Before entering upon the question of
the divine existence, I must remark: First, upon the importance of
a correct and thorough knowledge of the laws of evidence;
secondly, I must show what is evidence, and what is proof, and the
difference between them; thirdly, I must inquire into the sources
of evidence in a course of theological study; fourthly, must
notice the kinds and degrees of evidence to be expected; fifthly,
show when objections are not and when they are fatal; sixthly, how
objections are to be disposed of; seventhly, on whom lies the
burden of proof; and lastly; where proof or argument must
begin.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF A CORRECT AND THOROUGH
KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE.
1. Without a correct knowledge of this
subject our speculations will be at random.
2. The ridiculous credulity of some, and
the no less ridiculous incredulity of others, are owing to the
ignorance or disregard of the fundamental laws of evidence.
Examples: Mormonism is ridiculous credulity, founded in utter
ignorance, or a disregard of the first principles of evidence in
relation to the kind and degree of testimony demanded to establish
anything that claims to be a revelation from God. On the other
hand, every form of religious skepticism is ridiculous
incredulity, founded in ignorance or the disregard of the
fundamental laws of evidence, as carefully shown.
II. WHAT IS EVIDENCE AND WHAT IS PROOF, AND
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM.
1. Evidence is that which elucidates and
enables the mind to apprehend truth.
2. Proof is that degree of evidence that
warrants or demands belief, that does or ought to produce
conviction.
3. Every degree of evidence is not proof.
Every degree of light upon a subject is evidence; but that only is
proof which under the circumstances can give reasonable
satisfaction, while it supplies the condition of rational
conviction.
III. SOURCE OF EVIDENCE IN A COURSE OF
THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY.
This must depend upon the nature of the
thing to be proved.
1. Consciousness may be appealed to upon
questions that are within its reach, but not on other
questions.
2. Sense may be appealed to on questions
within the reach of sense, but not on others.
3. The existence of God may be proved, not
by an appeal to the Bible as his Word, for this would be to assume
his existence and his veracity, which were absurd. The existence
of God must therefore be proved either a priori, by our
irresistible convictions antecedently to all reasoning; or a
posteriori, as an inference from his works; or in both
ways.
4. The divine authority of the Bible, or of
any book or thing that claims to be a revelation from God, demands
some kind of evidence that none but God can give. Miracles are one
of the most natural and impressive kinds; prophecy is another; the
nature of the proffered revelation, its adaptedness to our nature
and wants is another. These are only noticed here as kinds of
evidence essential to the proof of such a question.
5. Appeals may be made to any historical
fact, or thing external; or to anything internal, that is, in the
Bible itself that might be reasonably expected if the revelation
in question were really from God.
6. In theological inquiries, as the
universe is a revelation of God, we may legitimately wander into
every department of nature, science, and grace for testimony upon
theological subjects.
7. The different questions must however
draw their evidence from different departments of revelation: Some
from the irresistible convictions of our own minds; some from his
works without us; some from his providence; others from his Word;
and still others from all these together.
IV. KINDS AND DEGREES OF EVIDENCE TO BE
EXPECTED.
1. In relations to kinds of evidence, I
observe, no impossible or unreasonable kind is to be expected. For
example, the evidence of sense is not to be demanded or expected,
when the thing to be proved is not an object, or within the reach
of sense. The existence of God, for example, is not given by
sense, for the sense gives only the material and not the
spiritual. It is absurd, therefore, for skeptics to demand the
evidence of sense that God exists.
2. It is a sound rule, that the best
evidence, in kind, shall be adduced that the nature of the case
admits. For instance, oral testimony is not admissible where
written testimony may be had to the same point. Of course, oral
traditions are not to be received, where there is written history
to the same point; but oral testimony is admissible in the absence
of written, as then it is the best that the nature of the case
admits.
3. So oral traditions may be received to
establish points of antiquity in the absence of contemporary
history.
4. Any book claiming to be a revelation
from God, should in some way, bear his own seal, as a kind of
evidence possible and demanded by the nature of the subject. The
claim should be supported by evidence external and internal that
make out a proof, or fulfills the conditions of rational
conviction.
5. As to degree, evidence to be proof need
not always amount to a demonstration, as this would be
inconsistent with the nature of the case, and with a state of
probation under a moral government.
6. We are not in general to expect such a
degree of evidence as to preclude the possibility of cavil or
evasion, and for the same reasons. On some questions we may
reasonably expect to find evidence of an irresistible character;
but in general it is important for us to remember that on all the
important subjects of life we frequently find ourselves under the
necessity of being governed simply by a preponderance of evidence
-- that we are in fact shut up to this often in questions of life
and death. Now what we find to be true as a matter of fact in our
daily experience, we should remember may reasonably be expected on
questions of theology. We shall find evidence on all practical and
important subjects that ought to produce conviction, that will
satisfy an upright mind; but yet on many subjects not enough to
preclude all cavil or evasion. On subjects of fundamental
importance, we may expect to find evidence both in kind and degree
that shall put those questions beyond all reasonable doubt.
7. In regard to the divine existence, it is
reasonable to expect such evidence in both kind and degree as
shall gain the general assent of mankind to the fact that God
exists. Such evidence certainly does exist, and this conviction
has been the conviction of the race.
8. We may expect that the evidence will be
more or less latent, patent, direct, inferential, incidental,
full, and unanswerable, according to its relative importance in
the system of divine truth.
V. WHEN OBJECTIONS ARE NOT, AND WHEN THEY
ARE FATAL.
1. They are not fatal when they are not
well-established by proof.
2. When the truth of the objection may
consist with the truth of the proposition, that it is intended to
overthrow.
3. When the truth of the affirmative
proposition is conclusively established by testimony, although we
may be unable to discover the consistency of the proposition with
the objection. Therefore,
4. An objection is not always fatal because
it is unanswerable. We may not be able to answer an objection, and
yet we may have positive proof that that is true against which the
objection is raised. In this case the objection is not
fatal.
5. An objection is fatal, when it is an
unquestionable reality, and plainly incompatible with the truth of
the proposition against which it lies.
6. It is fatal when the higher probability
is in its favor. That is, it is fatal in the sense that it changes
the burden of proof. When the higher probability is in favor of
the objection, the burden of proof then falls upon the one who
would sustain the proposition against which the objection lies. If
he establishes the higher probability the onus is again changed,
and the judgment ought always to decide in favor of the higher
probability.
7. An objection is fatal when it is
established by a higher kind or degree of evidence than the
proposition to which it is opposed. For example, consciousness,
sense, and reason present the highest kinds and degree of
testimony. An objection fairly founded in and supported by an
intuition of sense, consciousness, or reason, will set aside other
testimony, because, as we have seen, knowledge thus obtained is
intuitive, and more certain in its nature than that received from
testimony of any other kind.
8. An objection is always fatal when it
proves that the proposition against which it lies involves a
palpable absurdity or contradiction.
VI. HOW OBJECTIONS ARE TO BE DISPOSED
OF.
1. This depends upon their nature. If mere
cavils without reason or proof, they are not properly objections,
and may remain unnoticed.
2. So if they appear reasonable if they
were proved, and yet are without sufficient proof, we are not
gratuitously to take the burden of proof.
3. We are not bound to explain how the
objection is consistent with the proposition against which it is
alleged, but simply that if a fact, it may be consistent with
it.
4. No objection is competent to set aside
first truths, such as that a whole is equal to all its parts, that
time and space exist, that every effect must have a cause, that a
moral agent must be a free, self-active agent, etc. These are
truths of irresistible and universal knowledge, and no testimony
whatever is to be received as invalidating them.
5. No objection can set aside the direct
testimony of consciousness, nor of sense or reason, where this
testimony is unequivocally given.
6. Nor can any testimony set aside the
unambiguous testimony of God. It is a first truth of reason that
God is veracious; nobody can believe that he will lie. We
necessarily assume his moral perfection; hence the testimony of
God when rightly interpreted is conclusive upon any subject, and
no human being can doubt this.
There is always a fallacy in whatever is
inconsistent with first or self-evident truths, the affirmation of
the pure reason, the intuitions of sense or consciousness, or with
the testimony of God. Certain truths we are under necessity of
receiving as valid by the laws of our own intelligence. Whatever
objection is made to these must involve a fallacy, and cannot be
received as valid.
VII. WHERE LIES THE BURDEN OF
PROOF?
1. Always on him who takes the affirmative,
unless the thing affirmed is sufficiently manifest without
proof.
2. The burden of proof lies with the
affirmative until the evidence fairly amounts to proof in the
sense of demanding belief in the absence of opposing
testimony.
3. When the affirmative evidence amounts to
proof in this sense, the onus is upon him who takes the negative.
His business in not to prove a negative, but to counteract the
proof upon the positive side of the question, to render it null,
or to present so much opposing proof as will annihilate the ground
of rational conviction.
4. Every kind and degree of evidence that
may as well consist with the negative as with the affirmative to
be proved, leaves the onus unchanged.
5. When the evidence, or argument, or an
objection proves too much, as well as when it proves too little,
it leaves the onus unchanged.
6. If an objection needs proof, the onus
lies upon the objector.
VIII. WHERE PROOF OR ARGUMENT MUST
BEGIN.
1. Proof or argument must commence where
uncertainty commences; or rather where the conditions of rational
belief are wanting.
2. All argument and proof take for granted such truths
as need no proof, but are either axioms, self-evident truths, or such as are
either admitted, or are sufficiently apparent.