Study implies a student; knowledge
implies a knowing faculty. The study of theology implies the
existence of students capable of the knowledge of God.
I. DO WE KNOW ANYTHING?
Answer, yes; we know ourselves. Should
anyone say, I doubt this; I enquire, Do you know that you doubt
it? Should he reply, I doubt that I doubt it; I enquire again, Do
you know that you doubt that you doubt it? Should he reply, No, I
do not know anything; I enquire again, Do you know that you do not
know anything? Should he say, No, I only guess that I do not know
anything; I enquire again, Do you know that you thus guess? Should
he reply, It only seems as if I thus guess; I enquire, Do you know
that so it seems? Should he reply, No, this seeming is nothing; I
enquire again, Do you know that this seeming is nothing? Should he
reply, No, but only so it seems; I reply, Then you are sure that
so it seems; and if you are sure of this, or if you are sure that
you are not sure of this, it amounts to the same thing. We know
something -- we know ourselves; it is impossible to doubt
this.
II. HOW DO WE KNOW OURSELVES?
I answer, in consciousness. That is, we are
directly aware of ourselves in what we call consciousness. But
what is consciousness? The word has been used ambiguously. Some
times as the general faculty of knowledge; in this sense Sir
William Hamilton often used it. Sometimes it is used as a function
of the general faculty of knowledge, that function by which we
know ourselves. Sometimes it is spoken of as self-knowledge. It is
common to use the term as signifying either that particular
function of the intellect by the use of which we know ourselves,
or the knowledge of ourselves given by this function. More
generally the term is used in this last sense, to signify
self-knowledge; but often the faculty by which we obtain this
knowledge is called by the same name by which we designate the
knowledge itself. The connection in which the term is used will in
general show the sense in which it is used. If we speak of the
intuitions of consciousness, of course we speak of it as a
function or faulty of self-knowledge; if we speak of
self-knowledge as a consciousness, then it is plain that by
consciousness we mean the knowledge of self.
I say then, IN CONSCIOUSNESS WE KNOW
OURSELVES. Of this knowledge I remark:
1. That it is intuitive knowledge; that is,
a knowledge obtained by a direct beholding of ourselves in the
exercise of our various faculties.
2. I remark of this knowledge, or of
consciousness, that it is a certain knowledge, knowledge of the
highest possible kind, a knowledge that cannot be doubted. To call
its validity in question is to question the validity of all
knowledge, which we have seen, is nonsense.
III. WHAT DO WE KNOW OF OURSELVES IN
CONSCIOUSNESS?
1. We know our existence. This is not an
inference; "Cogito ergo sum," is a mere sophism. If I am not
directly aware of my existence, how do I know that I think; and
from the consciousness of mere thought, what right have I to infer
that I think, or that I exist at all. There is no premise from
which this can be inferred. The mere consciousness of thought
affords not the least evidence that I am the thinking substance,
or that I exist. And why should I say, I think? The very language
implies that I know that I am, in knowing that I think. The very
conception of thinking includes the assumption that I am. In
consciousness, then, I know my own existence. (Cogito ergo sum, I
think therefore I exist)
2. In consciousness I know that I have
three distinct faculties: The faculty of knowledge; the faculty or
susceptibility of feeling; the faculty or power of willing,
choosing, acting. I know in the exercise of these different
faculties or susceptibilities, that I posses them. I know, for
instance, that I know; and in this knowledge I know that I am and
that I have a faculty of knowledge, because I am conscious of
using it. I know that I feel; and in the exercise of feeling I
know that I possess the susceptibility or faculty of feeling. I
know that I will, choose; and in willing and choosing I know that
I possess and use the power or faculty of willing and choosing.
This knowledge, this feeling, this willing, I know to be my own;
and it is impossible for me to doubt either the exercise or the
existence of the faculties thus exercised.
3. In consciousness I know all of myself
that is knowable by me of myself.
4. In consciousness I know myself as
distinct from that which is not myself; and in the very conception
of myself as self I know that that exists which is not myself. Of
this I am in some way as certain as that I exist myself. Indeed
the conception of self implies the conception of not self. Self
can be defined only as we discriminate between that which is self
and that which is not self. I am, then, in consciousness directly
aware of myself, which implies that I am also aware of that which
is not myself.
Because of his peculiar definition of
consciousness, Sir William Hamilton insists that this awareness of
that which is not myself is strictly a consciousness. It is true
that we are conscious of knowing that there is a not self; but is
not this knowledge an intuition of the faculty of perception and
distinct from consciousness but known in consciousness? It is
sufficient to say that whether this as a knowledge of the not
self, is a direct intuition of consciousness, or is an intuition
of the perception faculty, which intuition is given to us in
consciousness -- certain it is that we have this knowledge, which
we can no more doubt than we can doubt the knowledge of
ourselves.
5. In consciousness we know that the
intellect has various functions; some of which are: Consciousness,
sense, reason, conscience, memory, imagination, etc. Of
consciousness I shall say no more at present, as it has been, for
our present purpose sufficiently defined. Of sense, reason, and
conscience, more things need in this place to be said.
IV. WHAT IS MEANT BY SENSE?
Sense is that function of the intellect by
which we directly intuit the material world, including our own
bodies and all material objects. It has been common to regard
sense as that function of the intellect that intuits sensation.
Sensation is an impression in the sensibility made either by some
material object, or by some thought or action of the
mind.
Sensation is a feeling. I once received the
common idea that sense perception was merely a perception of the
sensation, a feeling in the sensibility; but I do not now so
regard it. Philosophers who have regarded sense as merely giving
sensation have found it impossible to find any valid proof of the
existence of an outward cause of sensation. They have said truly,
that sensation being a feeling of the mind has in it none of the
qualities that we attribute to bodies, and consequently that from
the sensation we cannot infer the qualities of body or the
existence of those outward things which we suppose have created
the sensation.
This difficulty has stumbled many
philosophers, and they have admitted that there was no valid
reason for believing in the existence of the material universe.
But other philosophers (as Sir William Hamilton) maintain that
sense does not give us sensation, but that we are directly aware
of sensation in consciousness -- that we are directly conscious of
the feeling in the sensibility which we call sensation, and do not
know it by a sense of perception. This class of philosophers
maintain that by sense we directly perceive the primary qualities,
at least, of material bodies.
The sensationalists object to this, that it
is impossible to conceive how sense can directly perceive the
qualities of external bodies. But to this it is justly replied, it
is also impossible to conceive how sense could give us
sensation.
We know not how it is that we are directly
aware of ourselves, or how it is that we directly intuit anything
in consciousness, sense, or reason. How an impression upon the
sensibility should be irresistibly known to me, I cannot tell. The
fact I know; the how I do not know. So it is with all our
knowledge. Certain it is that we do not get the existence and
qualities of external objects as an inference from sensation. We
actually know that we do not thus get it -- that we have the
knowledge not as an inference from premises. That we do not get it
logically we know just as we know our existence.
For example, in knowing the material world
around me I know that I do not get at it in this way: Phenomena
imply substance; substance is as its phenomena are. Here are the
phenomena; these phenomena imply substance, and this substance
must be as the phenomena are; therefore such are the material
substances around me. Now who is not aware in consciousness that
this is not the way in which one gets a knowledge of his
surroundings?
Who, for example, ever looked at an object
and reasoned in that way, or could conceive himself as getting a
knowledge of that object by such a process of reasoning? No, we
are directly aware that we perceive it. Certain qualities of it
are revealed to us irresistibly and directly. The object stands
face to face with the perceptive faculty; and its primary
qualities are as surely known to us as our own existence, and
precisely in the same way, only through the use of another
intuitive function of the intellect.
In consciousness I directly know my own
existence; in consciousness I know also that I directly perceive
the existence of other things. The faculty that directly perceives
material objects I call sense. It would be out of place here to
enter into an inquiry with regard to the particular attributes or
qualities of the outward world that are given in sense. This
inquiry is in place in a treatise in psychology, but it is
unessential to our present course of study. For the present it is
enough for us to know that by the function of sense we know with
certainty the existence of the material universe.
Of this function, then, in conclusion, let
me remark, first, that it is an intuitive function of the
intellect, [and] gets all knowledges by a direct
beholding. From the very nature of its perceptions, its testimony
is to be received as valid. Nay, it is impossible to doubt the
validity of its revelations. Let philosophers deny as they will
the existence of the outward world; they know it still, and give
as constant evidence to themselves and everybody else that they
know it as other men do.
It should here be remarked that intuitive
knowledge is always irresistible knowledge, by whatever function
of the intellect the intuition is given. In intuitive knowledge
the object known and the knowing faculty stand face to face. Such
is the nature of the objects of intuitive knowledge, and such the
nature of the faculty of intuition, that standing face to face we
cannot help knowing these objects. They are directly beheld, and
known with irresistible certainty.
It should also here be said, that in
consciousness we are aware of sense perceptions and of all that
passes within us; so that with whatever function of the intellect
knowledge is obtained, in consciousness we have the report of all
these knowledges. The same is true of our feeling, willing,
imagining, remembering, dreaming, and whatever passes within us.