I. ARGUMENT FROM FINAL CAUSES; OR, as
it is better expressed, FROM APPARENT ULTIMATE DESIGN.
1. Syllogism -- Major premise: Design
implies a designing mind. Minor premise: The universe exhibits
conclusive proof of design. Conclusion: Therefore the universe is
the product of competent designing mind.
2. Second syllogism -- Major premise: The
mind that designed and created the universe is the first cause.
Minor premise: But the first cause must be a self-existent, and
therefore, as we have seen, immutable, infinite, and perfect
being. Conclusion: Therefore God exists, the infinite and perfect
First Cause.
The minor premise of the first of the above
syllogisms I have not attempted to prove. If anyone calls in
question the fact that the universe presents innumerable and
conclusive evidences of benevolent design, this is not the place
to enlarge upon a subject so extensive. So many treatises have
been written upon this subject, so much has been said in respect
to the indubitable evidences of design in the construction and
working of the universe, that it were a work of supererogation in
this connection to attempt to prove it. Suffice it to say in a
word, that the revelations of science are continually pouring
floods of additional light upon this question, insomuch that even
the rocks speak out and bear their testimony that they were
created by a designing mind.
II. FACTS AND SELF-EVIDENT
TRUTHS.
1. We have seen that in consciousness we
know ourselves to exist; and that we know the existence of that
which is not ourselves. I say, we know this in consciousness. It
is certain that the very conception of self as self implies also
the conception of that which is not self. Should it be said that
we are not directly conscious of that which is not self, I answer,
that this may be true of the material creation; that is, it may be
true and indeed must be true that sense gives the material not
self; but it should be remembered that sense is an intuitive
faculty and gives its object by a direct beholding of it, just as
consciousness gives its object by a direct beholding. The thing of
which we are conscious is that we directly behold the not self. It
is not so much a matter of consciousness that this beholding is by
the faculty of sense; for I am just as conscious of seeing or
directly knowing the outward world as I am the inward world. I am
just as conscious of knowing the not self as I am of knowing the
self. I am conscious of this knowledge, and am just as certain of
the existence of the one as of the other. So far as certainty is
concerned, therefore, it amounts to the same thing whether it is
obtained by one faculty of intuition or the other. The knowledge
is intuitive and certain, of this knowledge I am conscious; and
whether in strict propriety of speech I am conscious directly of
the existence of the not self, or of the outward world, or whether
on the other hand, I am conscious of knowing it through the medium
of sense, is immaterial so far as the fact of this knowledge is
concerned.
But here it should be said, that although
it is true in strict propriety of speech that we become conscious
of the existence of the outward world only through the intuitions
of sense, this is not true in respect to the existence of other
beings of whose existence we are directly conscious. In another
place I shall endeavor to show that we are directly conscious of
the existence of God, and this certainly is not given us through
sense. But here I wish to be particularly understood to say, that
so far as certainty is concerned, it matters not at all through
which of the intuitive functions of the intellect we get at truth.
If it be by intuition, the certainty cannot be called in question
without denying the validity of all knowledge. If one intuitive
function of the intellect may deceive us, in other words, if we
are not certain of what we directly behold in consciousness,
sense, or reason, if each of these faculties is not to be trusted,
neither of them is to be. We can no more doubt the validity of the
testimony of one than the other. We are certain of that which we
intuit; and if we are not, there is no distinguishing the
intuitions of one faculty from another in such a way as to know
which is to be trusted. They are all alike veracious, or all alike
untrustworthy.
2. There is a material nature.
3. There is an order in this
nature.
4. First self-evident truth: This nature
and this order in nature has a cause out of itself, or it is
self-existent and has the law of its order written within itself.
If it is self-existent and has the law of its order written within
itself, then it is by a necessity of its own nature eternally just
as it is and has been, and therefore immutable, eternal, and
infinite.
This we have seen in former propositions,
and it needs not to be enlarged upon.
5. Second self-evident truth: Matter cannot
be infinite; for it must have a form, and form implies limitation,
and therefore finiteness. To speak of matter as having no form is
a contradiction. To speak of form as being infinite is also a
contradiction. Again, it cannot be infinite, for it is made up of
finite parts or particles, and no number of units or finites can
ever make an infinite.
Again, it has been shown that if matter is
self-existent it must be eternal, infinite, immutable. But it
cannot be immutable because we ourselves know that we can
introduce many changes in it. That is, if the universe of matter
is self-existent and has the law of all its changes inherent in
itself, then there is no power that can vary in the least degree
these changes; for the law of these changes, if matter be
self-existent, must be absolutely omnipotent. In other words, if
matter exists and changes under a law of necessity, it is a
contradiction to say that any power in the universe, or any
conceivable power, can vary the order of these changes.
But as I said, we ourselves know that we
change this order, and we know that those around us introduce
innumerable variations in the order of changes going on in the
material universe around about us.
Dr. Chalmers and others have admitted that
without damage to the theistic argument, we may admit that matter
is self-existent and therefore eternal. "For," he says, "we must
not necessarily suppose the existence of God to account for the
collocation of matter." But I cannot consent to this, for the
reason, that if matter does eternally exist, necessity must be an
attribute of its nature, and in every respect in which it does
exist it exists by this necessity, and consequently it is
necessarily immutable. That is, no change can ever be introduced
into it except under the action of its own inherent necessary
laws; and these laws must, to all intents and purposes, be
omnipotent; that is, they must have power to resist any
conceivable power that might set upon them. To suppose the
contrary were to deny the self-existence and therefore the
necessary existence of matter. If God did not create the materials
out of which the universe is formed, if those materials do in fact
exist independent of him, that is, if they are self-existent, the
supposition that God could form the material universe and locate
matter as we find it located out of self-existent materials, is an
absurdity.
III. In the light of the above, THE
FOLLOWING POSITIONS ARE MANIFEST:
1. A self-existent material universe,
having an eternal and necessary order of development, is first an
absurdity.
2. It contradicts consciousness, for we are
aware ourselves of acting upon it and changing the order of its
development, which could not be were it self-existent and under a
law of necessary development.
3. It follows that material nature and its
order commenced in time. We have seen that order must be made up
of succeeding events, for order can belong to nothing else than
changes, but changes must occur in time. Should it be said, that
nature itself may have been eternal, and its changes have
commenced in time; I answer, this is a contradiction, if this
nature has the law of its development or changes in itself. If
this law is in itself, then these changes must have been coeval
with the existence of that in which this law resides. But eternal
changes are a contradiction; and an eternal nature having a law of
change in itself is a contradiction, because no eternal changes,
and consequently no eternal law of change, can possibly
exist.
4. The material universe must have had a
cause out of and superior to itself; its existence and changes
cannot otherwise by any possibility be accounted for. Indeed, it
is a contradiction to affirm the existence of nature, and the
order of its changes, except upon the admission that it had a
cause out of itself.
5. The cause of the material universe must
be a self-existent, and therefore an infinite Being. We have seen
that a necessary cause is a contradiction; for a self-existent
necessary cause must be an eternal cause, or imply eternal acts of
causation; for be it remembered that cause is power in producing
action. I say, therefore, that the cause of the material universe
must be a self-existent, and therefore a necessarily existent,
immutable, infinite Being.
6. Again, this Being must be a free and
intelligent Being. No being can be free in the proper sense of
freedom who is not intelligent; for free will acts only upon
conditions of perceived reasons for action; therefore freedom
always implies intelligence.
7. Again, this First Cause must be
naturally perfect; that is, every attribute which he possesses
must be infinite, and therefore perfect in the highest sense of
perfection.
8. Again, we have seen in a former lecture
that the ideas of the finite and the infinite are contrasts,
always exist together in the mind, and that neither can be held
without the other. The same we have seen to be true of the ideas
of the perfect and the imperfect, and also of the conditioned and
the unconditioned, of succession and time, of body and space. One
of these ideas, then, implies the other; and where one is the
other must be. But does the fact of the existence of the finite
imply the existence of the infinite; the existence of the
imperfect that of the perfect; the existence of the conditioned
that of the unconditioned? I answer, yes. (1) Because no finite
being is self-existent. Every finite existence, therefore, must
have begun to be in time, must have had a cause; and as an
infinite series of causes and effects is a contradiction, there
must be a First Cause. (2) An imperfect being cannot be a
self-existent being; for whatever is self-existent, we have seen,
must be infinite, and therefore every attribute which a
self-existent being possesses must be perfect in the highest
conceivable sense, since, being infinite, nothing can be conceived
to be wanting. If then, there be an imperfect being, it must be a
dependent and created being; but this implies the existence of a
First Cause, infinite and perfect. (3) The same is true of a
conditioned being. The very conception of a conditioned being is
that of a dependent being, that is, dependent for existence. Such
a being, therefore, cannot be self-existent. But if not
self-existent, it must have been created; and there must have been
a First Cause, which must be self-existent and
unconditioned.
IV. PROPOSITIONS, in the light of the
foregoing.
1. First proposition: If any event ever
occurred, an infinite and perfect God exists. Syllogism--Major
premise: We have seen that events imply the existence of a First
Cause. Minor premise: We have seen also that a First Cause must be
self-existent and therefore infinite and perfect. Conclusion:
Therefore if any event exists, God exists, the infinite and
perfect.
2. Second proposition: If any consciousness
exists, God exists, the infinite and perfect. Syllogism--Major
premise: Consciousness must be either an eternal and infinite, or
a finite consciousness. If an infinite consciousness, then it must
be the consciousness of God, and God exists; if a finite
consciousness, it is an event. Minor premise: But the existence of
any event, as we have seen, implies the existence of an infinite
and perfect Cause. Conclusion: Therefore if any consciousness
exists, God the infinite and perfect exists.
3. Third proposition: If any doubt of the
existence of God exists, God must exist. Syllogism--Major premise:
The existence of doubt is an event. Minor premise: The existence
of any event, as we have seen, implies the existence of an
infinite First Cause. Conclusion: Therefore, if any doubt exists
of God's existence, God the infinite and perfect must
exist.
4. Fourth proposition: If God's existence
be denied, his existence must be a fact. Syllogism--Major premise:
The denial of the existence of God must be an event. Minor
premise: The existence of any event implies the existence of an
infinite and perfect First Cause. Conclusion: Therefore, if God's
existence was ever denied, his existence must be a
fact.
5. Fifth proposition: If atheists exist,
God exists. Syllogism--Major premise: the existence of an atheist
is an event. Minor premise: The existence of any event implies the
divine existence. Conclusion: Therefore, if there be an atheist in
existence, God the infinite and perfect exists.
V. STATING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ABOVE
PROPOSITIONS IN ANOTHER FORM.
1. If any event ever occurred, an infinite,
free, and perfect Being must exist; showing, if any event ever
occurred it must have been finite, dependent, and in time. Finite,
because an infinite event is an absurdity; dependent, because
whatever is not infinite is not necessary and therefore cannot be
independent. That is, it must be dependent in time, because an
event is an occurrence, a something that comes to pass, begins to
be. An eternal event is impossible and a contradiction; it must,
therefore, occur in time.
2. If anything finite, dependent, and
commencing in time exists, it must have had a cause out of and
superior to itself. This we have abundantly seen. Therefore, if
anything finite, dependent, commencing in time, exists, there must
be a First Cause; and this Cause must be a self-existent, eternal
and necessary Being; that is, his existence must be necessary, or
the ground of his existence is in himself. But as a Cause, he must
be free. We have seen that a necessary Cause must be an eternal
Cause, and that an eternal Cause implies eternal events, which is
a contradiction. A First Cause, then, must be a free, intelligent
Cause; hence if any event ever occurred, there must be an
infinite, free, and perfect Being existing as a First
Cause.
But of this First Cause let me further say:
We have seen that a First Cause must be a self-existent Being,
consequently that he must be immutable in all his attributes; he
must therefore be infinite in all his attributes; and an
absolutely perfect Being must be perfect in all the attributes
which he possesses.
3. Again, we have seen that the existence
of atheism as an event implies the divine existence.
4. Again, if the possibility and reality of
theism should be denied, the denial itself would be an event and
imply the existence of God.
5. From the foregoing propositions, it
follows, that if the universe of creatures is all matter, God must
exist as the infinite and perfect First Cause.
6. Again, if the universe of creatures is
all mind, as the Idealists maintain, God must exist as the First
Cause. The same is true if the universe is only thought, as the
extreme school of Idealists maintain. The existence of thought is
an event, and really implies the existence of an infinite and
perfect First Cause.
7. But further, it has been laid down as a
self-evident proposition, that whatever is self-existent is
infinite. Of matter it should also be said that it cannot be
infinite, for since one of its essential properties is form, and
whatever has form cannot be infinite, it must therefore be finite
and dependent, and imply the existence of a First Cause out of and
above itself; which First Cause is self-existent, infinite, and
perfect.
8. Again, our own minds we know to be
limited or finite. Our conscious existence implies the existence
of God.
9. Again, from what has been said it
follows, that whether the universe is all matter, or all mind, or
only thought, or whether all this matter, mind, and thought exist,
God's existence is equally implied as the infinite and perfect
First Cause.
10. Again, knowing ourselves to exist, the
nonexistence of God is inconceivable; therefore nihilism is a
contradiction and an impossible conception. Suppose any one would
say, that he could conceive that nihilism should be true, in the
assertion he contradicts himself. He says, I can conceive that
there is no existence; but who has this conception? And what is
the conception itself? The very existence of the conception shows
the absurdity of the statement; and that he who affirms that it is
possible that nothing does in fact exist contradicts himself; no
such conception is conceivable.
VI. ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD.
1. Man is capable of being directly taught
of God; this cannot be rationally denied. We are conscious of
being spirit, and we necessarily conceive of him as spirit. If any
one denies that God as a Spirit can instruct our spirits by a
direct communication with us, the burden of proof is certainly on
him.
2. Again, man is capable of being conscious
that he is taught of God. The prophets were so; and every
spiritual mind has this consciousness at times. If it be asked how
the prophets knew that they were directly inspired of God, I
cannot tell; and perhaps they could not tell how God taught them.
But they were distinctly conscious that it was God, and no other
than God, that taught them. If it should be objected, as it may
be, that they may have been deceived, that the false prophets
certainly were deceived and therefore all prophets may have been;
I answer, it is true that men may be deceived, as in a dream they
may think themselves awake; nevertheless, when they are awake they
are aware of it. So if a false prophet may have been deceived, it
does not follow that the true prophets were not sure that they
were not deceived. If God can directly inspire a man, he can
certainly make him aware that he is not deceived; else how could
an honest man ever affirm himself to be inspired by God? But if
God can directly and personally teach the human mind, and we can
be personally aware of it; then we can be conscious of the
existence of God in the fact that he personally enlightens and
instructs us.
3. But again, man is capable of communion,
and sympathy, and moral union with God. If anyone denies this, the
burden of proof is upon him. Our necessary conception of God is
that he is a mind as we are; that he has intellect, sensibility,
and will, as we have. We necessarily conceive ourselves as being
in his image. Now this necessary conception which we have of God
must be substantially the same conception. To deny it were to call
in question our fundamental and irresistible convictions; or in
other words, to deny a first truth of reason.
If, then, man is in the image of God, he
must be capable of knowing him, of sympathizing with him, and of
moral union with him, agreeing with him in design or motive,
living for the same end for which he lives. And it is plain that
this sympathy may be a sympathy with his views, and therefore
intellectual; with his choice, and therefore moral; and with his
feelings, and therefore belonging to the sensibility. Thus our
whole mind is capable of this communion, and union, and sympathy
with God.
4. Again, if we have this communion, and
sympathy, and union, we must be conscious of it.
5. Again, millions of the wisest and best
of human beings have had this consciousness for years, have avowed
this consciousness, have lived in accordance with the existence of
such a consciousness. Now, the existence of this consciousness is
to the individual a certain knowledge of the existence of God; he
is conscious of the existence of God in his personal knowledge of
him, communion and sympathy with him. By this I do not mean that
he is conscious of his infinity; but he is conscious that he has
union with the divine mind, with one whom he certainly regards as
infinite and perfect. To the individual, the existence of God is a
fact in consciousness.
6. Again, the testimony of those who have
this consciousness is valid. They are competent witnesses; they
are credible witnesses. Myriads of them in every way, in life and
death, give evidence of entire sincerity, and also of being
intelligent in their affirmations. Now this testimony is good in
its kind; for if one cannot testify to that of which he is
conscious, of what can he testify? For this is a certain form of
knowledge. The testimony, then, of witnesses who give the highest
evidence of sincerity and of virtue in their life and death that
can be given, is valid testimony.
To this, it may be, and HAS BEEN OBJECTED,
FIRST, that multitudes have evidently been deceived. To this I
answer: Evidently been deceived? How has this deception been
evident? Has it appeared in their lives or temper? Or, have they
testified to contradictions and abnormalities? The objection
assumes that there was evidence that they were deceived. Now I
admit that many have been deceived, and have given evidence that
they were deceived, but this does not begin to prove that all have
been deceived. Of many it cannot be said that they have evidently
been deceived; for there is no evidence that they were deceived,
but the highest evidence that they were not deceived. The fact
that many have been deceived does not prove by any means that
others may not know that they are not deceived; any more than that
a man's supposing himself to be awake when he is asleep proves
that he cannot know when he is awake.
OBJECTION SECOND: This argument from
consciousness may be, and is, plead[sic.] by the
Spiritists. They affirm that they are conscious of direct
communion with spirits. To this I answer (1) That the cases are
not parallel. Those who are conscious of communion with God are
aware of this communion in its directly transforming influence in
giving to them a new inward experience, or a new inward spiritual
life, filling them with love, and joy, and peace, and adoring
views of his attributes and character; of the purifying and
elevating influence of this communion. In short, they are not
merely aware of its being communion with a spirit, but with a
Divine Spirit; and that this communion is to them a new life,
spiritual, heavenly; and that it influences the will, the
intellect, and the sensibility, and is transforming in its
influence, covering the whole of our inward experience and
developing itself in a holy life. Now nothing like this is so much
as affirmed by the Spiritists. Most of their affirmations are
manifestly inferences which they draw from material facts. They
hear a rapping, and infer that it is a spirit. But this is no
consciousness; they are only conscious of hearing raps. Again,
they profess to hear words; to be taught to write involuntarily,
or without knowing what they write; to be taught to speak in an
unknown tongue, without knowing what they speak; and sometimes to
speak impromptu, not from themselves, but from spirits with
them.
Now who does not see that all this is
inference? Suppose all the facts which they allege really exist;
the testimony is not in point. How do they know that it is a
spirit that moves their hand? And that it is such or such a
spirit? How do they know that it is a spirit that produces these
effects? Are they directly conscious of this spirit within
themselves in such a sense as Christians are conscious of
communion with God? I am not aware that Spiritists make any such
pretensions. But if they do, do they give as high evidence of
sincerity, intelligence, and honesty, as spiritual and heavenly
minded Christians do? Now I must say that I do not believe that
any such testimony in favor of Spiritism exists, or ever did
exist.
But (2), If this kind of testimony does in
fact exist, which is really the testimony of consciousness, of
course it is to be received. The testimony of consciousness is
conclusive, and not to be disposed of by such an objection as
this. If Spiritists can actually give us the testimony of
consciousness that they have had communion with spirits, and know
them -- if they are directly conscious of this, it must be true.
No one surely can affirm that no such communion is possible; but
do they have such communion? Do they give so high evidence to
others that they have this communion, that their testimony ought
to be received by them? I do not believe that any such testimony
exists among them.
Again, while I admit that the testimony of
consciousness with regard to communion with finite spirits might
be valid, yet I do not admit that it could be valid in the same
sense in which the testimony of conscious communion with God can
be valid. If God communes with us and we with him, he must be
interested to make us fully aware of it. He is able to make us
fully aware of it, and to render it impossible that we should be
deceived; and such in fact has been the consciousness of the
inspired writers and of spiritual Christians in all ages. They
really no more doubt their communion with God than they doubt
their own existence. If you ask them how they know it, they cannot
tell how, anymore than they can tell how they can see an object
when their eyes are open upon it; nor any more than they can tell
how they are conscious of their own existence. But they can tell
you that this communion is to them an indubitable reality; that
while it exists it cannot be doubted; and that it is only when it
has passed away and cannot be renewed in consciousness, that it is
possible to doubt it.
7. Again, in the course of theological
inquiries it will be seen that the testimony of consciousness is
conclusive upon many theological questions. I have been astonished
that so little importance seemed to be attached by Christians, and
Christian writers, to this form of testimony. I know that it has
been objected that it will not be received by skeptics. But why
should it not? Skeptics can resist the evidence of miracles, can
deny the evidence of their sense, can call in question first
truths of reason; but after all they possess minds, and with all
their denials it is impossible for them to get rid of the deep
conviction that such a testimony ought to be received. I ask, why
should not skeptics receive the oral and written testimony of
millions of spiritual minds that affirm that they know God by a
direct personal knowledge and intercourse with him; that they are
aware of communion with him, of being taught by him, of being led,
sustained, and saved from sin by him? They have testified that
their communion with him has resulted in a radical change of the
great end of their being; that it has resulted in the permanent
reformation of their lives; that they have for years kept up
habitually and more or less constantly this communion with him,
the result of which has been evident to all that knew them. Thus
they have lived on the comforts of this intercourse with God; thus
they have been sustained in holy living and triumphing over the
trials of life; and thus they have died, testifying in life and
death that God is, that they know him, have communion with him,
and walk with him.
Now why should not this testimony be
received on this subject? They surely are competent witnesses in
the sense that they know what they say and whereof they affirm.
They are also credible witnesses; for they give every evidence in
life and in death of entire honesty. Again, they are innumerable,
and are uniform in their testimony and agree together. No fact
then was ever established by so good and so much testimony from
human beings as this. Why, then, should infidels not receive it?
To say that individuals have been deceived is nothing to the
purpose; for in cases where individuals have been deceived, it is
admitted that they have given evidence of being deceived. If this
were not so, then there is no ground for saying that any ever were
deceived. But what shall we say of those who have given no
evidence of having been deceived? The fact that others have been
deceived on a question of consciousness, in other words, have
misinterpreted the facts of consciousness, or have never had in
fact any such consciousness, is no ground for the contention that
all have been deceived.
In consciousness I know God through my
sensibility, and not through my intelligence merely. With my eyes
shut I can recognize the presence of heat. I never saw heat. But I
know it in feeling. God sheds his love, that is, himself, abroad
in my sensibility. I know that this is God's love, and yet that it
is in my heart. I feel it and cannot but know it is God. I cannot
tell how I know it; the fact I know. To deny this is to shut us up
to speculation, and shut us out from all really transforming
knowledge of God. The intuitive function, sense, gets all its
intuitions through the sensibility. Sense is spiritual, although
the organs of sense are material. In consciousness I seem to have
a sense that is related to God. Material objects are revealed to
me in and through sensation. I do not infer the existence of the
material from sensation, but through sensation I directly behold
the material. So in the warmth and light and love and peace and
joy of our inward experience I directly and irresistibly recognize
God. I feel after God and find him, and I know that I feel and
find God. If we can know our organism, or the not me in
consciousness, surely we may know God in consciousness. I am
conscious of feeling God in my soul. I know it is God and no other
than God. The how I do not know. This, like all other knowledge,
is a mystery as to the how. (This paragraph added later, in
different hand writing, perhaps when he was old -- Gordon
Olson).
VII. METHOD OF THE NATURAL
REASON.
We have seen that the moral function of the
reason, conscience, directly assumes the existence of God as Moral
Governor. But does the natural reason, or the function of the
reason applied to natural objects and truths, as distinguished
from moral objects and truths, necessarily assume and affirm the
existence of God? I answer, Yes. Our own existence is a fact, an
ultimate fact of consciousness. The existence of the human race is
itself a fact of consciousness. This fact of our own conscious
existence is the platform on which we stand. This fact it assumes;
and it is impossible for us to forget it or not to assume it. Now
the human reason, assuming as it does its own existence, directly
affirms the existence of God as its logical antecedent, or more
strictly as the condition of its existence. God's existence it
knows to be implied in the fact of its own existence.
The human reason, therefore, necessarily
assumes the existence of God as being implied in its own
existence. The fact of its own existence and the existence of God
are both intuitively and necessarily affirmed, self-existence in
reason implying the existence of God. Therefore, knowing as we do,
by an absolute knowledge, that we ourselves exist, it is really a
necessary and universal assumption of reason that God exists; and
in this sense the existence of God is a first truth of reason, a
truth of universal and necessary assumption.
VIII. SUMMARY REMARKS.
Where, then, do we find ourselves at the
present stage of our inquiries on the question of the divine
existence?
1. His existence has been demonstrated by
the argument a posteriori, reasoning from effect to
cause.
2. The reality of his existence has been
shown to be an a priori knowledge of conscience.
3. The reality of his existence has also
been shown to be a necessary assumption of the reason, implied in
its existence. That man being conscious of his own existence, and
reason necessarily assuming its own existence, affirms the
existence of God directly as the logical condition of its own
existence.
4. It has been shown that the fact of his
existence is, in multitudes of cases, a truth or a fact of direct
and personal consciousness.
5. It has been shown that as certain as any
fact or event ever existed, whatever that fact or event might be,
God exists. If there ever was any event, God exists. If there ever
was a phenomenon, God exists. If there ever was an act, or a
thought, or a doubt in existence, God exists. If this is not proof
sufficient and conclusive, then it is impossible to prove
anything. It has been said, and strangely enough, that the
existence of God could not be proved. But we have seen the
contrary. Indeed, it is easy to prove the existence of God in so
many ways and by such an accumulation of evidence, that to deny
his existence is simply ridiculous.
6. The testimony from consciousness or
experience is, after all, that which will most affect and best
satisfy a certain class of skeptics, matter of fact minds. There
are certain important though unrecognized distinctions
between:
(1) How we know and how to prove to others
certain truths, for example, the existence of God. We know by
intuition, conscious experience. We prove by demonstration, and by
our own testimony. We know a priori, we prove a
posteriori.
(2) We know the truths given by reason,
consciousness, and sense, by intuition. We prove the truths of
reason by a perspicuous statement, of consciousness and sense,
either by our own testimony or by appeals to the consciousness and
sense of those to be convinced.
(3) We know many things that we cannot
prove, that is, our personal identity, our moral liberty or
freedom.
(4) He who insists upon proving everything,
can prove nothing.
(5) Truths that we know by intuition, either of
reason, consciousness, or sense, we cannot prove to ourselves, because there
is no truth more certainly known from which to reason.