salary, there is no other principle laid down in Scripture than that it should be adequate, *i. e.*, adequate to enable him to "live of the Gospel" without resorting to other means of support. This scriptural rule is rarely carried out. Even in the most richly endowed churches, while there are princely incomes for the few, the mass of the working clergy have an utterly inadequate support. In England it is said that the average income of the lower clergy is only a hundred and fifty pounds. In our own

church there are whole synods in which not one minister in twenty is supported by his salary. A distinguished gentleman from New England told us he had two brothers: one, an able and highly educated man, had preached for years to a church in Massachusetts, on a salary of six hundred dollars; the other, of whom he spoke as a "chub of a boy," who had only received a common-school education, was in a Boston store, where he received fifteen hundred dollars a year for rolling out carpets. When this circumstance was mentioned to a merchant of Boston, his reply was: "A thing always brings what it is worth!"

We do not intend to dwell on this subject. The inadequacy of ministerial support has always been an evil in the church, and we presume it will continue to be so. All we have to say is, that it involves a violation of the express command of Christ, and that it is a great injury to the church itself. Ministers must be supported. If they are not supported by their salaries, they must earn money for themselves. This demands a large part of their time and attention, which is so much detracted from their official work; and its tendency, and in many cases its effect, is to secularize the ministry itself. God no doubt will carry on his work, whether his ministers are supported or not. He may furnish men, as he did Paul, with such a plenitude, not only of grace, but of knowledge, and of gifts, that they may, as he did, labor night and day with their own hands, and yet preach the Gospel in season and out of season. But this is not God's ordinance. He requires the church to do its duty, and ministers to do theirs, in sending and preaching the Gospel to every creature.

The second principle above-mentioned is more open to debate, or, at least, is less generally recognized and adopted, and that is, that it is the duty of the church, as a whole, to sustain those of its members whom God calls to preach the Gospel. The grounds on which this obligation rests are:—

1st. That the command of Christ to preach the Gospel is given to the whole church. The obligation which it imposes does not rest exclusively on the clergy. Nor is it satisfied when a man does what he can to secure the knowledge of the Gospel for his own family, or for his immediate neighbors, or for those who

may choose to unite with him in the support of a minister. In times of pestilence and famine, no man feels justified in confining his efforts for relief to those immediately around him. Why then should he not be bound to send the Gospel to those perishing for the bread of life? Not only, therefore, the command of Christ, but the moral obligation which rests upon every man to do what he can to secure the salvation of his fellow-men, prove that our obligation to sustain the Gospel is not limited to the narrow sphere of the congregation to which we happen to belong.

2d. The church is one. It constitutes a body more intimately and permanently united than any other association on earth, not excepting even the family. Believers have not only one Lord, one faith, one baptism, and one God and Father of all, but they are members of the mystical body of Christ by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, so that, as the Apostle says, if one member suffer, all the members suffer with it, and if one member be honored, all the members rejoice with it. The consciousness of this unity, sympathy with our fellow-believers, a readiness to help them, is laid down in Scripture as a principal evidence of our own union with Christ. "Hereby we know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren." "He that seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?"

3d. Ministers are ordained to the service of the whole church, not to that of a particular congregation. When a man receives a commission in the army of the United States, he is a servant of the general government. He may be sent first to one place and then to another. He receives his support, not from the particular community whom he may be sent to protect, but from the general government, whose servant he is, and whom he is bound to obey. In like manner the minister is the servant of the church as a whole. He is bound to obey the church. His obligation is not limited to the particular congregation to which he is sent to preach. And, therefore, the obligation to provide for his support is not limited to that congregation. It rests upon the body to whom his service belongs, and to whom it is rendered.

4th. This principle has been generally recognized in the church, although it has not always been carried into effect. During the Apostolic age the effective operative laborers, those at least of whom we have any special mention in the New Testament, were not pastors of particular churches, but men without charge, who went wherever the Providence of God presented an open door, and who were supported by the general contributions of the churches. The idea, borrowed from congregational independency, that local pastors are the only real ministers of the church, and are alone authorized to exercise the prerogatives of ministers, is utterly foreign to the New Testament economy. So far as we know there is not a single local pastor named in the New Testament, unless James of Jerusalem be an exception. Such pastors may be mentioned in the salutations appended to some of the Epistles, but they were not the men that did the great work of the church during the Apostolic age. This fact is not referred to to depreciate the pastoral office. In the present state of the church it is indispensable, and its value above all estimate. The fact referred to is here adduced simply as evidence that the Apostles gave no sanction to the principle that the preachers of the Gospel were to rely for their support on the congregations to whom they preached. The great work of extending the Gospel was carried on by men who had no such congregations, and, therefore, were supported by their own labor or by general contributions. Even Paul acknowledges the contributions which he received time and again from churches with which he had no pastoral relations.

As under the old dispensation the priests and Levites were supported by a sustentation fund derived from the general contributions of the people, so throughout the greater part of the history of the Christian church the clergy have not been left to depend upon their several separate congregations. Their support was derived either from the resources of the church or of the state. The entire separation of church and state is a modern idea. A Christian community organized in one form and for one purpose was a state, and the same community organized in another form and for a different purpose was a church. The functions of these organizations

were not sharply defined or distinct, as the community as such felt bound to uphold both tables of the Decalogue, and, therefore, to provide for the maintenance of the true religion. We, in keeping the two organizations distinct, have, in a manner, lost sight of the idea that we are a community, a united whole, having common obligations, and especially the obligation of securing the preaching of the Gospel to all classes of the people.

5th. Apart, however, from all other considerations, it is decisive in support of the principle in question, that no church can fulfil the great duty of preaching the Gospel to the poor, which adopts the plan of making the preacher depend for his support on those to whom he preaches. This is almost self-evident. It is, at any rate, an historical fact, that no church does, or ever has, effectually reached the poor which acts on that plan. The opposite plan is adopted by the Romanists, in the Church of Scotland, in Prussia, and by the Methodists. The illustrious Chalmers knew that it would never do to allow the free church to depend exclusively upon their separate congregations, and, therefore, before the separation, he had, with a constructive genius equal to that of Wesley, organized an effective plan for a sustentation fund, so that those who left their pleasant manse and fixed stipends, were assured of at least an adequate support. We cannot shut our eyes to this fact. We have our Board of Domestic Missions to aid feeble congregations; we send missionaries to the heathen, and assume the responsibility of supporting them. We know and admit that we cannot do our duty to the poor without departing from the principle of making our ministers dependent on the people to whom they preach. The complaint is, that we cling to that principle to a degree which prevents our doing our whole duty. We fail in adequately reaching the poor. We fail to a far greater degree than those churches which boldly recognize the opposite principle. We cannot deny the fact that in our cities and larger towns the poor are not in our churches. We cannot get them in. They will not occupy "free seats" set apart for their accommodation. They instinctively go with their class.

How is this evil to be remedied? How is the Presbyterian

Church to be made a church which eharacteristically and pre-eminently preaches the Gospel to the poor? Without pretending to give an exhaustive answer to this question, this much may be safely assumed:—

1st. We must adopt and faithfully earry out the principle that every man who is ealled of God to the work of the ministry, and devotes himself to his work, shall receive an adequate support. This does not mean that every man ordained to the ministry shall be supported by the chureh. Many men thus ordained are found disqualified for the office, and should be allowed to demit it. Others are disabled by sickness and infirmity. These should, perhaps, be plaeced on the retired list (as is done in the army), and suitably provided for. Others, again, are in whole or in part engaged in secular pursuits, and get a support in that way. Others are professors in our literary institutions, although often effective and diligent preachers of the Gospel. These limitations greatly reduce the number of ordained ministers who are entitled to look to the church for their support. But the principle remains, that all whom God calls to preach the Gospel, and who are devoted to that work, the church, as a whole, or in its eollective capacity, is bound to support, provided that support be not otherwise secured.

2d. A support being thus provided, the Presbyteries should exercise the prerogative, which belongs to them, of assigning a field of labor to all their unoccpied ministers and licentiates.

3d. There should in all our large cities, and wherever necessity ealls for them, be established absolutely free churches. To these the people may come without restraint; and when made the subjects of grace, they will gladly of their poverty aid in sending the Gospel to others. Not long since a minister who had declined the most flattering ealls elsewhere, determined to try and establish a church among the most degraded class of the population of Glasgow. Such a chureh was gathered, and in a few years became the parent of several others in the same neighborhood.

4th. Besides such free churches, there should be a class of itinerant missionaries going from place to place within a given district, and even preaching the Gospel from house to house.

Forty or fifty years ago this was the principal mode in which our Board of Missions conducted its operations. As a general rule every young man on his licensure took a commission from the Board, and travelled about preaching in destitute places for six months, or a year, or for a longer period.

5th. This plan requires no new organization to carry it into effect. All that is necessary is that the Board of Domestic Missions should be authorized and enabled to promise every man, approved by the church, and devoted to the work of preaching the Gospel, an adequate support; and that the several Presbyteries should see to it, that all their ministers and licentiates, capable of service, should be diligently employed.

6th. The location and control of ministers and licentiates being thus distributed among the Presbyteries, there would be no concentration of power in one central Board, which is not only inconsistent with the principles of Presbyterianism, but, as experience teaches, is liable to great abuse.

We do not see that any formidable objections can be urged against this plan. It does not propose any equalization in the salaries of ministers. Every church would remain at liberty to give its pastor what salary it pleased. This might be done while enough was given to others to enable them to live. There are rich and poor in every other department of life and always have been. The same is true with regard to the ministry. Such is the will of God as revealed in his providence, "The poor ye have always with you." It would be chimerical to attempt to change this ordinance. It is a consolation to know that the poor are often as happy and as useful as the rich. It has been urged as an objection to this plan, that if a minister is independent of his people as to his support, he will not work. It is a sufficient answer to that objection that our foreign missionaries are independent of the people to whom they are sent, and yet they work. There are other principles of action in all men than the desire of support; and ministers are no exception to that rule. Besides, ministers are responsible to their Presbyteries, whose duty it is to see that all their members are faithful. The dependence therefore would only be shifted from the people to the Presbytery.

The ideas contained in this short paper, have been long be-

fore the churches. At the time of the disruption of the Church of Scotland, Dr. Chalmers published a pamphlet on "Church Economics" in which all these ideas are stated and expanded. Mr. James Lenox of New York caused an edition of that pamphlet to be printed in this country, and a copy to be sent to every minister of our church. It is to be hoped that the seed thus sown will yet bring forth its appropriate fruit.

ART. VI.—*Jonathan Dickinson and Dickinson Hall.**

It is a saying of Lord Bacon, that "the works or acts of merit toward learning are conversant about three objects: the places of learning, the books of learning, and the persons of the learned." A distinguished act of merit toward the places of learning has brought us together for this dedicatory service. A building, in the Baconian phraseology, "beautiful and adorned with accomplishments for magnificence and state as well as for use and necessity," has been reared by the bounty of one patron and friend of the college. Not to mark such an event in the academic history of the time with appropriate ceremonies, would be to show a most unscholarly indifference and a most culpable insensibility to a very munificent act, and to miss a fine opportunity for cultivating a spirit of generous loyalty to this honored institution. For, as the spirit of loyalty to the state is educed and strengthened by the observance of national occasions, so the spirit of loyalty to seats of learning is ever promoted by proper academic occasions and ceremonial. Not to mark such an event by religious rites—by an act of solemn and prayerful dedication to Almighty God—would be alike untrue to the spirit and aims of the founders, and to the genuine academic spirit itself, since that is rooted and grounded in Christian faith,

* An Address delivered at the dedication of Dickinson Hall, in Princeton College, by the Rev. J. O. Murray, D. D., New York City, and published here by our request.—EDITORS.

finds in Christian life its highest ends, and draws its inspiration from Christ, the Divine Teacher, as its highest source.

Joined, however, with *this* noble act of merit toward this venerated seat of learning is another, which in its sphere is of equal worth and beauty. The modesty of the giver, veiling itself in a reverend ancestral piety, has affixed another name than his own to this hall. In so doing, a name of highest Christian honor and influence, of wide and enduring power in its day and generation—a name equally dear to sound learning and a pure religion—is to be perpetuated so long as one stone shall stand upon another. Dickinson Hall is a monument, no less than a benefaction; and being both in one, all the high uses of an eminent educational charity, and all the grace and worth of a worthy commemoration are set like binary stars in our collegiate firmament, to shine in our eyes with a blended radiance.

No student of history, no wary observer of human affairs, can help remarking a change—manifest in the actings of the commemorative tendency in our nature—a change wrought by the leaven of Christianity working silently on the public mind. Once it was simply a question of greatness irrespective of any moral quality whatsoever. Is he a Cæsar? Vote him a demi-god, said the Roman senate, and the *vox populi* chimed in, and the sculptor filled every vacant niche in the empire with a statue. Martin Luther waits more than three centuries for his worthy monument at Worms, while Napoleon is enshrined in marble before he has been dead half a century. John Cabot gave England a continent, and no one knows his burial-place. Many of earth's best benefactors sleep, like Calvin, in unknown graves. But men are beginning to ask whether it is right—whether it is worth while—to commemorate any greatness but that which has in it the moral element. They are beginning to cherish more publicly and reverently the memory of great benefactors. It is as one of this series of commemorations of a benefactor of his kind that the act we perform takes its humble place.

Nor should it escape our notice that the monument chosen is in itself exactly fitted to the memory of him it perpetuates. For one class of honored names the statue in

marble or bronze is aptest. A great statesman and orator, if but the genius of sculpture can imprison him in the marble as performing some great act of his public career, is best commemorated thus. A great warrior has no more apt monument than some shaft or column, cast from cannon captured in his fights, and reared in some place of public concourse, where the throng may gather round its base and read inscribed there the story of his exploits. A great philanthropist may be most justly handed down to the pious regards of posterity by some humane institution bearing his name. But a student and lover of truth, a bold and ardent defender of it, a public teacher, of rare and eminent gifts, a founder of some high place of learning—what can so well commemorate his virtues and his godly fame as some hall of learning, reared where learning is but the handmaid to religion, and reason leads only to faith—reared amid quiet academic shades, far from the madding strife of ignoble crowds, where the virtues can be most appreciated and the character most deeply emulated! When the University of Oxford would honor the learned and pious Keble, it is not by column or statues in the grounds of Corpus Christi, but by a college to be henceforth known as Keble College. No “storied urn or animated bust,” no marble statue in these college-grounds, no other monument, could have been so well chosen to perpetuate among us the memory of President Dickinson as the hall which bears his honored name. That those present may perceive all the fitness of this commemorative act, it is needful to cast a running glance over his eminent career. Jonathan Dickinson was born April 22, 1688, at Hatfield, Massachusetts; was a member of the first class that was graduated from Yale College in 1706. In 1708, at the age of twenty-one, we find him settled in the pastoral charge of the Independent Church at Elizabethtown, having already made his mark as a powerful preacher of the Gospel, and settled, we are told, where “neither church nor minister was to be found in the regions beyond toward the setting sun,” and upon a stipend of £80 a year, besides house, glebe, and perquisites of marriage, fortunately then undiminished by any income tax. Thenceforward, for forty years, his name, we are assured by the

historian of Elizabeth,* “gave the town itself a prominence both in the province and in the country.”* He was a distinguished instance of that rare combination in ministerial gifts—preaching power and pastoral power. He was equally at home on some occasions which demanded a sermon of the highest order, and on an occasion which needed all the skill and fidelity of the pastor. He made his pulpit a power in all the regions round about, and was as eminent for his public spirit as for his pastoral fidelity. He gave himself, we are told, to the study of medicine as well as divinity, and acquired high reputation as a physician.” He wrote a treatise on the “throat distemper”—unlike many of his modern brethren, who only illustrate it by example. He was a foremost man in the transaction of all ecclesiastical business in the Presbytery and Synod. He was a learned and most able controversialist, and contended most earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints, against prelatival assumptions and Arminian latitudinarianism—a form of service to the church too little valued, too little understood in these days when so much is inveighed against theology, and the popular mind turns lightly and flippantly away from services rendered by men in defence of the truth, needing a courage, a zeal, a painful labor, which, when seen in leading battalions, are gladly hailed as heroism. Such was his reputation for learning in divinity, and for theological ability, that he was made “one of the correspondents of the honorable Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge.” His name is associated with that of Edwards by Dr. John Erskine, of Edinburgh, in a eulogy like this: “The British Isles have produced no such writers on divinity in the eighteenth century as Dickinson and Edwards.” His person “manly and of full size, solemn and grave in his aspect;” his forehead, if we may trust engraved portraits of him, intellectual; his brows heavy and commanding; his eye full and well set under its arch; the mouth finely cut, but firm; the whole countenance suffused with benignity, but suggestive of dignity and power easily roused, recalling, as not unlike his own, the features of his compeer and contemporary, Jonathan

* Dr. Hatfield.

Edwards,—every thing in the make and career of this eminent man is on a grand scale.

Yet it is as one of the founders and as the first president of the College of New Jersey that the hall named after him most fitly bears his name. He seems to have been, not only its projector, but the most active of all others in the necessary steps to accomplish its result. And it is worthy to stand as the crowning act of a most laborious and most distinguished career—that his brain and his heart originated, his wisdom and his energy secured, a corporate and actual existence for the institution whose sons, after more than a century, are gathered to do him honor to-day. It was but the fitting meed of gratitude to him for his services—nay, it was the truest guaranty of success for the institution itself, that the *New York Post Boy* of April 20, 1747, contained the following advertisement: “This is to inform the Publick that the Trustees of the Colledge of New Jersey have appointed the Rev. Mr. Jonathan Dickinson President of the said Colledge.” He accepted the trust, gave to the college all the prestige of his learning and influence; but in six months was stricken by mortal disease, and died October 7, 1747.

The munificence which has reared this building has, however, a significance apart from all memorial character in the edifice itself. It represents a form of giving of which this and similar institutions stand in special need. It recognizes, it proclaims, the peculiar responsibility which rests on our men of wealth to assume, *as individuals*, the charge of rearing needed buildings, establishing professorships and foundations, and the right and full equipment of various departments. There is a peculiar fitness in having our men of fortune take them up as foster-children and as individual enterprises. No such institution ought to be compelled to traverse with weary feet the length and breadth of our communities, endeavoring to eke out by appeal to numbers what the generosity of one can accomplish so much more fitly. It is best that some charities, such as are found in the various benevolent organizations of the church, should be reservoirs for the widows' mites, the smaller sums of Christian giving. But an institution like this, needing and deserving large en-

downments, makes a direct appeal to Presbyterian wealth, to single out one, from the various objects of its necessary equipment, and make that the recipient of an individual and bounteous charity. The friends of this college have reason to congratulate themselves to-day that this specific munificent form of giving has had such an inauguration. Nor can its influence be lost. Dickinson Hall is a standing appeal to our large-hearted and liberal givers, to imitate a wise and noble example. There is, moreover, something in itself so elevated, far-reaching, and enduring in the establishing of our places of learning on adequate foundations, that the appeal makes its way naturally and befittingly to men of wealth. It is worthy the sagacity, the energy, the enterprise, which have organized and achieved a large business success, to concentrate its benevolence on some institution of learning. What sublime motives blend in the union of learning and religion: learning vitalized and sanctified by religion; religion adorned and made influential by learning! What founders of states, what builders of any humane institutions, are more nobly and gratefully cherished than these princely donors to educational institutions! That many minds are feeling the force of these suggestions is evident from the fact that within a few years large amounts have been given by individuals to build up new institutions. But the land groans under the weight of existing colleges! The mistake made is, that the same end is not sought and obtained by aiding those already founded in some individual and specific way. Rear, for some well-known, long-established college, a building, and name it; found a professorship, and entitle it; establish a foundation, and make it a memorial: so the high ends of education will be better served; and so the laudable aim of securing a worthy remembrance for some honored name is infinitely better reached.

The occasion on which we have met further demands a notice of this noble charity, as representative of a form of giving especially needed in this juncture of our ecclesiastical history.

Ancient society found itself represented and controlled by three great centres—Jerusalem for religion, Athens for learning, Rome for order and law. Modern society obeys the same

tendency, but it is infinitely more ramified. Art has its centres; learning has its centres; civil government its centres; commerce its centres; religion its centres. Every ecclesiastical organization of extent and force must, to be well worked, have certain centres, religious and educational. Protestantism cannot afford to forget that Rome has her Propaganda, that mighty educational centre which is linked by living fibres to every outpost of Romanism. The power of such educational centres in any ecclesiastical system, false or true, will be, not as they are manifold, but as they are few and well placed. Our Presbyterian system, in its new compactness, let us fondly hope, in its coming consolidation, needs one educational centre at least, of scope and power commensurate with the ecclesiastical organization of which it is the child and the nurse. That Princeton is this focal point in our educational system, there can be no doubt. It belongs to her; and every auspicious sign points to her most worthy occupancy of the high trust. It belongs to her by reason of a century's great and good history. It belongs to her by reason of services rendered in the edueing of a consecrated mental power, which has been felt on every square foot of territory on which Presbyterianism has been planted in this country, and in which it has taken root. It belongs to her by virtue of her noble array of names historie in the councils of the church. It belongs to her by the prestige of saintly and famous memories. Her Dickinsons and Edwardses and Witherspoons, her Alexanders and Millers, are a goodly foundation on which to build up the foremost of our Presbyterian colleges. It belongs to her by the presence here of two faaulties, that of the college and the theological seminary, each of which, in its own sphere, has been so proudly eminent in this land and far beyond the seas. It belongs to her by virtue of her position in the history of the past and in the promise of the future. What is needed now is only a full recognition of this truth, and a vigorous development of the idea. To have one such centre—our Presbyterian Oxford or Cambridge—will only strengthen every sister institution which ought to live, and will only hasten the speedy demise of every one which ought to die: and there are such. And every friend of the college here to-day, every true

son of the church, must have felt that such gifts as have reared such a building as this are the true, the speedy, the honorable solution of the problem. Multiply these gifts and foundations, and the work is done. Rear other halls like this as they are needed; gather a library worthy this place and this past; found new professorships or endow the old; and the progress of recent years is certainly a reasonable guaranty that the Presbyterian Church will have here an educational centre worthy all the great responsibilities of such a post.

ART. VII.—*The True Sources of Literary Inspiration.**

THE literature which reveals the Good, the Beautiful, and the True in the soul of man is the best expression of the best mind of our race in all ages of the world. This expression, changing as it does from age to age, is partly a matter of artistic form, and partly a matter of content, while in point both of style and substance it must ever largely depend on the sources from which it draws inspiration. The study of literature, when that study is prosecuted with a paramount regard to the discovery and rational explanation of its changing aspects, begins with philology and ends in the philosophy of history. When the study of literature descends into an analysis of the lexical constituents and syntax of human discourse, we have the genesis of a systematic Grammar, considered as the science of language; while that literary and æsthetical criticism which mainly concerns itself with the nature and qualities of style, and with the mechanism of literary art, leads to the enunciation of a formal Rhetoric, considered as the science of effective discourse.

Now, it has been observed, from the days of Priscian down to those of his latest successor among the *grammatici*,

* This article is the Inaugural Address of James C. Welling, LL. D., on assuming the Professorship of Rhetoric and English Language and Literature in Princeton College.

that the men who spend their lives in the minute analysis of words, that is, who pursue this study as an end rather than as a means, are not always remarkable for the accuracy of their diction; and in the history of literature it is an equally obvious fact, that no familiarity with the science of a formal rhetoric has ever been found to confer on its possessor the graces of literary style. A modern English critic, and he is one among the most scholarly of his class, has inadvertently with mordant satire upon that dry and technical analysis which expends its ingenuity and exhausts its activity in the post-mortem dissection of literary forms. "It is," he says, "one of the most piteous things in human life to see an idiot vacantly teasing a handful of straw, and babbling over the blossoms which he picks to pieces. But," he adds, "it is not more piteous than the elaborate trifling of criticism over figures of speech and varieties of imagery, showing how metaphor differs from simile, how this kind of image is due only to an exercise of fancy, how that comes of true imagination, and how fancy is one thing and imagination another." And this complaint would seem to be as old as the science of rhetoric itself. We read in the pages of Cicero—and the dialogues of Plato bear no uncertain testimony to the same fact—that it was a question among the Athenian orators, whether books of rhetoric, "crammed as they are with needless disquisitions on exordium, and epilogue, and trifles of that sort," are really of any worth to the orator. In regard to the materials and the motives of eloquence, these books, it was said, contained not a line.

It is to be observed that in every department of practical life we witness the evolution of concrete arts prior to the scientific statement of the abstract principles by which those arts are underlaid. It is always the art which precedes and conditionates the science involved in the art. So wonderfully are men compounded of instinct and of reason in all that they think and do and say, that while in the act of thinking and doing and speaking they must needs be unconscious of the laws which determine and control the working of their energies, it is nevertheless possible for the reflective reason to discover in the products of every art the rational theory on which

it proceeds in evolving its products. And yet the poet Goethe, speaking of course as a literary artist, and not as a metaphysician or a psychologist, has not scrupled to say, "I prefer that the principles from which, and through which I work should be hidden from me. I have never thought about thought." On the other hand, the poet Schiller admonishes us, that "what happens to mere physical beauty of form, unless it seeks, in due season, to educate for itself a support and a substitute by the acquisition of a lovely gracefulness, that likewise happens to genius if it neglects to gather strength by the cultivation of principles, taste, and science." Unless controlled by an adequate power of reason, "the wildly-sprouting exuberant power of nature" he adds, "will outgrow the freedom of the mind and stifle it." It was said of Shakespeare by the first publishers of his collected plays, that "as he was a happy imitator of nature, so was he a most gentle expresser of it. *His hand and mind went together.*" But as the principles of a natural rhetoric are involved subjectively in all the emanations of Shakespeare's hand and brain, it is obvious that these principles may be unfolded and reduced to a body of doctrine by the critical reason.

Yet the most that all our science can here do is to regulate and to direct; to chasten and to subdue. It cannot *create*, for it finds the very conditions of its existence, as also the form and substance of its contents, in those antecedent creations for which it undertakes to account on logical and rational grounds. The science of rhetoric may analyze and explain the nature of human discourse, the sources of its power, and the number and quality of its different effects, but it cannot impart the energizing forces which shall set the mind of a Milton or of a Burke in motion. Science may explain to the literary artist the function and names of the tools with which he is to work, but all the rules of all the rhetoricians cannot give him dexterity in the use of them. This must come, the favor of Minerva being presupposed, from long and patient practice in the actual exercise of literary or oratorical art. Rhetorical science cannot even give us the faculty of pronouncing sound judgments on the works of art, much less the power of producing such works. A literary taste that shall be at once delicate and cor-

rect can come only from a felicity of nature which has been trained by culture, fed by long meditation on the ideal forms of beauty in the soul of man, and refined by communion with the manifestations of the Beautiful in nature and art, till, in the end, the æsthetic sense within us shall be as "feelingly alive to each fine impulse" as was the untaught artist soul of Correggio when, for the first time, he stood in the presence of Raphael's St. Cecilia, and exclaimed, "*Anch' io sono pittore.*"

Now, all our rhetoric books profess, or should profess, to do nothing more than to teach the *science* of discourse; as all our grammars profess, or should profess, to teach only the *science* of language. No grammar of the English tongue can teach us the *art* of speaking or writing our vernacular with fluency and correctness. This art must come from practice, until practice has been trained into habit, and until habit has been concreted into a "second nature." But our English grammars *may* teach us the *science* of speaking and writing our vernacular tongue, though, unhappily, such are the logical relations between science and art, between theory and practice, that our science can be of little use to us in the actual art of discourse, when, by the very conditions of the problem, we must needs speak or write under the impulse of faculties that have been trained to work automatically, if they are to work effectively. Rhetorical science, in like manner, must needs be relegated to the background while the mind is at work on the products of its literary art, and literary art must needs pause in her creative career before rhetorical science can take up the work of introspection and analysis.

It is no longer supposed that any analysis of the epic poem, however subtle and exhaustive that analysis may have been, from Aristotle to the Abbé Bossu, can prove of much use to the world in the production of new Iliads and Odysseys. It is not only true that we must have Homers before we can have Aristotles, but it is only just to admit that the poetic Muse has generally ceased to sing "her native wood-notes" before the analytic critic begins to think of reducing her strains to a scientific notation. "All eras in a state of decline are subjective," says the greatest of German poets, "while all

progressive eras have an objective tendency." The poet, "soaring in the high reason of his fancies," with his "garlands and his singing robes about him," does not sing by the critic's score, albeit that he follows implicitly the subtle laws of rhythm and melody while

"Untwisting all the chains that tie
The hidden soul of harmony."

It has been said, and the saying is historically true, that the Institutes of Quintilian mark, if they did not cause, the period of decadence in Roman oratory, and that, too, although he is among the most eminent of those who ever professed to teach the rhetorical art. With all his science, Quintilian was not gifted with the sagacity to discern that the art of eloquence was passing in his day under an eclipse. On the contrary, he predicted that those who might write about oratory after him would find the materials of fresh admiration in the popular advocates by whom the Roman Forum was then illustrated. It is easy enough for us *now* to detect the shallowness and frippery that were then coming into vogue under the maxims of a formal rhetoric—a rhetoric which taught men to study the structure of sentences more than the body of their thought—as also under the decline of public sentiment in Rome at a period when earnest discussion had ceased to be the mould of political measures, and when eloquence had degenerated into the commonplaces of a servile panegyric, whose degrading office it was to burn incense under the nostrils of a tyrant like Domitian. It is plain enough to us *now* that the coruscations of Cicero had faded from the Roman sky, when the ambitious young orators of Quintilian's day, as he tells us, conceived themselves to have beautifully expressed "the heavenly manner" of that great master in eloquence, if they could only succeed, now and then, in nicely rounding a period with the words "*esse videatur*"—a form of speech which Cicero was observed to affect.* To such a degree had a mechanical theory of rhetoric blinded the minds of men, at this time, to the real sources of true eloquence and of literary inspiration!

It was his comprehensive theory of eloquence which caused

* Quintilian: *Inst. Orator.*, x., 2, 18.

Cicero to regret the divorce of rhetoric from philosophy and from public affairs which had taken place even in his time; for, to separate the theory of speaking from the science of morality, of life, of virtue, and of politics was, he said, to create a schism between the tongue and the heart of man—*discidium illud quasi lingue atque cordis, absurdum sane et inutile et reprehendendum*.^{*} And it was this same exalted notion of his art which caused him to denounce the artifices of the rhetoricians, as being “excessively ridiculous,” and which extorted from him the remark that he came forth an orator, not from *their* shops, but from the walks of the Academy.

It is as true now as in the days of Cicero, that it is only the copiousness of the things we know that can beget in us a copiousness of diction, while brilliancy of style finds its surest support in the reflex influence exerted on our character by the dignity and grace of our intellectual acquisitions. If we would attain to the mastery of words, we must first attain to the mastery of ideas. Words are but the symbols of things, the counters of ideas, the continents of thoughts, and we cannot hope to play with shadows, apart from a knowledge of the substance that casts them, without becoming, like Prospero, “the dupe of our own enchantments.” The words of our tongue are indeed the common heritage of us all, and they wait obsequious to do our bidding if we know only *how* and *when* to make them the handmaids of our fancy or our reason. But even the most “rabble-charming” among those words which, as Dr. South says, “have a sort of wild-fire wrapped up in them,” lie cold, inert, and passionless in the dormitories of the mind till they are waked into life by the clarion call of some *earnest* soul. Words are but skeletons until, in the exercise of that creative power with which we are endowed by the Father of our spirits, we clothe them with the forms of living speech, when, instinct with energy, they come to us or go forth from us, warm and palpitating with the flesh and blood of human passion, or informed with all the potencies of human thought. The Hebrew seer, in holy vision, was set down in the midst of a valley full of bones, and “lo! the

^{*} *De Orat.*, iii., 16, 61. Cf. *Orat.*, iii., 19, 72.

bones were very dry;" but it is written that "he prophesied upon them," and they came together, "bone to his bone," till the sinews and the flesh were knit upon them. But as yet "there was no breath in them." They were bodies without souls; forms without the informing spirit. And it was not until the prophet called to the four winds of heaven—the majestic type of that quickening spirit which kindled the tongues of flame on the day of Pentecost—that the breath came into them, "and they lived, and stood upon their feet, an exceeding great army." And so, it is only "the Vision and Faculty Divine," in its lesser or in its greater manifestations, which can "create a soul beneath the ribs of death" in the forms of literary art. Our science may help us to knead and mould the plastic clay into typical shapes of beauty, but it is only the Promethean art which snatches its fire as from heaven's altars that can send forth to all time and through all lands "the thoughts that breathe and the words that burn." The marble statue which Pygmalion chiselled with patient toil and cunning-skill from the cold and senseless block, was so fair and shapely that he fell in love with it, but it was not until the Goddess of Beauty had breathed into the image the breath of life that the desire of the artist's soul was satisfied. Without that true electric energy which has power to thrill, the roar and rattle of artificial discourse are as much an offence to men as the mock thunder of Salmoneus was an affront to the gods, and if no expiation was found for the latter in the Virgilian Hades, so should the former be forever banished to Milton's "Limbo large and broad, the paradise of fools."

To seek for literary or oratorical inspiration in the precepts of a dry and formal rhetoric is to seek for the living among the dead. It is to prepare for the Olympic game or for the Paneratic contest by the study of anatomy, and by frequent visits to the dissecting-room. Nay, more. Such a study, so misdirected, is not simply useless; it is positively injurious. It is not only not quickening; it is deadening. Where, then, may we hope to find the true sources of rhetorical art and of literary inspiration?

I answer, in the first place, we may hope to find them by recurring to those perennial fountains of invention from which

the master spirits of literature in every age are seen to have drawn their inspiration, before as yet the Aristarchs of criticism had dropped their lead and line into the waters of Helicon, and before the rhetorical engineers had opened their macadamized roads to the peaks of Parnassas. It is not enough to study and understand the works of great authors, though this we *must* do; still less is it enough to study the grammarian's analysis of their words or the rhetorician's analysis of their styles and effects, though thus we should do. If we would do *what* "the ancients" did, we must do *as* they did. We should study them by day and by night, but we should not so much copy their works as imitate their methods. "People talk of the study of the ancients," says Goethe, "but what does it mean except that we should look at the real world, and strive to express it, *for that is what they did?*"

If, as the poet has said, the lives of great men are of use to remind us that we, too, may make our lives sublime, it is so only when we have the grace given us to attune the psalm of our life to the same high endeavor which still glows in all the golden deeds and mighty thoughts of human history. And, in like manner, if we would excel in that literary art by which all that men have greatly thought and wrought is hallowed with fit commemoration and treasured up in the golden urns of song and story "on purpose to a life beyond life," we must learn how to study the works of highest genius—studying them not as *the end* of our art, but as *means* to ends, if that haply by constant and long communion with the forms of literary beauty we may insensibly grow into the likeness of those great literary artists who fed their fancy and informed their genius upon the bosom of that Mother Nature who is the Teacher of us all.

All direct and intentional imitation of literary models is necessarily an imitation of Nature at second-hand. In its best estate, it commences at one degree removed from the integral fountains of inspiration, and, in the hands of subsequent imitators, leads to an ever-progressive debasement in the ideal standard of taste, and, consequently, to an ever-progressive deterioration in the products of literary art.

And herein lies the great danger of a formal rhetoric, if divorced from Nature, from public affairs, and from real life. The literary history of all the nations that have ever had a literature is replete with warnings under this head; for where is it that literature has not dwindled and pined under the influence of that dilettanteism which comes into vogue when men have once turned away from the true sources of inspiration? The great creative epochs which gave birth to a Homer, a Dante, a Chaucer, a Shakespeare, were followed, sooner or later, by that false rhetoric which mistakes form for substance, which puts the works of literary Art in the place of Nature, and ends by substituting the husks of a dry and technical rhetorical science for the living and breathing activities of a hale and vigorous art.

It was so in Athens, when eloquence had ceased, in a measure, to find its inspiration in earnest patriotism and in public affairs, but when a whole host of rhetorical teachers arose, like Gorgias, and Thrasymachus, and Protagoras, and Prodicus, and Hippias—all professing, with arrogant words, to teach how the worse might be made to seem the better reason, and how the feebler cause might be made the stronger by the artifices of speech. And then it was that the Attic line of orators, whose resistless eloquence once “shook the arsenal and fulminated over Greece,” began to run through the descending scale of Lysias, of Isocrates, of Hyperides, of Æschines, of Dinarchus, and of Demades, till it ended in Demetrius Phalereus, almost the last of the Athenians who can be called an orator, and of whom it was said that, when he encountered the heat and dust of active life, he seemed not like one who came from the soldier’s tent, armed and nerved for stern conflict, but like a recluse scholar emerging from the shady retreats of his master Theophrastus. Such was the facile and fatal descent of oratory in Greece—a descent only momentarily arrested by even the matchless eloquence of Demosthenes, whose oratorical effectiveness grew to the height of his great arguments in the study of Thucydides and Plato, and in actual struggles with the conflicts of political life.

And so it was in Rome when eloquence no longer drew its sap and nutriment from public affairs, but when the hectic

flush of decay had come to mock the ruddy glow of health—when rhetors like Ansonius and Rufus and others, instead of producing new forms of beauty, chose rather to spend their strength in mere mosaic-work, in centos pieced together from Virgil, and in macaronic verse possessing as little of true mother wit as of fidelity to Roman idiom.

It was so in Italy, when, instead of Dante, that land of scholars had her “Professors of Dante” in all her universities, and when, after Petrarch had set the fashion of writing *concetti* and *canzoni*, a whole herd of commentators sprang up to fix the minds of men on the mere mannerism of his literary art, and when a whole herd of poetasters followed in their wake, until, as Petrarch himself complained, “the very tailors stitched in rhyme, and the shoemakers cobbled in verse,” and until, in the sixteenth century, the affectations of Marini spread like a contagion through the whole body of Italian letters.

It was so in Spain, when, after the glories of her creative age, the refinements of Gongora and of the *estilo culto* quenched the springs of original thought, and humbled the proud Castilian speech to wear a foreign livery as the badge of its servitude to the “*stile Marinesco*.” It was so in France, when, after the rude but masculine vigor of Marot, of Henri Etienne, of Amyot, and of Montaigne, the blue-stocking dames and periwigged pedants of the Hôtel Rambouillet began to coo about “love” in the boudoirs, and to twitter about literature in the *ruelles* of Paris. It was so in England, not only during the period of *Euphuism*, technically so called, or while the metaphysical poetry of Donne and Cowley was at its height, but even long after the days of Dryden and of Pope, both of whom, notwithstanding their poetic talents, taught and practised a false theory of literary art when they put the works of the ancients, transcendent models though they be, in the place of Nature, as the ultimate standards of literary appeal.

But let it not be supposed that, in thus pointing the moral of literary history against a false theory of rhetorical inspiration, I am indifferent to the study of great writers, or to those graces of style which, as all agree, may be cultivated

and improved by communion with the productions of genius. It is because I would magnify and exalt this study that I thus speak. I would have this communion as constant and as intimate as it can be, if only it be direct, and if it be intelligent and searching, looking rather to the sources than resting in the effects of literary art. Let our worship of the great masters in literature be as fervent as that of Dante for Virgil, or as that of Petrarch for Homer, but, in the use of models, let it not be forgotten that the true literary artist must never permit his model to become his "better self," or to interpose between himself and the realities of Life and Nature. The well-head of eloquence, if it is to flow in copious and limpid streams, must gush up from the depths of the soul; the spray of the fountain that is fed by a force-pump glitters for a moment in the sun, and then runs dry. We can express only the Beauty and the Force that are in us—which we have made an integral part of our nature. It is said of Gainsborough, the great painter of English landscape, that in order to give fixity to his eye and shape to his designs, he was often known to construct on his table, out of bits of stones and weeds and broken pieces of looking-glass, a rude model of the rustic scene he was painting. But the landscape that really fixed his view, and which he was transferring to his canvas, already stood in full-orbed beauty before the eye of his imagination; it was *in him*, not on his table; and it was in him because, by long and loving communion with the visible forms of nature, he had learned to spiritualize them and make them a part not only of his mental wealth, but of his very being. When Domenichino was once reproached for not sooner finishing a picture, he replied, "I am constantly painting it *in my mind*." And so, if we would make an intelligent use of models, in the formation of a literary style, we must sedulously nurture within our own souls that ideal beauty of which all models are, at best, only the imperfect expressions.* Nor let it be supposed that "the ancients have stolen all our good things," and left us without resource. In the "Palace of Invention, with its hundred

* This sentiment lies at the basis of Quintilian's precept, when he says: "*Primum est ut quod imitaturus est quisque, intelligat, et quare bonum sit, sciat.*"—*Inst. Orat.*, x., 2, 18.

halls," there are "chambers of imagery" that still wait for the enchanter, at the touch of whose wand the doors shall fly open, "as on golden hinges turning." There is no reason to lament the barrenness of our brains in this modern age, unless we addle them by that species of literary superfœtation against which Shakespeare warns us in one of his sonnets, when he writes,

"If there be nothing new, but that which is
Hath been before, how are our brains beguiled,
Which, laboring for invention, bear amiss
The second burden of a former child."

In creative power of invention, and in the art of literary expression, there was never a greater master than John Milton, whose early essays betrayed "by certain vital signs" that they were likely to live; under the consciousness of which, and obeying what he calls "an inward prompting," he began to hope, as he tells us, that by labor and intense study which he took to be his portion in this life, he "might, perhaps, leave something so written to after times as they should not willingly let it die." Yet Milton has warned us that success in high and effective discourse is not to be attained by "the invocation of Dame Memory and her Siren daughters," but (after devout prayers to that Eternal Spirit who can enrich with all utterance and knowledge) "by industrious and select reading, by steady observation, and by insight into all seemly and generous arts and affairs."

It is in the culture of "generous arts and affairs" that the graces of style find their native as well as their appropriate place. Gracchus, pitching his voice by the notes of a flute that he might the more melodiously harangue a Roman mob in his declamations against the Agrarian laws; Ariosto, spending whole days in the polish of a single stanza; Bossuet, modulating his fine mind by a quiet tune or two on his viol, that he might the more harmoniously round his rhythmical periods; Voltaire, thumbing the *Athalie* of Racine and the *Petit Curême* of Massillon, that he might the better keep his taste pure from the corruptions incident to a rapid and voluminous writer; Robert Hall, lying on the floor, and writhing with intense pain, while dictating the manuscript copy of his famous sermon

on "Modern Infidelity," yet pausing in the fine frenzy of his anguish to substitute the word "pierce" for "penetrate," are a few illustrations—their number might be greatly increased—of the value that should justly be attached to mere style: for it is nothing but a difference of style which sometimes makes the expression of one man's thoughts trivial, and of another man's weighty; which makes the thought of one man perish in the uttering, and sends forth the thought of another man instinct with the breath of immortality.

And if attention to mere style is always important, it becomes especially important to us, with whom the English tongue is vernacular, provided there be any truth, as I believe there is, in the statement made by Mr. Marsh, when he declares that to write English with propriety is a more difficult accomplishment among the English-speaking race than the Frenchman finds it to write correct French, or the German to write correct German. To this we should add, in further enforcement of the same cultivated sensibility, that, in the opinion of one among the greatest masters of modern English style—I refer to Coleridge—the genius of the English mind and language demands a denser body of thought, as the condition of a high polish, than suffices for the purposes of literary art in some other tongues, as, for instance, in the Italian, with its more poetical idiom and its more homogeneous vocabulary. If, in our English, we would have the sparkle of the diamond, we must first be sure to have the diamond's solidity in the body of our thoughts, and then we may wisely bestow on the structure of our sentences a labor of the file which shall rival the patient industry that the lapidary brings to a diamond in the rough before its facets are fitted to shine on the finger of beauty. As in finest steel its polish of surface and keenness of edge are due to the high quality and rare temper it has received under the metallurgist's hand, so, in all good writing, it is only the sterling quality of our thoughts that can be made the basis of a style that shall be as brilliant and incisive as a Damascus blade. There are, indeed, those who aspire to be, as Carlyle has it, "mere blowers of soap-bubbles for their fellow-creatures." But it is not to such that I address myself. *Non ragioniam di lor.*

Superadded to the "steady observation" of nature and of life, as also to an "intelligent insight into all seemly and generous arts," and to the "industrious and select reading" of great authors, as sources of literary inspiration, there is one other condition of success in literary art and rhetorical effectiveness to which I cannot but advert in the conclusion of these remarks. If we would speak and write effectively we must ever keep ourselves in close communion and in warm sympathy with the spirit of that age in which Providence has cast our lot. Never was there an age which called more loudly for earnest and thoughtful men, or which offered to earnest and thoughtful men a wider field of activity and usefulness. Our whole country has recently passed through a time of storm and pressure like to that *Sturm-und-Drang-Zeit* with which Germany was visited in the early part of our century. The windows of heaven have been opened on our land, and the fountains of the great deep have been broken up under the very foundations of the Republic, but the ark of our National Life has outridden the storm, and if that ark still rests on the peaks of Ararat, with the surge of angry billows seething in the plains below, it rests there as a stranded argosy, freighted with the highest of human hopes, and not as a dismantled hulk.

"It is a pleasure," says Lueretius, the great poet of nature among the Romans, "to stand on the shore and see ships tossed at sea; a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle and see a battle with its adventures below;" "but," he adds, "there is no pleasure so great as that of those who hold well-guarded the serene temples which have been founded and reared by the learning of the wise." It is this higher pleasure which falls to our lot to-day, and we are called to enjoy it at a period in our academic history when "the serene temples" in which *we* most exult, as "sons of Nassau," have just received an accession in that splendid edifice this day to be dedicated, which, by its honored name, carries us back to the very cradle of our *Alma Mater*, and which, by the grandeur of its solid architecture and the symmetry of its proportions, is suited to typify as well as to commemorate the large-hearted munificence of its noble founder.

And we are called to enjoy this higher pleasure at a juncture in our national affairs which, in bringing with it a peculiar class of duties, affords at the same time the strongest incentives to their adequate performance. While nothing is more alien to the pursuits of scholarship than the actual pursuits of war, in which our country has lately been engaged, it is a noteworthy fact in the history of the race that all periods of great civil commotion have been attended and followed by a new phase of intellectual energy. It is in the stir of great events, and under the sway of strong passions, that the dormant powers of the national mind are roused into vigorous exercise; and though in the stern gladiatorship of martial conflict these powers may for a time be laid under contribution by the demands of a mere material strife, the day soon comes when the antagonists must needs retire from the lists, when arms must yield to the gown, and when the statesman and scholar are called to untie, with dexterous hand, those Gordian knots which the sword has left uncut. It was so in Greece, when the strife between Attica and Sparta culminated in the long and desolating war of which Thucydides has left us the imperishable record. That period was known in subsequent ages of the classic world as "the Peloponnesian times"—so Thucydides calls them—a period no less remarkable for the opulence of its intellectual resources in the arts of peace, than for its deeds of heroism in the art of war; for the same vitalizing energy which nerved the warrior in the field, breathed also in the eloquence of Pericles as he floundered and lightened from the Pnyx, and gave point and pungency to the satire of Aristophanes in those dramas which still most vividly reflect the many-hued lights of that pictorial epoch in Grecian history. Rome had nothing better than her Atellan farces, or the ballads in which her poets sang the exploits of legendary heroes, down to the day when the first Punic war, in stirring the national mind to its lowest depths, created the conditions of a higher emotion, along with the demand for a higher species of literary art; and her Augustan age in literature was ushered in by political convulsions and civil feuds which not only shook but subverted the foundations of the state. Without the vigorous stirring of all the depths in his

soul by the events of his troubled political life in Florence, we may be sure, says a modern writer, that Dante would never have yielded as he did, for the first time in all literature, "the whole innermost truth of a man's soul, and the living image of his age, in a poem passionate with all that was real to him, rising fearlessly to the heights and sounding the depths of an argument unequalled then in its sublimity."

In later times no age has been so marked by the agitations of human thought as the sixteenth century, and yet in no age were the embryonic germs of knowledge and art fecundated with an intelligence more vivid and enduring. It was indeed an age of conflict—of war, civil, social, and religious—but it was for that very reason an age of earnest thought, of daring adventure, of restless enterprise, and of brilliant discovery in the world of matter and of mind. For this was the age of Luther and of Leo X. ; of Calvin and of Loyola ; of Fiesco and of Machiavelli ; of Cortez and of Vasco de Gama ; of Bacon and of Descartes ; of Raphael and of Michael Angelo ; of Tycho Brahe and of Kepler ; of Cervantes and of Camoens ; of Tasso and of Spenser ; of Ariosto and of Shakespeare. It was as if the world, both of thought and of action, in "spinning down the grooves of change," had taken fire by the celerity of its motion. All that was merely curious and critical, recondite and pedantic, in scholarship and literature, was swept away by the mighty rushing tides of human thought. In times of luxury and ease there is a perpetual temptation to turn knowledge into the ornament rather than the staff of life. When the fermentation of thought has ceased, the wine settles on its lees and grows so vapid that it can neither gladden the heart nor kindle the brain of man. But when an ardent intelligence and a lively enthusiasm pervade the great mass of society, there is no room left for that merely cloistral learning which surfeits on the honeyed store of the past, or for that dainty dilettantism which stifles the savor of life with unguents and perfumes. When the whole community has received the shock which wakes it from the slumber of apathy and sloth, the recluse scholar is called from the groves of the Academy to take his appointed place in the Forum of active life. "When God shakes a kingdom with strong and

healthful commotions to a general reforming," says Milton, "he then raises to his own work men of rare abilities and more than common industry, not only to look backward and revise what hath been taught heretofore, but to gain further, and to go on some new enlightened steps in the discovery of truth."

It is in such an age that the educated men of America are called to act their part to-day—an age which, by the peculiar problems it offers for solution in every department of thought, in religion, in science, in literature, in statesmanship, may be justly held to call for the ripest culture in unison with the deepest earnestness. No man can afford, least of all can educated men afford, to stand aloof from their age in sullen apathy or selfish indifference. It was a saying of Bacon's that in this world God only and the angels may be spectators. "No great intellect," says Leopardi—that profound genius of modern Italy, whose unhappy destiny it was "to move about in worlds not realized" within the walls of his library—"no great intellect was created for mere literary studies, nor was man born *to write* but *to do*."

The disciples of Epicurus made the love of pleasure an excuse for not meddling with the affairs of state; but what shall be said of the American scholar who makes the love of letters a pretext for renouncing the duties of a citizen? So, indeed, did Atticus in the most stirring period of the Roman commonwealth, shrinking from the forum and the field, that he might bury himself in his library, where he loved, as Cicero tells us, to sit under the shadow of Aristotle's bust. But for this history does not praise Atticus. So did old Michel de Montaigne, in the very middle of the sixteenth century, finding his favorite "eigne of vantage" in a sequestered nook of his solitary chateau, and there writing his pleasant essays, while making a mock of both Catholic and Huguenot in the civil and religious wars by which his country was rent. But for this history does not praise the old Gascon essayist. So did even Goethe, in the epoch of the Napoleonic wars which convulsed his fatherland—quaffing his chosen Cape wine "in lettered ease" at a time when the vials of wrath were poured out on all Europe; pursuing his theories in optics,

while the heavens were darkened by the smoke of battle; and inditing his ingenious but untimely theses in osteology, while the bones of his countrymen were bleaching on a hundred stricken fields. But for this history does not praise the many-sided genius of Germany. Far other was the conduct of Pericles in those trying times of Athens when the scourge of the noisome pestilence came to darken the horrors of civil strife. Far other was the conduct of Cicero, in whom, notwithstanding his "more than girlish vanity," the statesman, the scholar, and the patriot were harmoniously blended. Though he lived in a day of popular giddiness and revolt, he found time to speak and act for the republic as well as to write the *Tusculan Disputations*, and, when yielding to the storms of fate, he withdrew for a season from the sinking land he could no longer save, the muse of history records to his credit that it was the last act of the retiring patriot to take the image of Minerva, which he most prized among his household gods, and place it in the temple of Capitoline Jove; thus signifying, in the expressive symbolism of the old ethnic mythology, that the citizen who had once saved his country by his presence in her councils, still commended her safety during his involuntary absence, to the patron goddess of moderation and wisdom. Far other was the conduct of Milton, who foreswore the delights of travel in Italy at the outbreak of the civil war in England, counting it, as he tells us, a disgrace to remain abroad while his countrymen were contending for their liberties at home; and it does not need to be said, that he ever esteemed it among his highest glories to have performed, with fidelity, his humble duties as the Latin Secretary of the Commonwealth.

And our own age is not poor in like illustrious instances, whether we turn to Italy with her statesmen and scholars—her Cavours and Giobertis, her Balbos and d'Azeglios—in whom the active duties of life were combined with intellectual and literary pursuits—in Cavour, with mathematical studies; in Gioberti, with profound disquisition in mental and moral philosophy; in Balbo, with historical science; in d'Azeglio, with æsthetical criticism and popular fiction; while, as to the land from which we bring the traditions of our civil polity,

and in which we find the cradles of our race and tongue, it is enough to cite the names of a Cornewall Lewis, of a Gladstone, of a Roundell Palmer, of a Derby, Disraeli, and Bulwer, to prove how little foundation there is for the assumption that those who guide the affairs of the State must needs forego the love and culture of letters in their devotion to the cares of office.

It has ever been held among the crowning glories of our Alma Mater, that in the long line of worthies whom she has sent forth "to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously, all the offices, both public and private, of peace and war," she has been especially happy in the number and quality of the statesmen whom she has contributed to the public service. Let us see to it that this glory shall suffer no diminution in our hands, at a time when, more than ever, our country requires the guidance of high-minded and enlightened men. It is recorded in the chronicles of Holy Writ, that the children of Issachar alone among their contemporaries in the Hebrew Commonwealth, "had understanding of their times, to know what Israel ought to do;" and though in a crisis of their nation's history they numbered only two hundred chieftains, it is said that "all their brethren were at their commandment." I would that the men who shall go forth from this institution may have "understanding of *their* times," that so they may, by their words and by their works, wield among their contemporaries the influence which springs from the power of knowledge, wisely applied to beneficent ends in the figure of human society, and that thus they may realize the grand ideal of Bacon, by making their knowledge "a rich store-house, for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate."

ART. VIII.—*The Theology of Christ, from his own Words.*
By Joseph P. Thompson. New York: Charles Scribner
& Co. 1870.

THIS title-page expresses a happy conception, which is well executed in the body of the volume. The number of those

who prate of receiving Christ and rejecting Christian theology, of cultivating Christian life and repudiating Christian doctrine, is about as great as the multitude of those who are restive under the restraints which the Gospel imposes upon the lawlessness of thinking and feeling to which the carnal mind is ever prone. Those who chafe under the doctrines of the New Testament weary us with their absurd attempts to array theology against life, dogmas against spirit, the person of Christ against the teachings of Christ. In pursuance of this aim, it has become quite a fashion, to set off Christ and his instructions as far more edifying and acceptable than the Epistles of Paul and other Apostles, in which the great principles of Christianity are presented in an aspect more developed and formulated, and more approaching systematic theology. So they undertake to set Christ against his Apostles and prophets, and represent the Gospels as less bristling with dogma than the Epistles. Hence they would disparage the Epistles because burdened and repulsive with theology, and bring us to the immediate teachings of Christ, as being so simple, beautiful, and guiltless of that *monstrum horrendum*, theology, and its hard, unedifying dogmas.

We have often remarked how shallow and fatuous are all such pretensions, and that nothing more is requisite to dispel them than a careful study of the words, the teaching and preaching of Christ himself. All those obnoxious doctrines against which liberalists, sceptics, and rationalists of all grades do so reluctantly, are taught, not merely by Augustinians and Calvinists, but by the Apostles; and not merely by Paul, Peter, John, and Jude, but by the great Teacher who commissioned and inspired them. These "hard sayings" do not originate with us, but with Christ himself, and are so designated by him. It is quite time that attention should be directed to this fact by concentrating its proofs in a strong and incontestable light. We have long felt that a great and inviting field opens here, waiting to be occupied. We have even longed for the leisure to enter it ourselves. We rejoice that it has at length been entered, so far as we know, for the first time, at all events in the English tongue, by one who proves himself so competent to deal with it as Dr. Thompson.

In thus calling attention to his very valuable treatise on this subject, we seize the opportunity to call attention to some of the most salient points of the great theme treated in it. And first, in regard to dogmatic or Christian theology itself, against which all kinds of latitudinarians so much inveigh, *i. e.*, a series of definitive propositions concerning God, and the relation of man to God, affirmed upon the authority of God speaking in his Word. We have heard these men vehemently denounce "propositional theology."

"Preaching being the characteristic feature of the life of Christ, no true understanding of his mission can be had without a knowledge of what he preached as the truth of God. The Gospels which give us the record of his life contain also a Gospel which he preached; and this Gospel comprises not only the rules of practical morality, the lessons and precepts of humanity and religion, but the doctrines of a Positive Theology. It is sometimes alleged that Christ taught personally none of those doctrines which are commonly set forth by the church in her creeds as distinctive of the Christian faith, but directed his teachings to practical life, inculcating the virtues, graces, and charities that would reform, adorn, and bless society, and elevate mankind; that the doctrines of regeneration and atonement, of the divinity of Christ and the personality of the Holy Spirit, were woven out of his sayings by speculative minds among his followers, after Jesus had finished his personal testimony of truth and goodness, that such doctrines owe more to St. Paul and St. Augustine than to Christ, and belong not to the original substance of the Gospel, but to a philosophical theology that has grown up around it.

"So far as the very words of Christ have been preserved, these form the essence of Christianity, just as the original sayings of Socrates as preserved by his disciples are the substance of the Socratic wisdom. To the first preacher of Christianity must we look for the freshest, truest, best conception of the system. In his words we find a proper theology—not formulated, indeed, nor systematized, yet expressed in doctrines set forth with a certain gradation of time and thought, or in a certain order of development—and these doctrines interwoven with the whole texture of the precepts and promises of the Gospel.

"In a great Christian convention it was said lately, 'The churches are dying of theology; ministers must preach Christ,' and the sentiment was received with applause. But Christ himself preached theology, and it is not possible to preach Christ except one shall preach the doctrines that he taught, and that are the substance of his Gospel. Shall one preach that Jesus is the Saviour of mankind? But this is a doctrine to be illustrated from his life and death, and confirmed by his own words. Shall one preach that men must repent and believe, that they may be saved? But this again is a doctrine to be expounded, proved, enforced. Shall the preacher, with Paul, determine not to know any thing 'save Jesus Christ and him crucified?' But the relation of Christ's death to our salvation of all doctrines most requires clearness of statement and cogency of proof. If the church is languid and feeble in face of rationalism, ritualism, and materialism, it

is for lack of a vigorous grasp of the doctrines of the Gospel. Preaching has run too much to the superficial, the fanciful, the sensational; men go to church that they may be pleased and excited, rather than instructed; for some transitory play upon the imagination and emotions, rather than the lasting conviction of the understanding; whereas, what most they need is, that the intellectual and moral nature be lifted up to the great thoughts of Christ, and so filled with his Spirit. Christ is best preached in the grand doctrines whereby he himself preached the Gospel of the kingdom of God." (Pp. 2, 3, 4, 5.)

We detect the true ring here.

On the subject of depravity and regeneration, Dr. Thompson shows that our Saviour taught in his interview with Nicodemus and elsewhere the most thorough-going doctrine. He says: "There is no mistaking the judgment of Jesus Christ upon that point. The doctrine of the universal sinfulness of mankind lay at the basis of his scheme of renovation, and his doctrine of the necessity of the new birth grew logically out of that; both are fundamental in this theology. The terms of admission into the kingdom of heaven are the same for all. The reformation that is demanded is not renouncing one's more flagrant and conspicuous sins, lopping off individual vices or habits, but transforming the sinful heart into a new and holy heart." (Pp. 40-1.) Again he tells us, "The new birth is more than repenting—to be born anew implies that repentance is confirmed, and the renunciation of sin made sure by bringing into the soul a new life-power from the Spirit of God. . . Since sinful desires have ruled the heart, and sin has gained possession of the imagination, the reason, the inclinations, the will—of the whole man as a thinking, feeling, acting soul—one's own resolution, however sincere, one's own decision, however earnest, proves too weak to eradicate the propensity to evil; therefore must we be re-enforced from above; we should never succeed in purifying ourselves—for "that which is born of the flesh is flesh"—and our best purposes of amendment would begin under the limitation of weakness and the taint of carnal habits; spiritual life within us must be born of the Spirit of God." (Pp. 42-3.)

Although the volume is not wanting in other less adequate forms of statement, yet its general tone on these subjects is in harmony with the foregoing, which comes quite up to our standard as to the extent and dominion of corruption in the

soul of man, his impotency to remove it, except as empowered thereunto by supernatural regeneration. This the author clearly shows to be the theology of Christ.

While Dr. T. signalizes the will as the seat of responsibility, and the faculty which embraces God and salvation, he says, "This elective principle carries along with it the feelings of the heart. It is not a dry intellectual state, though it may seem dry when analyzed for purposes of definition; neither is it a cold, stiff purpose of the will, though its value and durability as a principle require that it shall take the form of fixed, rigid resolution; but feeling, entering into them, animates the purpose, keeps the resolution all aglow." This is good psychology, whether natural or Christian.

Dr. Thompson shows by proofs manifold, enmulative, invincible, how Christ taught and preached the spirituality of worship, a living Providence, prayer, the distinct personality, and oneness with the Father in divinity, of Christ, the personality, divinity, and saving offices of the Holy Ghost, the heavenly paradise, the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment, the blessedness of the saints, the eternal punishment of the wicked, and the sacraments. Many of these chapters are very able, and abound in solid practical and theoretical divinity, in apologetics and homiletics, and in passages of great beauty and force. We recall chapters on Prayer, Providence, Paradise, Heaven, the Punishment of the Wicked and its eternal duration, as specially valuable and interesting. We should be glad to quote from them. We have only space, however, to refer all interested on the great topic treated to the volume itself, which will show the author's views, and the neat, popular, but not unclassie, style in which he clothes his ideas.

Before closing, however, we will ask attention to two points which we should prefer to see developed with greater emphasis, and fulness, and explicitness than we find in this very valuable volume. The title of the chapter concerning the saving virtue and efficacy of the death of Christ is, "Salvation made possible through the death of Christ;" so the strongest representations which we find of the vicarious and propitiatory nature of Christ's death is in these words: "It was to counteract an evil consequence of sin, to remove the penalty

of a moral transgression, that the serpent was lifted up; and it was for men perishing in sin that the Son of man was lifted up; for men condemned because of sin that he came with that healing of the soul which is eternal life. The cure for the bite of the serpent was appointed expressly for that end; and so, in the counsels of wisdom and mercy, it was appointed that the Son of man be lifted up. His crucifixion was appointed for our salvation." (P. 61.) "As he said to Pilate, he *laid down his life*; he came to do this; it was in his plan to die upon the cross as a ransom." (P. 65.) All this, in itself, admits of the construction that we are saved through Christ's death merely as it effects the internal purification of the soul by its moral impression upon it, and by the inward work of the Holy Spirit producing the "healing of the soul," and so becomes its ransom by removing the penalty of sin in this manner; or with his being, likewise and primarily, a ransom and deliverer from the penalty of sin, by bearing this penalty, or by sufferings substituted directly for this penalty—by a truly objective atonement for sin offered immediately, vicariously, and sacrificially, in direct satisfaction of divine justice. We do not doubt that Dr. Thompson means at least to include the latter—a doctrine so explicitly taught by Christ when he declares that he laid down his life for the sheep, and as a ransom for many, and manifoldly taught throughout the Bible. But what has specially forced itself on our notice is, that in his representations of the relations of men to God, Christ, and salvation, the ways of approach and reconciliation to God, the nature of experimental religion on its practical and speculative side, we miss the distinct reference to this atoning work, while we find other things clearly and adequately put. We find the Christian life set forth in the aspects of love, repentance, the service of God, choosing God, obeying God, spiritual renovation—faith also, faith in Christ too; but this faith in him more as a spiritual renovator by his Spirit, his Word, the impression or suasive influence of his death, than in the form of distinct and specific reliance on him as an atoning sacrifice, on his blood and righteousness put in lieu of the sinner's as the ground of pardon and justification. The following, for example, is true to the life as far as it goes:—

"The choice which the soul makes in religion is not simply a choice of opinions, nor a choice of systems, nor a choice of ends personal to itself, but the choice of an object of affection, even of its highest love; the choice is itself an affliction, going forth in the act of will as the dominant love of the heart. Not duty, nor fear, as toward God in his majesty, nor simply approbation in the contemplation of the Divine excellence, but love it is that inspires the deep principle, the fixed purpose of the soul to serve and praise God in holy living. Thus religion absorbs all the powers and affections of the soul." (Pp. 89-90.)

This is a specimen of never so many passages good and edifying. But we too much miss Christ in that *expiatory* character of his death, which is a first object of saving faith and condition of Christ's being "the Way, so that no man cometh to God but by him." We invite the author's attention to the importance of being more frequent and explicit on this particular point in future editions of this excellent volume.

The other point respects the limitations of salvation. Dr. Thompson proves triumphantly that the great articles of Evangelical doctrine are taught by Christ himself, including those which are most offensive to the carnal mind and liberal thinkers. We will add to this, that his teachings are no less decided and explicit for the distinctive principles of the Calvinistic system as against Arminianism and Pelagianism. And we doubt not our author would agree with us that Christ utters these doctrines as decisively as any of the Epistles or other portions of Scripture. It is true, as Dr. Thompson says, that salvation is limited only by unbelief. But what limits this unbelief? Is it not the determinate electing love of God, drawing its objects to the Father, by the spirit working faith and destroying unbelief in their souls? While the Gospel is sincere, full, free, and unlimited, who will accept it? All that we hold on this subject is nowhere more strongly asserted than by our Saviour, when he declares, "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me." "This is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing." (John vi. 37-39.) "No man can come to me except the Father who hath sent me draw him." (John v. 44.) "Him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out" (v. 40). And when he further tells us that he lays down his life for the sheep, that the impenitent believe not, because they are not of his sheep, and that he

prays for them and not for the world, and much more found in the tenth and seventeenth chapters of St. John's Gospel, we only say that it involves the utmost limitations of the efficacy or design of the Gospel which we find in the other Scriptures, and in the great Calvinistic symbols.

We only deem it important to add, that the "theology of Christ," as exhibited in the book before us, goes far to settle the question as to the propriety of incorporating doctrine into popular preaching. Christ taught and preached the doctrines, even those which constitute the offence of the cross, the high mysteries of the Trinity, incarnation, and redemption; of providence, election, and predestination; of the fall and supernatural regeneration of man; of justification by faith, repentance, and holy living; of the resurrection, final judgment, the eternal blessedness of the righteous, and everlasting punishment of the wicked. These constitute the substance of Christianity. Preaching these in themselves, and their practical applications, we preach Christianity. We quite agree with our author, that if the church is languid and feeble in face of Rationalism, Ritualism, and Materialism, it is for lack of a vigorous grasp of the doctrines of the Gospel, and that ignoring them, "preaching has run too much to the superficial, the fanciful, the sensational."

ART. IX.—*The Papal Temporal Power.*

ON the twentieth of September, the Italian army entered Rome, and dispossessed the Pontiff of his temporal sovereignty. He had, on the tenth of the same month, thus addressed his army: "At this moment, when a great sacrilege and the most enormous injustice are about to be consummated, and the troops of a Catholic king, without provocation, nay, without even the least appearance of any motive, surround and besiege the capital of the Catholic world, I feel, in the first place, the necessity of thanking you and our entire army for your generous conduct up to the present time, for the affection which you have shown to the Holy See, and for your willingness to consecrate your-

selves entirely to the defence of this metropolis. May these words be a solemn document to certify to the discipline, the loyalty, and the valor of the army in the service of this Holy See." He then directs the commander to open negotiations for surrender as soon as a breach shall have been made in the walls, as further resistance would only involve a useless shedding of blood. Under date of November first, we have the conditions announced of the Italian government on taking possession of Rome. "All the political authority of the Pope and the Holy See in Italy is abolished and will remain so. The Pope will be entirely free in the exercise of his ecclesiastical rights which he now possesses as the supreme chief of Catholicism, and will enjoy all the honors and liberties which constitute sovereign prerogative." "The appanage of his holiness and his court shall be furnished by Italy, which also assumes the debts hitherto contracted by the Pontifical State." The debt of the papal government thus assumed is said to be about \$150,000,000. Its revenue from the Roman States, at the latest dates consulted, was about \$5,800,000; its expenditures \$14,800,000, leaving a most formidable deficit of over \$9,000,000. Italian soldiers now maintain order on the Vatican Hill equally as on the other side of the Tiber. In a word, the Pope is a *subject* where once he was a *sovereign*, and seems destined, as time advances, to be made more and more sensible of the complete change in his *status*.

A blow at the temporal power is a blow at the Jesuits, who, within the last thirty years, had increased from less than three thousand to more than eight thousand five hundred. And for a thousand years never had the bishops been more helplessly in bondage and servile to the Papacy. The Jesuits no longer have their head-quarters at the Vatican, and the bishops may now reassert some measure of independence and self-respect. There is difficulty, it is true, in estimating the relative importance of recent occurrences in public affairs. Our partialities or prejudices may be too deeply engaged to admit of a dispassionate judgment. We must be at a proper distance, or we may mistake some very insignificant objects for the grand features of a landscape. The history of the popedom teaches us that it is unsafe to predict too positively

that the temporal power, of which Victor Emmanuel has stripped Pio Nono, is a permanent dispossession. Rome has seen many vicissitudes. It was in the eighth century that the temporal power had its commencement. Pepin deposed the last descendant (Childeric III.) of the Merovingian dynasty, and the regal authority which had been conferred on him was confirmed by the authority of the church in the person of Pope Zachary, A. D. 752. Desirous of retaining the crown in his family by means of the favor of the church, Pepin readily yielded to the prayer of the Pope, crossed the Alps with an army, defeated the Lombards, who were at war with Rome, and conferred the exarchate of Ravenna and Pentapolis on the Pope. This was in the year of our Lord 754, and was the origin of the Pontifical sovereignty. Under Charlemagne, the Popes were invested with further power, and defended in the exercise of it. He conferred on them Spelato and Perugia. Prior to the invasion of Italy by Pepin they were the subjects of the Greek emperor, and their interference with civil and political matters was confined to mere admonition of the civil magistrate. In defence of their encroachments, it was pretended that their predecessors had received as a donation from Constantine the sovereignty of Rome and Italy; and the false decretals forged for this purpose appeared about the end of this same century. Thus, pious fraud united with worldly policy and military power in laying the foundation of the political sovereignty of the Papacy. It was even made agreeable to the people of Rome themselves; for, at first, along with the clergy, they had a voice in the election of the Popes, subject to the approval of the emperor.

The great Hildebrand, Gregory VII., who was the first Pontiff elected by the cardinals, in 1073,—for the suffrage had been wrested from the people by Nicholas II.,—made it his great object to attain for the Papacy increased wealth and authority. He excommunicated some of the ministers of the Emperor Henry IV., and at length the emperor himself, and absolved his subjects from their allegiance. His majesty obtained absolution from this sentence only by sitting at the Pope's gate three days barefooted, clad in coarse garments. It was not, however, till A. D. 1278 that the Popes had con-

firmed to them the complete supremacy over the possessions which from the time of Pepin had been claimed as granted to St. Peter. Nicholas III. exacted the surrender as a condition precedent to the crowning of Rudolph I. At the accession of the present Pontiff, the territorial extent of the Papal dominion is said, with the exception of Ferrara and Urbino, which were secured respectively in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to have remained nearly the same as it was under the cession of Rudolph. It amounted in all to about 1,800 English square miles, divided into some twenty (so-called) legations and delegations, and had, at the time of its restoration by the Congress of Vienna, after its spoliation by the first Napoleon, a little more than three millions of inhabitants. Boniface VIII., the last of the great Popes,—the heirs, so to speak, of Gregory VII., who succeeded to the tiara in 1294,—attempted to complete the mighty work of his predecessors, by the subjection of all the kings of the earth to the Pontifical authority. In the council held at Rome in 1302, he composed the famous decretal, *Unam Sanctam*, which asserts that the power of kings is to be held subordinate to that of Popes, and that Popes have the right of appointing, correcting, and deposing them.

But the temporal power has by no means been held, during this long period, in undisputed peaceful possession. Gregory VII., at whose gate the emperor so humbly sat for absolution, subsequently nearly lost his life in an uprising of the people, and was banished by the emperor, who caused himself to be crowned in Rome. He died in exile. Under the successor of the haughty and aspiring Boniface VIII., the residence of the Supreme Pontiff was changed from Italy to France, and Avignon made the capital of the religious world. His exile from Rome lasted seventy-two years, and in the history of the Roman Church has been known as the "Babylonish captivity." Then followed immediately the great schism, which lasted fifty-one years; two Popes were elected, one residing at Avignon, and the other at Rome. The schism was extinguished in 1429 by the abdication of the Pope who held his court at Avignon. During the absence of the Popes, the people of Rome maintained in their own hands the government of their city; but

at the return of the court, through the aid of a foreign army, the Popes resumed their despotic sway.

It will be remembered that within our own century that remarkable man, Napoleon Bonaparte, with Europe prostrate at his feet, and controlling the destinies of eighty millions of people, caused the Pope, Pius VII., to be arrested, and confined him as a prisoner, first at Savona, and afterwards at Fontainebleau. This was in 1809. The revolution in 1848 expelled the present Pontiff, who was restored by Louis Napoleon by force of arms, but only to a small remnant of his former territorial dominions, the city of Rome and its immediate circumjacent territory. The Romagna, comprising fifteen legations and delegations, with an area of 12,681 square miles, with nearly two and a half millions of inhabitants, became detached from the Pontifical government; and only the city of Rome and the Comarca, together with the delegations of Viterbo, Civita Vecchia, Vallettri, and Frosinone, showing an area of only some 4,600 square miles, with a population less than 725,000, remained to constitute the sum-total of the temporal sovereignty of the Pontiff. Since 1850 he has been upheld, in the exercise of the temporal power over this small territory left to him, by French bayonets, up to the breaking out of the war that has proved so disastrous to France. Probably, during the last twenty years, there has been no time when, if the French protection had been withdrawn, the people of Italy would not have wrested, as they have now done, from Pius IX. what temporal power remained in his hand.

While it would be rash to affirm that diplomaey and foreign arms may not force back on Rome the despotism from which it has been delivered, we are not to close our eyes to certain things which render such a result, to say the least, quite improbable:—

1. The Pope has been dispossessed by a Catholic king, who claims to be a loyal son of the church. If it were a revolution in the interests of Red Republicanism, it is easy to see that the great powers of Europe, not excepting those in which Protestantism has the ascendancy, might be led to consider that safety required them to combine for reinstating

the Pontifical sovereignty. But these powers look upon the government of Victor Emmanuel to be as deeply concerned in maintaining the monarchical system as themselves. Cavour, one of the greatest statesmen of modern times, initiated the movements which elevated his country vastly in the rank of nations, and which have now been consummated in the unification, and making Rome the capital, of Italy. The people of Rome, with the exception of a portion of the ecclesiastics and lazzaroni, appear to be united as one man in favor of the change that has been made, having given 50,000 votes in its favor to only 50 against it. All classes of the population are said to have voted, except the priests and those immediately under their influence. And nothing has yet appeared to prove that the king is not truly what he professes to be, a devoted son of the Roman Church. The Pope complains, but he complains of nothing except what is clearly an incident to the loss of the temporal power. This is the burden of his recent protest addressed to the cardinals. He complains that "having no longer that supreme and full power, in virtue of which we enjoy the right of our civil principate, in the use of public means of conveyance, and in the public circulation of letters, and being unable to trust the government who has arrogated this power, we are really deprived of the necessary and speedy way, as well as of the free faculty of treating the affairs which the Vicar of Jesus Christ and common Father of the Faithful, to whom his sons, so numerous, come from all parts of the world, must treat and administer." He brings no charge of any attempt to interfere with the rites of religion, or the doctrines of the church.

2. The effect in Roman Catholic countries of the decree of infallibility. There is a manifest indifference in the European Roman Catholic world to the loss of the temporal power, which can be explained only by the alarming doctrine which seems to be contained in the Pope's claim of this power, by infallible authority; to wit, that "his title would not be invalidated by any degree of misgovernment, or however incompatible his sovereignty might be with the welfare of Europe and mankind." They look upon it as the inauguration of Theocracy, of which every priest, in the pulpit, in the con-

fessional, and in the family, will be the enforced, if not already the zealous, apostle.

That the definition of the dogma of infallibility, and the lapse of the temporal power, should have occurred so closely, in the order of time, is not to be viewed in the light of an ordinary concurrence or sequence of events. Nor should it be viewed merely as "one of those historical sarcasms, one of those ironies of fate, which occasionally stamp great epochs of the world." It is doubtless too soon for us fully to judge what may be the effect on the Roman Catholic world of the decree of infallibility. It seems, however, to be too much to expect that it will be tamely submitted to by the respectable party that so strenuously opposed it. It is a fact worthy of record that, on the question of infallibility in the general congregation of July 13th, eighty-eight prelates voted *non placet*, and sixty-two others voted *placet juxta modum*, or gave only a qualified assent. Of the eighty-eight who voted *non placet*, there were three cardinal archbishops, and three archbishops; thirty-three were from Germany, twenty from France, eight from America, and eight were Orientals. On the 18th, when the dogma was adopted, sixty-six were not present who voted on the 13th; and, in addition to the prelates who had left Rome, between one hundred and thirty and one hundred and forty, it is said, chose to absent themselves from the sitting rather than incur the guilt of voting *placet*, or the odium of avowing their convictions. The most eminent of the absentees were the Archbishops of Paris and Lyons; Cardinal Mathieu, of Besançon; Dupanloup, of Orleans; and the Bishop of Nancy. Of the two who had the courage to persist in their *non placet*, at the final vote, Bishop Fitzgerald, of Little Rock, Arkansas, was one; a bishop from southern Italy was the other. There is an old Catholic rule, it is said, which requires that decrees of faith should be adopted by a unanimous vote, while canons of discipline may be passed simply by a majority vote. The Roman Catholic world is represented by 1,590 archbishops and bishops, according to the year-book of 1869. Making allowance for some bishops, who hold several seats, and for others, who have died, there remains at least 1,400; 800 of whom were not present in the council at the voting. Whether

it will be considered by these men, and others among the priesthood and intelligent laymen, of whom Père Hyacinthe may be regarded as the type and representative, that it remains an open question for them to adhere to the infallibility, or to refuse their submission, is yet to be seen. Authority, it is true, is the principle that governs the Roman Catholic Church; but for that very reason some of these men claim that they are called to “distinguish between an apparent and a real authority; between a blind and a reasoning and reflecting submission,” and to ask the question, “Is the authority of the Council of the Vatican lawful?” “It is because I am *a Catholic*,” says Père Hyacinthe, “and wish to remain such, that I refuse to admit as binding upon the faith of the faithful a doctrine unknown to all ecclesiastical antiquity, which is disputed even now by numerous and eminent theologians, and which implies not a regular development, but a radical change in the constitution of the church, and in the immutable rule of faith. It is because I am *a Christian*, and wish to remain such, that I protest, with all my soul, against those almost Divine attributes to a man, who is presented to our faith—I was about to say our worship—as uniting in his person both the domination which is opposed to the spirit of that Gospel of which he is the minister, and the infallibility which is repugnant to the clay from which, like ourselves, he is formed. One of the most illustrious predecessors of Pius IX., St. Gregory the Great, rejected as a sign of Antichrist the title of Universal Bishop, which was offered to him. What would he have said to the title of Infallible Pontiff?”

The party in the Romish church represented by the eighty-eight prelates who voted *non placet* in the Vatican council will undoubtedly receive strength and courage by the Pope's forfeiture of his temporal power. “Before this year closes,” says Dr. Philip Schaff, “we may see the beginning of a new movement in the Romish Church, headed by such men as Dollinger, in Germany, and Père Hyacinthe, in France, or by others whom God alone can raise and will raise in his own time—a movement similar to Jansenism in the seventeenth, if not the Reformation in the sixteenth, century.” In his speech before the Council, Cardinal Schwarzenberg said: “In

my fatherland (Bohemia) the Hussite movement is still burning beneath the ashes; and among Catholic nations also, the great question of a radical reformation of the church in head and members (*reformatio in capite et membris*) continues to be a live problem that anxiously awaits its solution. If you carry your point, schismatic movements and apostasy from Rome will be inevitable." "The Council," says Father Hyacinthe, "which should have been a work of light and peace, has deepened the darkness, and unchained discord among the *religious* world. War replies to it as a terrible echo in the *social* world. War is one of God's scourges; but in inflicting chastisement, it may also prepare a remedy." It is thus evident that he, and they whom he represents, are disposed to regard the war which now desolates Europe, and has so seriously affected Rome, as a chastisement for the sin that has been committed by the declaration of infallibility, and as likely to exert some counteractive or remedial influence. The Italians, when they entered Rome and dispersed the foreign mercenaries, and thus took away the power of the pope as a temporal sovereign, it is certain set at naught his recent definition; that is, if in virtue of his supreme authority, he is understood to define, among other things (as he may now do, if infallible, without Council), that the maintenance of his secular power is essential to the preservation of faith and morals. The opposers of the infallibility dogma will doubtless discover its deserved and signal rebuke in this speedy fruit of the war, and which promises, moreover, to prove, at least in some degree, its counteraction. Will not such men as Schwarzenberg, Strossmayer, Hefele, Dupanloup, Fitzgerald, and Hyacinthe find some compensation for the odium they have been called to endure for fidelity to their convictions in the fact that the man to whom attributes almost divine were ascribed, on the eighteenth of July, was, on the twentieth of September, stripped of the power which he claimed belonged to him of right as the supreme head of the church? Can we expect that they will be zealous in the demand for the restoration of this power?

3. A great change has taken place, and is still in progress, among the nations of Europe, by which those that have been known as Roman Catholic have lost greatly in influence, and

the Protestant interest has gained in equal, if not greater, proportion. Spain long since lost that potency by which, as the chief agent, she executed the behests of Rome. When the so-called "Invincible Armada" threatened England, she could boast of over 40,000,000 of inhabitants; she has now only 14,000,000. The British Islands had, at that time, 10,800,000; they have now over 30,000,000, and millions more have gone, with their Protestant faith, to people the United States, Australia, India, and New Zealand. And it is an event of no small significance that the newly-elected king of Spain is a son of Victor Emmanuel, who accepts the crown with the express sanction of his father. Austria, first, in the conflict with Louis Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel, and then with Prussia, has been completely humiliated, and has sunk from its rank as a first-rate power. And now France, the avowed champion of the Pontificate for the last twenty years, instead of having bayonets to spare to defend a foreign throne, has not found enough for the protection of its own. Solferino, Sadowa, and Sedan are names which will long have a peculiar significance in the history of our times, as they will be seen to sustain a peculiar relation to the recent overthrow of the Papal temporal power. The alliance between the five great powers which controlled the affairs of Europe from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the Revolution in 1848, and which doubtless would have thrown its protecting ægis around the government of his holiness, has been dissolved. There is no international law that can be pleaded in the case, for the Pope has steadily disclaimed the binding force of any such law as infringing the rights of the church, and has elected to rely for his protection on a sanction which is wholly unknown to international law. A great change has taken place since Adrian IV. granted Ireland to Henry II. of England, and compelled the Emperor Barbarossa to hold his stirrup; and another Pontiff, in the same century, Alexander III., is said to have trodden on the neck of the emperor as he knelt to kiss his foot. The vial has been poured out on the Euphrates.

The prophecies of Scripture clearly point to the overthrow of Papacy in the Roman Church. That we have the hierarchy, image-worship, and temporal power of this church foretold,

and their downfall, no one who examines the subject with candor can doubt for a moment. See Apocalypse from xiii. 11 to the end of chapter xix.; particularly chap. xiv. 6-20, chaps. xvi. and xviii. It is true some have thought they had discovered things in Scripture which are not there, and have suggested interpretations which cannot be sustained, and in their zeal, excited by the corruptions and abuses that have been palmed upon Christianity, have expected judgments that may never come; but that the Papacy, with its persecutions, errors, and end, is clearly foretold, cannot seriously be questioned. We should, of course, be on our guard against harsh, uncharitable judgments, and that spirit which would find satisfaction in visitations of evil on those from whom we differ, and whose errors we may regard as most pernicious. "When we say Rome," says Prof. Tayler Lewis, "we mean Rome strictly,—Papal Rome, Jesuit Rome, Rome that sitteth on the seven hills,—and not that great and venerable body, called 'the Catholic Church,' as it exists in Europe, and on which this Papal power has so long been sitting, like a dire, stifling incubus she could not throw off. It is a distinction that Protestants ought ever to make as enabling them, on the one hand, to preserve their charity, and, on the other, sternly to maintain the true interpretation of those solemn prophecies which so fearfully paint this terrible evil that was developed in the history of the church. We can thus preserve a feeling of brotherhood for our fellow-Christians of Germany, France, and Spain; we can love them for the real saintliness often exhibited in their communions; we can pity what we regard as their errors, growing out of this long malarious oppression; we can ask their charity, in turn, for confessed defects in our own Protestantism; but with Jesuit Rome, Papal Rome, the Rome of Hildebrand and Borgia, there can be no communion. She herself utterly repels it, and we can only prefer her ban to her embrace. When Rome is gone; when this Jesuit, Italian power has sunk like the millstone that 'the angel cast into the sea' (Rev. xviii. 21), then may there be again one venerable mother, one Catholic faith, one church, with its open, visible communion, as well as its pure, spiritual unity."

Not only are the remains of the fourth kingdom (Dan. ii. 40-45), as perpetuated even to our day by the Roman hierarchy (Rev. xiii. 12, 14-17), passing rapidly away, but it is most remarkable that, simultaneously with this great overturn, the Cæsarism, as it is called, or empire, which the ruler who has upheld, during the last twenty years, the Pope in Rome, and supported, by the French naval, military, and political power, Papal propagandism in the South Seas, China, and elsewhere, has fallen certainly beyond all hope of ever regaining its former prestige and power in the world. It has been the highest ambition of Louis Napoleon to be viewed as sustaining the same relation to the Great Napoleon, which Augustus did to the Great Cæsar; and not merely by natural relationship, but in the founding of a great empire. His "Life of Julius Cæsar," was undertaken not so much to gratify an ambition for authorship, as to commend the principles on which he hoped to found a Napoleonic dynasty that should rank with that of the ancient Cæsars. He was seeking to prepare the way for that *plebiscite*, by which he hoped to win, in the vote of the masses, a power to override the popular will, as expressed in regular representative assemblies. The centralization of irresponsible power in one man, by the apparent consent of the people, is Cæsarism. And that system has undergone a sudden and hopeless collapse in France, simultaneously with the collapse of the priestly dominion in Italy, which has perpetuated the Cæsarism, not excepting its idolatry, of old Rome. The collapse follows immediately upon the *plebiscite*,—that mockery of the people,—in an appeal to their vote, in the one instance, and in the other, upon the ascription of a divine attribute to a mere mortal—that mockery of God—in the decree of infallibility.

We have seen in what light one party in the Roman Church may be supposed to regard the loss of the temporal power; we are left in no doubt as to the manner in which another party, the ultramontanists and Jesuits, are disposed to regard this event.

Archbishop Manning delivered a discourse in the Pro-cathedral of Kensington, October 2d, which was subsequently written out by him, and given to the public in the New York

World, October 20th. He says: "Rome has been seized by violence, and the head of Christendom, and Christendom itself, has been robbed. The capital of the Christian world is reduced to the capital of a nation." "It was a violation of sovereign rights, the oldest and most sacred in the world. For more than a thousand years the Vicars of Jesus Christ have reigned as sovereigns over Rome. They are the most ancient of Christian kings,"—"And this sin and injustice, as it would be against any sovereign, is also sacrilege against the Vicar of Jesus Christ. It is a violence against a person who is sacred, and a violation of sacred things. The sovereignty of Rome is a sacred trust in behalf of the whole Christian world. The freedom of the church and the liberty of the truth are contained in it. Pius IX. received it from his predecessors as a trust, and is bound before God to hand it on intact to those who shall come after. His throne is not that of earthly right alone, but of the Vicar of Christ; a power not won by conquest, nor sought by ambition, nor bought by gold, nor filched by intrigue, but forced upon the Pontiffs by a moral and political necessity. When the people of Rome and of Italy had no other protectors, they made the Pontiff to be their king. Christian Rome became afterwards the germ of civilization, and of the political order of the Christian world. But the Christian order of the world is a creature of Divine providence, and has a sacred character of which the sovereign Pontiff is the centre and head. The attempt to depose him is, therefore, a sacrilege against the Christian order of the world."

He then proceeds to comment on the effect of this persecution, as he is pleased to term it, in purifying the church, and clearly recognizes the existence of a party in it, whose views are diametrically opposed to his own. "One thing is certain, we shall have among us fewer bad Catholics, worldly Catholics, lax Catholics, and liberal Catholics. When the world turns upon the church, such men are either reclaimed or fall off. When trial comes, it does not pay to be a Catholic; to be firm costs something. Only those who hold faith dearer than life stand the test. We are not afraid of this sifting. Nominal Catholics are our weakness and vexation, our scandal, and our shame; sometimes they are our greatest danger."

But the protests, which the Roman Catholics of this country are zealously engaged in making, are more deserving our attention. No such efforts, as far as we are informed, are made in Roman Catholic countries. Why do we not hear of the people of Austria and Spain protesting and demanding the restoration of the temporal power? We do not ask the same question in regard to the Roman Catholics of Germany and France, for a very obvious reason. It seems to be left very much to the citizens of this republican country to demand that the crown rights of this foreign potentate should be maintained. At an immense gathering in Baltimore, November 10th, to welcome the return of Archbishop Spalding, after an extended sojourn in Rome, these attempts to enlist the Roman Catholic people of the United States in an enthusiastic protest against the act of the Italian government in taking possession of Rome, and depriving the pope of civil jurisdiction, appear to have had their inception. The archbishop was conducted by an imposing procession to the cathedral, where he was addressed by Judge J. T. Mason. The Rev. Father Coskery then delivered an address to the archbishop, in behalf of the clergy, in the course of which he said: "A so-called king, whom we are ashamed to call Catholic, despising the warning voice of Jesus Christ, and not capable of learning wisdom from other silly potentates who have *gone* before him, is impious, senseless, and selfish enough to dream of receiving a short-lived ephemeral success upon the ruins of the church of Christ," etc., etc. In his response the archbishop said: "Availing himself of the unprotected state of the Papal dominions, that chief of Italian infidels, Victor Emanuel, led an army of 60,000 men against a defenceless old man—whom to know is to love; therefore I acquiesced in the wish of many persons to adopt appropriate resolutions on this occasion when this vast assembly greets me home. I hope every Catholic heart here present will leap with exultation, when the resolutions which are to be offered shall be read." The resolutions were prefaced with a long preamble, beginning: "We, the Catholics of the archdiocese of Baltimore, in general meeting assembled, to the number of more than 50,000," etc., in which the dispossession of the Pope of his temporal power is said to be in open violation of

treaties, a sacrilege against the wishes of the majority of the Roman people, and an insult to all Christendom. But the most noticeable part of the preamble is an argument attempting to show that the principle that lies at the basis of the Pope's temporal sovereignty is the same which was adopted by the founders of the American Republic, in providing that the District of Columbia should be the seat of the general government, and should be exempt from all State influence and control, but the common property of all the States. It maintains that between the District of Columbia, in its relation to the United States, and the Papal territory in its relation to the United States of Christendom, "the principle is the same and the parallelism is complete." But the parallelism utterly fails, and there is scarcely ground for any analogy. For the same civil constitution and the same jurisdiction which are supreme in the District of Columbia are supreme in all the States. Surely our Roman Catholic fellow-citizens, who claim that the temporal power of the pope is supreme at Rome, do not mean it is supreme in all the states of Christendom.

It cannot be that they intend to sanction the claims of those ambitious Pontiffs of a former day, who aimed to extend their temporal power over all the nations, and even presumed to re-adjust their boundaries, to parcel them out, and distribute to their votaries crowns and thrones. And, then, what "property" in this ecclesiastical District of Columbia have those millions who belong to Christendom, who feel called upon, by their Christianity, to protest against the Papacy itself? Will they say that those millions do not belong to Christendom? The resolutions adopted declare that the overthrow of the Papal sovereignty was in violation of treaty rights, and would justify the intervention of all Christian governments in favor of its restoration.

On Sunday, December 4th, in all the Roman Catholic churches of the city of New York, in addition to the sermons, etc., a protest against the occupation of Rome by the Italian government was read, adopted, and signed by committees specially appointed. It is remarkable that the name of the archbishop does not appear in these proceedings. In the

evening, an immense congregation assembled in the cathedral. Vicar-General Starr was appointed president, and Hon. John McKeon, secretary. After an address by the vicar-general, Mr. McKeon spoke, and then read the protest or address, which, upon being put to vote, was unanimously adopted. It was drawn up by a committee comprising both lay and clerical members of the Roman Catholic communion in New York, as follows: Rev. Fathers Hecker, Starr, Quinn, and Marcus; and Charles O'Connor, John E. Develin, John McKeon, T. James Glover, Esqs., and Mr. Navarro.

On the same day there was a monster demonstration in Philadelphia at the cathedral, and a similar protest was adopted by acclamation. Hon. James Campbell presided, Hon. Joseph R. Chandler read the protest, and made an address. Speeches were also made by General William A. Stokes, Daniel Dougherty, and others. Similar meetings have been held in Buffalo, Boston, and other cities. On December 9th, Archbishop Spalding lectured on "The Temporal Power of the Pope," in the Academy of Music, Philadelphia, to an audience that filled the place. The ideas he advanced were so similar to those contained in the preamble and resolutions adopted at Baltimore, not excepting the illustration attempted to be drawn from the District of Columbia, that we naturally infer the preamble and resolutions were from the archbishop's own hand.

We cannot forbear again to express our surprise at these concerted and combined movements in republican America. There may be nothing surprising in the fact that the Romish priesthood should be zealous for the maintenance of the temporal power; but we confess it is quite impossible for us to understand how educated and accomplished laymen, like Mr. O'Connor and Mr. Chandler, who are understood to be the earnest advocates of democratic institutions, can consent to be brought forward as the champions of monarchical rights. We should really like to know how these gentlemen reconcile their advocacy of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope with their democratic or republican principles. We should like such an acute dialectician as Mr. O'Connor is understood to be to inform us if the Catholics

of Italy, not to say Rome itself, whose interests and rights are most nearly concerned, and who can best judge of the character and influence of the Pontifical civil rule, decide that it is an evil to them, burdensome and oppressive, how much weight ought to be attached to a contrary opinion, held by the Catholics of other countries. Will not Mr. Chandler, who holds so elegant and facile a pen, and for whom we have conceived a high respect, tell us why, if for seven hundred years the bishops of Rome administered the affairs of the church during the period when the Empire was converted, without the possession of this power, it is so necessary to them now? We should like further to know why the Pope may not be "a subject," as Christ, whose vicar he claims to be, submitted, in his humiliation, to be a loyal subject of the government which then prevailed at Rome. (Matt. xvii. 27; xxii. 21.) Who exempted him from obedience to the civil power ordained of God? Is the servant greater than his Master? We respectfully ask of such men, why not let the temporal power go, as with it doubtless will eventually disappear many of those things which have been a ground of protest with large numbers who call themselves Christians, and thus hasten the purification and pacification of the Christian world, and the spread and triumph of our holy religion?

ART. X.—NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Presbyterian Re-union. A Memorial Volume. 1837-1871 New York: De Witt C. Lent & Co. 1870.

This volume is made up of historical reviews, of the Old School church by Dr. Samuel Miller, of the New School church by Dr. J. F. Stearns; Biographical Sketches (O. S.), by Dr. Sprague, and (N. S.) by Dr. Z. M. Humphrey; History and Analysis of the Re-union movement, from its beginning to its consummation, by Dr. Wm. Adams; The Assemblies of 1869, by Drs. Jacobus and Fowler, their Moderators; The Process of Reconstruction, by the Rev. G. S. Plumley; The Future Church, by Rev. John Hall, D. D., of New York. Also an Appendix, containing statistics of the Old School Branch since 1837, by Dr. David Irving, and of the New School during the same period, by Dr. E. F. Hatfield; Sketches of Members of the Re-union Committee, by Dr. J. H. M. Knox, with other documents. As a simple repository of great documents and statistics in our Presbyterian history, it will be precious to every Presbyterian. The articles in it are mostly productions of representative men, and are characterized by the various features and attractions usually found in the writings of their respective authors. Altogether, they form a very valuable presentation of the great re-union of the two branches of the Presbyterian Church, and do credit to their compiler, Rev. G. S. Plumley.

Nothing can be more obvious than that these different articles, however fair and judicial the spirit in which they are written, must be affected by the standpoints and past attitude of their respective writers to the extent so justly set forth by the Dr. Stearns in his article.

"In preparing this sketch, the guiding principle must be that of truth impartially stated. Yet, if separate sketches are to be given, the writer of either will stand somewhat in the position of an advocate, and must not be held as violating the wholesome rule, "to study the things that make for peace, and to guard against all needless and offensive references to the causes that have divided us," if, on some critical points he states the case of his clients from their own point of view, though to the other party it may have a different aspect. It is to be hoped, however, there will be very little even of the appearance of partisanship."—p. 51.

We quite concur in this, and therefore have no sympathy with some hypercriticism which we have seen on one or two of the articles in the

book, as being too much tinged with the past ecclesiastical affinities and sympathies of their authors.

Dr. Adams has judged it necessary to an adequate account of the doctrinal meaning of the re-union movement, to bring forward into strong relief the protest of the minority of the O. S. Assembly at Albany in 1868, against the plan of re-union there sanctioned, with the entire answer of the Assembly to the same. He gives emphasis to the latter especially, as doing justice to the doctrinal attitude of the New School body. This document declares that--

"The authors of the Protest first speak of a series of doctrinal errors and heresies, which may be concisely stated as follows: 1. There is no moral character in man prior to moral action, and therefore man was not created holy. 2. There was no covenant made with Adam, his posterity did not fall with him, and every man stands or falls for himself. 3. Original sin is not truly and properly sin bringing condemnation, but only an innocent tendency leading to actual transgression. 4. Inability of any and every kind is inconsistent with moral obligation. 5. Regeneration is the sinner's own act, and consists in the change of his governing purpose. 6. God cannot control the acts of free agents, and therefore cannot prevent sin in a moral system. 7. Election is founded upon God's foreknowledge that the sinner will repent and believe. 8. The sufferings of Christ are not penal, and do not satisfy retributive justice. 9. Justification is pardon merely, and does not include restoration to favor and acceptance as righteous.

"The charge that is made in this Protest, and the only charge made in this reference, is, that while the other branch of the Presbyterian Church repudiate the doctrines for themselves, they at the same time hold that they are consistent with the Calvinism of the Confession of Faith. The authors of the Protest allege that it is the judgment of the New School body that a person can logically and consistently accept the Westminster symbols, and these nine or ten Pelagian and Arminian tenets at one and the same time. This is the substance of their charge." Pp. 235-6.

The answer proceeds, "Such a position, if taken by the New School church, or by any church, would be self-stultifying and absurd. It is too much for human belief. . . . These very errors, charged by the signers of the Protest as allowed by the New School Presbyterians, have already been repudiated by them. . . . The errors and heresies alleged in the Protest, are combated and refuted in the Theological Seminaries of the New School. . . . It must be distinctly observed that if any doctrines had been hitherto allowed by the New School body which 'impair the integrity of the Calvinistic system,' they are not to be allowed in the united church under the terms of union. Such doctrines are condemned, and every one who may teach them is subject to discipline."

There is no doubt that the effect of these testimonies as to the doctrinal position of the New School church, given and concurred in, in the most solemn manner, by men in both branches, who were entitled to the greatest weight, had much to do in promoting mutual confidence, and preparing the way for re-union. We are glad to see their import and force fully appreciated by Dr. Adams. If all parties proceed upon the construction and application of our standards thus indicated, there can be little danger of doctrinal collision and friction in the united church.

The Life of Christ. By the Rev. William Hanna, D. D., LL. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1871.

The publishers have compressed the five volumes of this admirable work into three, with precisely the same type and illustrations as before, and in a style every way satisfactory. We trust that the work, thus cheapened, will be accessible to still larger numbers.

The fourth and last volume of that greatest of Roman Histories, by Mommsen, has been published by Charles Scribner & Co. Those who have the previous volumes will desire this, not only to complete their set, but to secure the valuable index it contains of the whole four volumes.

Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. A Text-Book for Students. By the Rev. J. Clark Murray, Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, Queen's University, Canada. With an Introduction by the Rev. James McCosh, LL. D., President of Princeton College, New Jersey. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Company.

It is a notorious drawback to the study of Hamilton's Philosophy that it was never drawn out by himself in an orderly and systematic form, but needs to be hunted up from class-lectures, dissertations, review articles, and other fragmentary productions. In this respect, he and Coleridge go to a greater extreme than any writers we now remember, who have achieved fame and exerted any wide or enduring influence. The present is not the first attempt that has been made to sift the scattered fragments of his philosophy and put them in compact and systematic form, but in our opinion it is the best. This "Outline" renders the study of Hamilton's Philosophy, hitherto so awkward, no longer impracticable to beginners in schools and colleges. It is a condensed, clear, and very complete outline, well shaped for a text-book, and to facilitate a ready insight into Hamilton's Metaphysics, whether we accept or reject them. We concur with Dr. McCosh, who says, "I have carefully read the work in proof, and I am

able to say that it furnishes an admirable summary, clear, correct, and readily intelligible, of the leading doctrines and connections of Hamilton's Philosophy. The account is rendered mainly in Hamilton's own language, by one who understands his philosophy, and has the higher merit of entering thoroughly into the spirit of his great teacher. I have observed that in points in regard to which there have been disputes as to Hamilton's meaning, Professor Murray seems to me to give the proper version . . . The testimony now given will not be esteemed of less value because it comes from one who feels that Hamilton has often followed Kant's critical method too implicitly, and who dissents from his doctrines of Causality, of the Relativity of Knowledge, and of the negative nature of our idea of the Infinite."

Sacred Rhetoric; or, A Course of Lectures on Preaching. By Robert L. Dabney, D. D., Professor of Systematic and Pastoral Divinity; Union Theological Seminary, Virginia, Richmond. Presbyterian Committee on Publications. 1870.

A Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons. By John A. Broadus, D. D., LL. D., Professor in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Greenville, S. C. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co.

These are both valuable contributions to the great study of Sacred Eloquence, during the year which has now transpired. Both acknowledge freely, what the student in this department cannot fail to recognize; large indebtedness to ancient and modern, pagan and Christian masters; and, above all, that unrivalled master of the subject, Alexander Vinet. Indeed, it may be affirmed that little has been added to his completeness, except what is strictly extraneous to pure Homiletics, and belongs to common Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, or Pastoral Theology. In both these works, however, we are glad to find wise and pertinent counsels, on action, public prayer, and the conduct of public worship generally.

Dr. Dabney's work is exceedingly vigorous. Nothing that others have said or written passes through his mind, without bearing forth the stamp of his genius and strength of his style. He is even too vigorous or impulsive to make a good text-book. He preaches too much, in the process of teaching others to preach. Specimens of his own are given too much, where we seek for direct and simple explanation of the art. Hence, the range is not ample enough, and the distinctions are not full enough, in the enumeration, to be an exhaustive thesaurus. There is also a peculiar vehemence of manner, which is out of place in a didactic treatise: amounting really to exaggeration of statement often, that is declamatory more than instructive. What

he discards of matter and method as evil, he assails with invective, as well as demolishes with judicious argument.

But these very faults in a text-book, make it interesting to the general reader. It is able, ingenious, eloquent, and often profound. It is eminently an American book; freely eclectic, and yet manfully independent. We dissent from him in some particulars, especially in absolute condemnation, under "modes of preparation," of methods which have been approved by many of the most effective preachers in every age. But we must commend, as a crowning excellence, the skilful and strenuous advocacy of Biblical preaching, and pleas for the restoration of expository methods to the pulpit.

The treatise of Dr. Broadus is in some respects the opposite of Dr. Dabney's. It is more complete as a compilation, probably the most complete, for a text-book, that has yet appeared in Homiletics. It lacks the force and freshness of its contemporary; and is, therefore, less entertaining to the reader. It is also ample to redundancy; and though less defective in its enumerations, it is also less scientific in its analysis. It is an admirable distribution of the subjects, which adds to the *doctrinal*, the *moral*, and the *historical*, the *experimental*, as a fourth class, which Vinet omitted, and Dr. Dabney has not mentioned. But when he proceeds to add, as a fifth co-ordinate class, the *occasional* sermons, he becomes loose and confused, according to the principles of true division. We might then as well take in the *hortatory*, as Dr. Porter does, for another class; and thus co-ordinate, indefinitely, what is subordinated in the first four. Dr. Broadus betrays too much desire to make a book: as if it were an end, instead of a means in his hand. But it must be said he has made a good book: full of instruction, rich, varied, and exhaustive. Both he and Dr. Dabney have done great service to pulpit eloquence, in the masterly demonstration each has made, in his own way, that preaching the Gospel can regain its power and success only when the eye in delivery is emancipated alike from the manuscript, and the recitation of words committed to memory. And yet Dr. Broadus owns and explains the advantage of other methods, in preparation and action, with great candor and wisdom.

Froude's History of England. Popular Edition, Vols. XI. and XII.
New York: Charles Scribner & Co.

Froude's History of England has passed the ordeal and sustained the severest test of criticism. If it is not an "eternal possession," it certainly stands in the very front rank of modern historical works. An extended review of it in its previous form, and repeated notices

of the different volumes of the popular edition as they successively appeared, have shown our estimate of the merits of this admirable work. The concluding volumes exhibit the same spirit of candor, depth of research, and keen perception that have characterized the earlier portions. Its pure style, and graceful, flowing narrative fascinate all readers, and this cheap but elegant edition will reach a large appreciative circle whose wealth does not equal their culture, but whose intelligent judgment determines the position of works in the literary world.

We trust that the favor with which his history has been received will induce the author to carry out his original design, and to complete his account of the reign of Queen Elizabeth.

Heroes of Hebrew History. By Samuel Wilberforce, D. D., Lord Bishop of Winchester. Second Edition. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870.

The author and the subject of this work will give it a hold upon a large number of readers. The eminence and power of Bishop Wilberforce as a writer are well known. The sketches drawn by such a writer, of Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, Joshua, Samson, the Judges, Samuel the Prophet, David the King, Micaiah, Elijah, and Elisha, must be replete with interest. They originally appeared in *Good Words*, a favorite British periodical. In answer to an extensive demand, the author has collected and given them to the public in this attractive volume.

Short Studies on Great Subjects. By James Anthony Froude, M. A. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870.

The fame which Mr. Froude has already achieved by his *History of England*, itself a series of brilliant and powerful essays, as well as narratives, will whet the appetite of the literary public for this collection of articles, most of which have before been published in periodicals or otherwise. They are of various merit, but it is only necessary to look through the list of topics to be assured that, handled by Mr. Froude, they must contain much of great force and value. A glance anywhere *ad aperturam libri*, displays passages and sentences from the pen of a master, that flash truths upon us with new light and power. We open here, and read "that the Emersonian attitude will confuse success with greatness, or turn our ethics into a chaos of absurdity." We open there and read, "*corruptio optimi est pessima*; the national church, as it ought to be, is the soul and conscience of the body politic, but a man whose body has the direction of his conscience, we do not generally consider in the most hopeful

moral condition." And again, "the Protestant doctrine was a cry from the very sanctuary of the soul, flinging off and execrating the accursed theory of merits, the sickening parade of redundant saintly virtues which the Roman Church had converted into stock, and dispensed for the benefits of believers."

While Mr. Froude thus hurls his seathing rebukes at all impostures and shams, however venerable, and with equal impartiality at ritualism and the bolder forms of rationalism, we regret that we cannot detect more decisive indications of sympathy with a faith decidedly scriptural and evangelical.

Life of the Rev. John Milne, of Perth. By Horatio Bonar, D. D. Fifth Edition. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870.

Here, too, the author and the subject alike will give a charm to Christian readers. This book takes rank with the biographies of Burns and Hamilton, recently published by the Carters, which have found so general a welcome with the Christian public. Mr. Milne was an uncommon man, first as a Christian pastor, then as a missionary, then as a pastor returned to his early charge in Perth. He was one of that evangelistic circle of which McChesney and Burns were prominent figures. Aside of the charm of the narrative, it is rich in spiritual wisdom, and in pastoral and missionary experience.

A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures, Critical, Doctrinal and Homiletical, with special reference to Ministers and Students. By John Peter Lange, D. D., in connection with a number of European Divines. Translated from the German, revised, enlarged, and edited by Philip Schaff, D. D., in connection with American scholars of various evangelical denominations. Vol. VII. of the New Testament, containing the Epistles of Paul to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, and Colossians. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870.

Another volume of this great commentary is thus brought within the reach of our American clergy and scholars. The commentary on Galatians is by Otto Schmoller, and translated from the German by C. C. Starbuck, A. M., and Dr. M. B. Riddle, who has already become prominent in translating and editing this great work. The others are by Karl Braune, D. D., General Superintendent at Altenburg, Saxony, and translated, with additions, by Dr. Riddle, except that Philippians is translated by the well-known scholar, Dr. Hackett. It is easy to find passages in this or any volume of this commentary to which we cannot assent. This does not detract from its immense value as a thesaurus of exegetical and doctrinal literature on the subject. Not merely so, but the able evangelical translators and editors work it into

thorough harmony with the great system of truth maintained by Evangelical Christians, with whatever differences in details.

Saving Knowledge. Addressed to Young Men. By Thos. Guthrie, D. D., and W. G. Blaikie, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers.

The Saving Knowledge here given relates to God's Verdict on Man, God's Sentence on Man, the Evil of Sin, Man's Inability to save himself, God's Gift to Man, the Saviour's Person, the Work and Glory of the Saviour, the Way of Salvation, the Sinner's Link to the Saviour, Faith, the Spirit of Life, Sanctification, the Sacrament. We find on examination that it is such a work on these subjects as we should expect its eminent authors to produce: orthodox, evangelical, experimental in matter; fresh, clear, and vivid in style; and highly adapted to show men how to come to Christ, and live in and through and unto him.

Lighthouses and Lightships. A Description and Historical Account of their Mode of Construction and Organization. By W. H. Davenport Adams, author of *Buried Cities of Campania*, etc. With Illustrations from Photographs and other sources. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870.

This is the fourteenth volume of Scribner's admirable Illustrated Library of Wonders of Nature, Science, and Art. It is exceedingly well executed. We think the issuing of this series one of the best services rendered by the publishing trade to the public for a long time. These volumes have all the fascination of novels and tales. But they have the high advantage over that vast mass of trashy fiction which is now destroying the moral and intellectual stamina of the growing generation, that they not only entertain but solidly instruct. Still later, we have received "*The Wonders of Acoustics*," another volume of the same series, which fully sustains its previous character, on the phenomena of sound.

Historical Theology. A Review of the Principal Doctrinal Discussions in the Christian Church since the Apostolic Age. By the late William Cunningham, D. D., Principal and Professor of Church History, New College, Edinburgh. Edited by his Literary Executors. Two Volumes. Third Edition. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Welford & Co. 1870.

It is seldom that a theological work of such magnitude and value is given to the public. We are glad to see it appreciated, as such treatises rarely are, sufficiently to reach a third edition. The Chair of Church History affords the incumbent opportunities for teaching almost every department of theology, doctrinal, practical, and ecclesiological, for which he has any special taste or aptitude. For all

are involved in it, and he can emphasize whatever he pleases. Thus it has given rise to two of the most important treatises on theology published in recent years: that now under notice, and Shedd's *History of Christian Doctrine*. We think Dr. Cunningham's work rich in the history of controversies, and of the development and definition of Christian doctrine in the church. While it is strong and clear in its analysis of Patristic, Athanasian, and Pelagian controversies, we think it quite the best recent exhibition of the Reformed Theology known to us.

The author is everywhere learned, orthodox, candid, judicious, and logical. As we follow him through the different heads of doctrine, we always feel that we are under the lead of a genuine theologian, who is master of his subject. While he makes all needful distinctions, he does not lose himself, or land his readers in useless subtleties. While standing up for unadulterated Calvinism, he knows when to stop, and keeps clear of extremes. We see these qualities especially in his handling of the Church, the Fall, the Trinity, Incarnation and Redemption.

He is very pronounced in support of the representative, in opposition to the realistic theory of the fall of the race in Adam, and of justification through Christ. In short, he finds the Reformed Theology to be simply that of the Westminster and other great Calvinistic symbols. It has been quite fashionable for those who disrelish this theology, or its constituent parts, to call it "Princeton Theology." If all that were meant by this, is that it is taught and maintained here, we should rejoice in the honor. But it is often so named, as if it were peculiar to Princeton, and were without any higher than such local sanction. Let all thus minded, study these volumes, and they will find the greatness and gravity of their mistake. It is the common, recognized theology of the Reformed Church.

Bible Notes for Daily Readers. A Comment on Holy Scripture. By Ezra M. Hunt, A. M., M. D., author of "Grace Culture," etc. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870.

This work is highly creditable to the author, who is a layman and physician, and has rescued time from a laborious and exacting profession, to prepare for publication a running commentary on the whole Bible. We are not to look here for the grade of scholarship or learning that will render it an aid to professional exegetes. But it is likely to be a great help to the mass of readers of the Bible and teachers of Sunday-schools and Bible-classes. The author has done for others what he found needful to invest the Bible with due interest for him-

self. Without printing the text, which the reader is supposed to have before him in a copy of the common Bible, Dr. Hunt gives notes on such parts and topics of each sacred book, as he deems most noteworthy, in order to keep before the reader the continuous thread of the sacred narrative and its salient points. The spirit of the notes is thoroughly orthodox and evangelical. The circulation of these two massive volumes, nearer quarto than octavo, cannot fail to promote among the people the knowledge of those words which are spirit and life.

Rome and the Council in the Nineteenth Century. By Felix Bungener. Translated from the French; with Additions by the Author. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Welford & Co. 1870.

The author has before given us a specimen of his skill and tact in dealing with Romanism, in his book on Rome and the human heart, intended to show how "the human heart has created Catholicism, and how Catholicism in turn sacrifices everything to the human heart, flattering its pride, and pampering its tastes, even when it appears to be threatening them." This volume takes occasion from the meeting of the late Ecumenical Council, to sift the dogma of Papal sovereignty and infallibility, the syllabus, the discussions, politics and intrigues within the Council; the course of the recalcitrant Bishops; the superstitions, the alleged miracles, the mariolatry, together with the whole inward and outward working of the Papacy from the time of Trent until now. He does it with that clearness, condensation, and vivacity of style of which the French are such eminent masters.

The Oldest and the Newest Empires: China and the United States. By William Speer, D. D., Corresponding Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Education. Formerly Missionary in China, and to the Chinese in California. Hartford, Conn.: S. S. Scranton & Co. San Francisco, Cal.: H. H. Bancroft & Co.

Dr. Speer has had high opportunities for knowing China and the Chinese at home, and as immigrants to our Pacific shore. He is peculiarly qualified, therefore, to produce a valuable work with the above title. On examination, we find that the volume fully justifies the reasonable expectations thus excited. It is at once a compendious history of this most ancient and wonderful nation; a graphic portraiture of the present condition, social, civil, and religious, of the Chinese; a presentation of the aspects and probable consequences of the present drift of Chinese immigration to this country; a discussion of the present condition and future prospects of our own country. It is enriched by copious and excellent pictorial illustrations. We know of no work so well fitted to diffuse among our people just views of the Chinese. It is quite readable in style.

A Record of College, Field, and Prison. The Knightly Soldier; a Biography of Henry Ward Camp, Tenth Conn. Vols. By Chaplain H. Clay Trumbull. Boston: Nichols & Noyes. New York: Oliver S. Felt. 1865.

A true and life-like sketch of one of those choice young men of culture, refinement, piety, and beautiful manhood, who perished in the late war, martyrs to the cause to which they conscientiously devoted themselves.

Light and Truth; or, Bible Thoughts and Themes. The Lesser Epistles. By Horatius Bonar, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1871.

This volume is a series of brief meditations on a large variety of topics, doctrinal, experimental, and practical, presented in the minor Epistles. They bring out the true meaning of the sacred Word, and are marked by that evangelical fervor and unction which pervade all the author's writings, and make them exceedingly welcome to devout readers.

PAMPHLETS AND PERIODICALS.

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Annual Reports to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States, of its Trustees in Relation to the Fund for Disabled Ministers and their Families. Also, the Sixth Annual Report of the Ministerial Relief Fund.

We are glad to bring to the notice of our readers these reports touching a most worthy charity, which deserves the sympathy and aid of the whole church. In the hands of the present efficient secretary, Dr. George Hale, we look for a steady advance of this excellent cause.

New Analysis of Fundamental Morals. By Edward J. Hamilton Holliday, Professor of Mental Philosophy in Hamilton College, Ind. Republished from the American Presbyterian Review, in April, July, and October, 1870. New York: Charles Scribner & Co.

This elaborate article shows a considerable aptitude for subtle metaphysical analysis, and much arduous thinking on the topic with which it deals. We think, however, that it would be more likely to be understood and appreciated, if this thought were couched in a simpler and easier style. Only those who are thoroughly trained in metaphysics, will make out the author's idea and aim; nor even they, without close study. Whether this "analysis" of the fundamental ethical idea given by him is new in substance as well as form, we will not pronounce without a closer inspection than we get from two or three sittings over it. In our view there are but two fundamental conceptions of the great issue—one of right as intrinsic, a supreme good in

itself, and not merely as a means to any other good, such as happiness—the other, that which conceives of it as good simply as a means to happiness—or what Prof. Hamilton signifies to be the views represented respectively by Drs. McCosh and Hopkins, with neither of which, he says, can he agree. From such language as the following, we should think he sides with the former:—

“The objective laws which we obey in these exercises of duty are, (a.) that we ought to do good to beings simply because this doing is right; and (b.), that we ought to love beings—to cherish toward them that natural affection which seeks their good and rejoices in it, simply because it is right in us to cherish this affection.” Pp. 12-13.

But we judge that the main drift of this “analysis” is the other way, and considerably in the direction of Dr. Hopkins’ views, from the following and other like passages:—

“By a ‘good,’ as men use the term, we understand anything which is essentially or invariably productive of happiness, and so may be said invariably or unconditionally to contain it; by good, the same idea in the form of a general motive,” etc. etc.

We will say nothing more decisive till we are sure we have threaded the author’s system. Without being able to see that it will do much to set aside existing ethical systems and controversies, we think it indicates unusual metaphysical ability and keenness in its author.

Letters from the South, relating to the Condition of the Freedmen; Addressed to Major-General O. O. Howard, Commissioner of Bureau, R. F., and A. L. By J. W. Alvord, General Superintendent of Education in said Bureau. Washington, D. C.: Howard University Press. 1870.

These letters are a series of reports on the condition of the Freedmen, in their industrial, educational, moral and religious aspects, designed to correct injurious misrepresentations and prejudices, and to give the public correct information from a well-informed and trustworthy source. They are well worth the perusal of all interested in this great subject.

Baccalaureate Sermon, delivered in the Chapel, Glendale Female College, Glendale, Ohio, Sabbath evening, June 12, 1870. By Rev. D. L. Potter.

An earnest and eloquent plea for filial obedience, love, and reverence.

The Origin, Progress, and Present Position of the New York Society for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled.

We are indebted to the treasurer of this excellent charity, Joun-

than Sturges, Esq., for this well-drawn account of the origin and progress of this great charity. We are struck, as we look over the list of donors, with the appearance of the same names against princely donations, which we ever find foremost in Presbyterian and Evangelical charities—a sure proof that religion fosters the truest philanthropy, and that there is no love to man like that which flows from love to God.

ART. XI.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

FRANCE.

THE French publications which we have to announce had, of course, nearly all appeared before midsummer. In Theology and Philosophy the list is very brief, consisting of Abbé Neveux's "Life of St. Paul;" Bertet's "Papacy and Civilization before the Tribunal of the Everlasting Gospel;" Volume IV. of Bersier's Sermons; Bishop Ozanam's "Christian Woman and Modern Society;" Abbé Morel's "Liberal Catholics;" Fraysse's "Idea of God in Spinoza;" Abbé Laprane's "Philosophy of Malebranche" (2 vols.); Carran's "Critical Exhibition of the Theory of the Passions in Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza;" D'Assier's "Essay on the Positive Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century;" Empart's "Contemporary Empiricism and Naturalism, an exhibition and refutation of Taine's System;" and Passy on "The Forms of Government and the Laws that regulate them."

In history and biography, we note De Joinville's "History of St. Louis;" Boutarie's "St. Louis and Alphonso of Poitiers;" Bascet's "Archives of Venice;" Desnoiresterres' "Voltaire and Frederic;" De Montrond's "Frederic Ozanam;" Vol. II. of Peyrat's "History of the Albigenes" (the Albigenes and the Inquisition); Desmasures' "History of the Revolution in the Department of Aisne, in 1789;" Vol. XIII. of De Viel Castil's "History of the Restoration;" Vol. IX. of Gabourd's "Contemporary History;" Lehr's "Miscellanies in Alsatian Literature and History;" De Casse's "Gen. Vandamme and his Correspondence;" Gilles' "Campaign of Marius in Gaul;" "The Carthaginians in France," by De Mariehard; Rambaud's "Greek Empire in the Tenth Century;" Bouillier's "Studies in Foreign Politics and History;" De Camp's "Paris, its Origin, its Organs, its Functions, and

its Life in the second half of the Nineteenth Century; Vol. II. of Dugat's "History of the Orientalists of Europe from the Twelfth to the Nineteenth Century;" Lumbroso's "Researches concerning the Political Economy of Egypt under the Lagidæ;" Didot's "Studies on the Life and Labors of John Sire de Joinville" (2 vols.); and a work by Daux on "The Phœnician Emporia—Researches into their Origin and their Establishment at Zeugis and Byzantium."

In the philosophy of history and political philosophy we make a record of Castellan's "Investigations into the Principle of Authority and the Future of Societies; and Laurent's "Philosophy of History," (Vol. XVIII. of his "Studies concerning the History of Humanity").

In mental philosophy and its history we call attention to Margerie's "Contemporary Philosophy;" Sierp's "Translation of Kleutgen's Scholastic Philosophy Exhibited and Defended" (4 vols.); "Charles Darwin and his French Forerunners," by Quartrefages; and a "New Translation of Lucretius," by Lavigne; with an "Essay on the Physics of Lucretius," by André.

In philology and general literature the most important publications of the quarter are Naville's "Texts relating to the Myth of Horus collected in the Temple of Edfou" (with an Introduction); Part I. of the Third Series of Chabas' "Egyptian Miscellanies; Oppert's "Inscriptions of Dour-Sarkhyan" (at Khorsabad); General Faidherbe's "Collection of Numidian Inscriptions;" Benloew's "Essay on the Spirit of Literatures;" Pierron's "Illiad of Homer" (a digest of researches and criticisms); A Report of Demogcot and Montucci on the Higher Education in England and Scotland; Würtz's "Report on the Higher Practical Studies in the German Universities;" Reaume's "French Prose Writers of the Sixteenth Century;" Moreau's "J. J. Rousseau and the Philosophic Age;" Lereaux's "Study on the Essays of Montaigne;" Vol. I. of Burgeaud des Març's "Rabelais," with a new commentary; Vol. I. of Emile Chasles' "National History of French Literature;" Duchesne's "History of the French Epic Poems of the Seventeenth Century;" Flotard's "Modern Comedy;" Vol. II. of S. Julien's "New Syntax of the Chinese Language;" Le Hericher's Etymological Glossary of the Proper Names of the French and English;" and Mrs. W. Monod's "Woman's Mission in time of War."

GERMANY.

Since our last notice of Von Kirchman's Philosophical Library fifty numbers have appeared, completing some works then commenced, and adding Kant's "Religion within the bounds of Pure Reason;" Spinoza

on "God, Man, and Happiness;" "Aristotle's Art of Poetry" (translated, with notes, by Ueberweg); Schleiermacher's "Philosophical Ethics;" Kant's "Prolegomena to Metaphysics;" Kant's Logic; Descartes' Philosophical Works; Plato's Republic (Schleiermacher's translation); Kant's "Metaphysics of Ethics;" Hegel's "Encyclopædia of Philosophical Science;" Condillac's "Treatise on the Sensations," etc.

The only philosophical works that we find occasion to note besides, are, Vol. IV. of Prantl's "History of Logic in the West;" "Aristotle's Theory of Knowledge," by Kampe; Von Plänckner's translation and interpretation of Lao-tse's "Way to Virtue;" Ulrici "On the Problem of Logic;" Bergmann's "Outline of a Theory of Consciousness;" Byk's "Hellenism and Platonism;" "Philosophical Problems of the Age," by J. B. Meyer, (of Bonn); Kaulich's "Manual of Psychology;" a Prize Essay, by C. S. Cornelius, on "The Origin of the World, with special reference to the question whether we must ascribe to our Solar System an origin in Time;" "Jacob Böhme and the Alchymists," by G. C. A. Von Harles; and Max Müller's lecture on Buddhistic Nihilism.

Bunsen's "Bibelwerk," which was commenced in 1858, is now completed by the publication of the eleventh and twelfth half volumes. Dr. Holtzmann has had the chief oversight and done most of the work since the death of the original editor. Nos. 1-3 have just been issued of Starke's "Synopsis Bibliothecæ exegeticæ, in Vetns et Novum Testamentum." Other recent expository works are Schäfer's "New Investigations concerning Ecclesiastes;" Reinke's "Habakkuk;" Ewald's "Translation and Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Epistle of James;" Rinck's "Homiletic Exposition of James;" Steffann's "End of the Ages—Lectures on the Revelation of St. John;" Von Hofmann's "Commentary on Ephesians" (Part I. of Vol. IV. of his Comm. on the New Testament); and Pressel's "Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi."

The most interesting publication of the quarter, in theology proper, will be, as we think, according to the general judgment, a volume of Julius Müller's "Dogmatic Discussions." Other works in the same department are Vol. I. of a "System of Christian Evidence," by Prof. Frank, of Erlangen; Baumgärtner's "Nature and God;" Von Schüzler's "Doctrine of the Divine Incarnation;" "Scripture and Tradition," by Prof. Dieckhoff, of Rostock; Schöberlein's "Holy Passion," in seven liturgical meditations; Von Harless' "State and Church, or Error and Truth in the conceptions of a 'Christian' State and a 'Free' Church;" Schenkel's "Luther in Worms, and in Wittenberg," etc.;

Probst's "Liturgy of the First Three Christian Centuries;" "The Decretals of Pope Clement VIII.," edited by Prof. Sentis, of Freiburg; Dalton's "Heidelberg Catechism, as a Confession and as a Practical Work;" a posthumous work of Vilmar's on the "Augsburg Confession;" Bastian on the "Buddhist Conception of the World;" Vol. IV. of Brischar's "Catholic Pulpit Orators of Germany within the Last Three Centuries;" Parts I. and II. of Brockhoff's "Cloisters of the Holy Catholic Church;" Vol. I. of Maassen's "History of the Sources and Literature of Canon Law;" Part III. of Kayser's "Contributions to the History and Exposition of the Hymns of the Church;" Vol. XI. of Grätz's "History of the Jews from Mendelssohn's time;" Arnold's "Immortality of the Soul—the Chief Views of Classical Antiquity;" Schneider on "The Idea of Immortality in the Faith and in the Philosophy of the Nations;" Auerbach's "Jewish Law of Obligation;" and a Prize Essay by Bitz on "The Death Penalty viewed in the Light of Religion and Theological Science."

History and biography have received some interesting and valuable contributions in the completion of Von Reumont's admirable "History of the City of Rome" (three large volumes); Vol. I. of a revised edition of Peter's excellent "Roman History;" Kolb's "History of Civilization;" Stichert's "Erasmus of Rotterdam;" Krause's "Taking of Constantinople by the Crusaders in the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Centuries;" Vol. I. of K. Mendelssohn Bartholdy's "History of Greece from the taking of Constantinople in 1493 to the Present Time;" Oppert's "Prester John in Legend and History;" Vol. II. of Plitt's "Life of Schelling;" Bachofen on "The Legend of Tanaquil;" Fischer's "History of the Crusade of the Emperor Frederic I.;" Grossman's "Count Ernest of Mansfeld;" "Sources of German History in the Middle Ages," by Lorenz; Wegele's "Frederic the Peaceable;" Börnstein's "Italy in 1868-9;" Vol. IV. of Von Arneth's "Maria Theresa;" a new edition of Schlesinger's "History of Bohemia;" Carl Elze's "Lord Byron;" Wohlwill's "Process of the Inquisition against Galileo Galilei;" Vol. I. of Ebeling's "Life of Count Von Beust;" Part II. of Kramer's "Carl Ritter;" Vogt's "Life of Rosseau;" Zapp's "History of German Women;" Ecklin's "Blaise Pascal, a witness to the Truth;" Lefinann's "August Schleicher;" C. Von Weber's "Maurice, Count of Saxony;" Golowin's "Russia under Alexander II.;" Part I. of Vol. II. of Schaefer's "History of the Seven Years' War;" Vol. V. of Ebert's "History of the Prussian State;" and Vol. II. of G. L. Von Maurer's "History of Municipal Constitutions in Germany."

The chief contributions to philology are Part I. of Vol. I. of West-

phal's "Methodical Grammar of the Greek Language;" a revised edition of Vullers' "Institutiones Linguae Persicæ;" Zsehokke's "Institutiones fundamentales linguæ Aramaicæ;" Sehlotzman's and Nöldeke's Treatises on the Moabite Stone; Vol. II. of the second edition of Corsen's Prize Essay on "The Pronunciation, Voelalization, and Accent of the Latin Language;" Bastian's "Studies in Comparative Philology;" Part I. of Vol. I. of Holtzmann's "Old German Grammars;" Part I. of a new edition of Fiek's "Comparative Lexicon of the Indo-Germanic Languages;" the fourth number of Levy's "Phœnician Studies;" Löw's "Contributions to Jewish Archæology;" and the completion of Fritzehe's edition of "Lucian of Samosata."

We close the quarter's list with Mädler's "Discourses and Treatises on Astronomical Subjects;" Zeissberg's "Vincencius Hadlubek, Bishop of Craeow" (a contribution to the literary history of the thirteenth century); Part I. of Brink's "Chaucer;" Hayn's "Romantic School;" "Immermann's Life and Works," by Von Putlitz; Vol. II. of Förster's "History of Italian Art;" D. F. Strauss' "Voltaire;" Rausch's "History of the Literature of Rhæto-Romanie People;" and Vol. IV. of Von der Deeken's "Travels in East Africa."

ENGLAND.

The actual publications of the season have been very few. The publishers' announcements consist mainly of intentions, which are, in many cases, excellent. The few books actually issued since the compilation of our last list, we hold in reserve for announcement in our next number.

